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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
This thesis confines i t s e l f to an exposition of the ideas of 
l i b e r t y of a number of representative Nineteenth Century l i b e r a l 
t h e o r i s t s , a general appraisal of these ideas and a discussion of 
the fundamental aspects of the concept of l i b e r t y i n the l i g h t of some 
recent thinking on the subject. 
The Nineteenth Century i s referred to as the age of l i b e r t y , 
but no agreed ideology of l i b e r t y existed. The concept meant different things tc 
different t h e o r i s t s . E a r l i e r views of l i b e r t y emphasized the 
importance of individualism and a more negative application^of the 
concept; i ^ i l e l a t e r views defended collectivism and a more positive 
interpretation of i t s use. There were also considerable differences 
of opinion about the advantages and disadvantages of the related 
ideas: democracy, equality and l a i s s e z - f a i r e . 
Although the authors tended to beOLieve i n the idea of human 
progress, there was wide disagreement as t o the best means of achieving 
i t . For some, individual l i b e r t y was the way forward, irtiilq for others 
increasing regulation by government was desirable. 
The Vi c t o r i a n idea of l i b e r t y changed with the changing 
circumstances of the times, the l a t e r l i b e r a l s seeing themselves as 
correcting and enlarging the e a r l i e r notion to meet the requirements 
of a new age. 
This stiody suggests that the p o l i t i c a l understanding of l i b e r t y 
i s not something which can remain constant.' I t i s inevitably subject to 
fluctuations i n t e l l i g i b l e only i n the appropriate h i s t o r i c a l context. 
^ 1 -
INTRODUCTION; LIBERALISM 
Ideas always play an important part i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
evolution, and consequently, i t i s not surprising that during periods of 
rapid aiid gradual change the promotion and c r i t i c i s m of ideals 
constitutes a debate more intense and widespread than i n the absence 
of c r i s i s . The Nineteenth Century provided the occasion for numerous 
ideological disputes. One, however, persisted throughout-the. debate 
on l i b e r t y . This idea was a fundamental princ i p l e i n the ideology of 
l i b e r a l i s m - the dominant p o l i t i c a l theory of the age. I t i s this 
p o l i t i c a l theory that we must consider i f we are to understand what 
the Victorians understood by the concept. 
The development of l i b e r a l theory i n the Nineteenth Century i s 
a continuation of e a r l i e r r a d i c a l thought as propounded i n doctrines 
with 30 various an appeal as those of Thomas Paine, Joseph P r i e s t l y , 
.and Adam Smith. I n spite of t h e i r differences, a l l three were firmly 
against a l l forms of unlimited authority which could provide the 
opportunity for a r b i t r a r y government. They spoke for c i v i l and 
r e l i g i o u s freedom, and freedom for private enterprise. Theirs i s 
the protestant tradition; from vrtiich l i beralism derives i t s moral 
conscience and p o l i t i c a l commitment. 
I t has been held by some thinkers that the Victorians firmly 
believed i n the economic doctrine which became known as l a i s s e z - f a i r e . 
Evidence has been furnished which shows t h i s proposition to be f a l s e , 
at l e a s t as far as the major p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l thinkers of the 
period are concemedo I n l i b e r a l thinking the state always had a 
degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the welfare of i t s subjects. Extreme! 
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l a i s s e z - f a i r e theory was not even universal amongst the Eighteenth 
Century Physiocrats. Certainly, i t was the tendency i n th i s era to 
attempt to separate p o l i t i c s from economics; each man, i t was held, 
i s the best judge of h i s own interests, and the function of government 
was to reduce r e s t r i c t i o n s on individual enterprise and l i m i t l e g i s l -
ationv on economic matters to the necessary minimum. But t h i s view, 
based on the b e l i e f that there exists certain natural economic laws 
that govern human actions i n the economic sphere, did not preclude 
government help for those who could not help themselves. The b e l i e f 
that to obstruct or tamper with nature i s harmful, therefore, economic 
forces are to be l e f t alone for they w i l l inexorably lead to prosperity 
and harmony between the different. classes engaged i n trade, was 
alluded to only i n so f a r as i t appeared that i t pointed the way to 
greater prosperity. 
I t i s claimed that Adam Smith expressed l a i s s e z - f a i r e ideas i n 
hi s "Wealth of Nations", irtien he pointed out the advantages of 
d i v i s i o n of labour and free trade, Malthus i s also said to have 
e:q)ounded l a i s s e z - f a i r e ideas i n forebodings about what would happen 
i f attempts were made to ameliorate the l o t of the working classes as 
a whole. This kind of interference he said would lead to greater 
population, which i n tvrn would mean more food being required. To 
obtain t h i s food, poor land would have to be cultivated, prices 
would then r i s e , and so more poverty would be the outcome. Similarly, 
Ricardo argued that any improvement i n wages above what the c a p i t a l i s t 
i s able to give and s t i l l make a p r o f i t , would iipset the law of supply 
and demand to the detriment of the in t e r e s t s of a l l . I t would only 
create unemployment. 
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No one was committed to l a i s s e z - f a i r e as a revealed truth as 
d i s t i n c t from a probably advantageous policy. I t i s true these writers 
advocated a measure of freedom of trade and were suspicious of too 
much interference by government i n economic matters, but even in t h i s 
they were unable to bind those they inspired. At no time did l a i s s e z -
f a i r e become a l i b e r a l orthodoxy. George Watson even goes so f a r as 
to say i n h i s chapter on t h i s i n h i s book, "The English Ideology": 
"No p o l i t i c a l party in Nineteenth Century England can be 
shown to have believed i n i t or to have attempted to 
practice i t . To that extent t h i s chapter i s the history 
of a myth."l 
Even the la t e Eighteen Century writers referred to above are claimed by 
Watson not to have been propagators of l a i s s e z - f a i r e economics. He 
soundly chastises Carlyle for linking Adam Smith with l a i s s e z - f a i r e and 
c a l l i n g i t "Donothengism". Carlyle must "not have read," or "accurately 
remembered" 'The Wealth of Nations', says Watson, and goes on to say -
that Smith was in favour of a large measure of state functioning in the 
areas of defence, protection of the individual from coercion by others 
and i n the establishment and maintenance of public enterprises which 
would present too formidable a task for private individuals. According 
to Watson, the term " l a i s s e z - f a i r e " i s not mentioned in "The Wealth of 
Nations", nor do the other writers, Malthus and Ricardo refer to i t i n 
th e i r publications. More w i l l be said l a t e r about t h i s question of 
l a i s s e z - f a i r e and i t s r e l a t i o n to l i b e r t y ; i t i s s u f f i c i e n t at t h i s stage 
to emphasize that t h i s doctrine should not be seen as quintessential to 
the ideology of lib e r a l i s m . 
1. G. Watson, "The English Ideology". Studies in the Language of 
Victorian P o l i t i c s , pages 68-69. 
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L i b e r a l theory i n the Nineteenth Century, also owes a great 
deal to the Philosophical Radicals, notably Jeremy Bentham, James M i l l , 
and John Stuart M i l l . The p r i n c i p l e of "the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number" formed the basis of Philosophical Radicalism, What 
t h i s school of thought proffered, was a programme of reform i n the legal, 
economic and p o l i t i c a l spheres j u s t i f i e d by reference to th i s basic 
p r i n c i p l e . Both i n private morals and public policy, t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
was said to provide a r a t i o n a l guide. 
I t i s i n Bentham's e a r l i e s t work, 'The Fragment of G-ovemment' 
(1776) that the u t i l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e i s f i r s t presented at length. 
By attacking Blackstone's 'Commentaries', Bentham challenged the Whig 
conception of law and government. Jurisprudence ought to be "censorial", 
not expository, as Blackstone had seen i t . To bring about improvements 
i n the law required a cr i t i q u e . The law must be subject to a standard 
of value, and t h i s i s the function of the u t i l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e . " I t i s 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number that i s the measure of 
right and w r o n g " . I t i s not contract but human need and i t s satisfactions 
which i s the basis of good government. There can be no contractual 
limitations on a government, basing i t s p o l i c i e s squarely on the principle 
of u t i l i t y , "Legal power by i t s very nature cannot be l e g a l l y limited, 
and somewhere i n every p o l i t i c a l society authority must head up i n some 
2 
person or persons whom others are accustomed to obey. This i s the case 
i n any form of government, free or despotic. Here then i s the comer«-
stone of Philosophical Radicalism. Actions of government measured 
1. G-.H. Sabine, "A History of P o l i t i c a l Theory", 3rd Edition page 568. 
2. G.H. Sabine, "A History of P o l i t i c a l Thought, page 568. 
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,by the greatest happiness principle, and reform of the Legislative 
process dependent on the assumption of Legal Sovereignty. 
In "The Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,"^ 
Bentham argued, as Helvetius had done, for a unification of psychology, 
ethics and jurisprudence. The standard of value for censorical j u r i s -
prudence was quite simply that of pain and pleasure which alone motivate 
man and enable the l e g i s l a t o r to control his behaviour: 
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters pain and pleasure. I t i s for them 
alone to point out vrhat we s h a l l do. On the one hand 
the standard or right and v;rong, on the other the ch|in 
of causes and effects; are fastened to thei r throne." 
Bentham assumed that pains and pleasure can be summed, l i k e material 
objects - a sort of "Calculu? of pleasure". So, a l l the s o c i a l 
psychologist has to do i s c l a s s i f y human experience into quantities of 
pleasure and pain, and from th i s calculus, plan for the greatest happiness. 
Perhaps Bentham actually believed that human beings reacted i n this 
mechanical way governed by the forces of pain and pleasure, or perhaps 
he saw the need for t h i s assumption as a necessary f i c t i o n , "a postulation 
without the allowance of which a l l p 0 l i t i c a l reasoning i s at a stand. 
He was i n f a c t much influenced, as were other l i b e r a l thinkers, by 
Newtonian physics, to the extent that he t r i e d to place his ethical 
standard on a s c i e n t i f i c foundation. But despite the crudities of 
Bentham's psychology, and the fact that there i s no lo g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for connecting the u t i l i t a r i a n maxim to the psychology axiom, the 
principle of u t i l i t y held s u f f i c i e n t cogency to inspire the reforming 
zeal of a number of l i b e r a l thinkers. 
1. G. H. Sabine, "A History of P o l i t i c a l Thought", page 568 quoted 
from Chapter I Section 1 of, "The Introduction to the Principles 
and Morals of Legislation", (1789). 
2. G. H. Sabine, "A History of P o l i t i c a l Thought", page 569. 
3. G. H. Sabine, "A History of P o l i t i c a l Thought", page 569. 
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James M i l l f a i t h f u l l y followed Bentham, M i l l was hostile 
towards the small r u l i n g minority, mostly of landowners and certain 
moneyed i n t e r e s t s . To r i d government of such privileged class bias 
he proposed the remedy, (of which he had convinced Bentham) of 
extending representation to the c i t i z e n s , e s p e c i a l l y to those who 
belonged to the i n d u s t r i a l middle c l a s s . Following Bentham, James M i l l 
held that man i s an e n t i r e l y s e l f i s h animal, and that t h i s was a "law 
of human nature" characterised by love of l i b e r t y for himself and l u s t 
f or power over others. I t can then only be along u t i l i t a r i a n l i n e s 
that a government can be established which w i l l gurantee l i f e , l i b e r t y 
and happiness. At the same time, those who form a government being mere 
men, are also subject to the "law of human nature", and w i l l be moti-
vated by the same desire for power, at the expense of the l i b e r t i e s of 
others. The remedy f o r t h i s weakness i s to check the power of government 
by a democratic constitution. The interests of the l e g i s l a t u r e must be 
i d e n t i c a l with those of the coiintry, thus the lawmakers w i l l have the 
general i n t e r e s t at heart when wielding power. This w i l l be assisted 
by l e g i s l a t i v e control of the executive; annual elections to r e s t r a i n 
the power of members of Parliament; and Universal Manhood suffrage for 
those over f o r t y instead of a prqperty qualification, ( f o r a high 
property q u a l i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t s i n an aristocracy, and a low one embitters 
those who are excluded). He believed i n an educated electorate, and 
t h i s b e l i e f i n enlightenment removed any anxieties about the tyranny 
of a majority. He believed that the i n d u s t r i a l middle class were "the -
wisest part of the community"^ and would guide the lower classes. ,A 
very naive f a i t h , i t would now seem. The idiole commitment of these 
1, quoted by G.H. Sabine, "A History of P o l i t i c a l Thought", page 58t. 
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Radicals placed too much dependence on the assumption that the greatest 
good for the greatest number w i l l be the outcome i f each man reasonably 
pursued h i s own individual i n t e r e s t s . I t i s a strange paradox that 
Bentham and James M i l l , while s t a r t i n g from an extremely pessimistic 
view of human nature, placed such great t r u s t i n man's reason as the power 
and guide to human progress, a view which characterized much of l a t e r 
Nineteenth Century l i b e r a l thought. 
Liberalism as propounded by the Philosophical Radicals had great 
p r a c t i c a l influence i n Nineteenth Century p o l i t i c s . Their ideas 
inspired p r a c t i c a l men to prune away a good deal of p o l i t i c a l deadwood, 
improved the e f f i c i e n c y of the j u d i c i a l and l e g i s l a t i v e processes and 
r a d i c a l l y reformed public administration. One of the s a l i e n t features 
of the ameliorating' process was the Reform B i l l of 1832, a measure which 
did what Bentham had proposed, invigorated the action of government. 
Administrative reforms followed; the Poor Law was administered centrally; 
public health measures were brought i n ; and central administration for 
the County police, and the inspection of factories was soon established. 
By way of these reforms and others, the influence of Philosophical 
Radicalism was to make for more controlled and more e f f i c i e n t government. 
I n c r i t i c i s m i t has been said that Philosophical Radicalism was 
too much of an ad hoc collection of ideas, and that i t placed too great 
a dependence on one c l a s s i n society, the i n d u s t r i a l middle c l a s s , 
believing that p o l i t i c a l power given to i t would result i n the well-being 
of the community at large. Much c r i t i c i s m has also been le v e l l e d at i t s 
pre-oocupation with e g o i s t i c individualism, adherence to which tended to 
deny i t any r e a l idealism of the kind the Victorians found so inspiring 
i n the woric of T.H. Green. Nevertheless, when the r a d i c a l s wrote, the 
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function of the state, themeanuig of l i b e r t y and i t s relationship to 
l e g a l coercion needed a rigorous reappraisal. The whole question of 
the relationship of man i n society was i n the spotlight. Society was 
undergoing major changes. Urbanisation, population increase, 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and s o c i a l mobility created new puzzles and problems 
to the extent that Benthamism was i t s e l f soon outdated. I f l i b e r a l 
theory was to be seen as a s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l theory i n touch with 
these changes and not the ideology of a temporary pressure group, then 
modernisation had to be effected. The f i r s t of the r e v i s i o n i s t s was 
J.S. M i l l , who set u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n a new l i g h t , analysed and presented 
a new concept of personal l i b e r t y and embraced both a more e l i t i s t and 
communal outlook. Though J.S. M i l l professed allegiance to the 
u t i l i t a r i a n tradition, he made departures from i t . He accepted the 
Benthamite principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 
and that the individual was motivated by desire for his own greatest 
pleasure. But M i l l emphasized a d i s t i n c t i o n between higher and lower 
pleasures and the need for government to improve the condition and 
consciousness of those who might only experience the l a t t e r kind of 
pleasure, l e f t to t h e i r own devices. 
Despite his problem with u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , J.S. M i l l became the main 
protagonist of the f i r s t restatement of libera l i s m . He ethics repudiated 
the extreme negative aspect of the concept of. l i b e r t y . He looked to a 
greater moral concern for s o c i a l welfare, beyond the "merely observable 
and c l a s s i f i a b l e " , a n d held l i b e r t y , integrity, self-respect and personal 
d i s t i n c t i o n to be i n t r i n s i c goods and not merely instrumental i n contributing 
to happiness. I t i s then, against t h i s background of l i b e r a l thought 
1. G. Watson, "TheEnglish Ideology", page 12, 
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that we proceed to our analysis of the concept of l i b e r t y as 
expressed by the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l philosophers i n our study. 
-11 -
Chapter I 
John Stuart M i l l 
"Liberty i s the English ideology," and i t s achievements 
within Parliamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s dignified by 
tr a d i t i o n a l and ceremonial forms - sometimes called 
'the W^estminster model' - i s s t i l l the f i r s t image 
that springs to mind when most men hear the name of 
England."1 
I t was with the idea of l i b e r t y as a way of l i f e i n mind, that 
John Stuart M i l produced h i s great work, 'On Liberty'. M i l l 
proclaimed l i b e r t y as the end i n i t s e l f and i n doing so he was 
appealing to a self-evident truth; at l e a s t t h i s i s what he seemed 
to be invoking in h i s claim that a l l mankind can never have the right 
to s i l e n c e one dissenter. The d i s t i n c t i v e e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of h i s 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m was i t s moral idealism. The e a r l i e r u t i l i t a r i a n s had 
not pursued l i b e r a l government because they desired l i b e r t y , but 
because they believed i t wouid r e s u l t i n e f f i c i e n t government, more 
e f f i c i e n t they thought than benevolent despotism. But for J«S. Mm, 
the l i b e r t y which he eulogized so warmly was a good i n i t s own right. 
This ideology of l i b e r t y , grounded i n morality i s what gave 'On Liberty' 
an ajdour which did not grace h i s other work. 
In the Introductory Chapter of 'On Liberty', Mill i s concerned 
2 
to warn us of the "tyranny of the majority," as an e v i l of which 
!• G. Watson, "The English Ideology", page 11. 
2. J.S. M i l l , «0n Liberty', page 9-
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society must be v i g i l a n t . Here we have M i l l reacting against the 
democratic ideas with which the l i b e r a l movement began. He explains 
h i s case by stating what l i b e r t y meant in e a r l i e r times and contrasting 
t h i s with what i t means i n h i s own day. P r i o r to the advent of 
democracy, c o n f l i c t s had existed between government and certain of i t s 
subjects. As the p o l i t i c a l r u l e r s sort to maintain t h e i r own power 
and coerce t h e i r subjects, l i b e r t y to these subject classes was seen 
i n terms of safeguards against tyrannous r u l e r s . I n order to r e s t r a i n 
these r u l e r s from taking advantage of the weaker members of society, i t 
was necessary to have an individual authority powerful enough to hold 
sway over them. But protection would also be needed against t h i s "king 
of the vultures" who "would be no l e s s bent upon preying on the flock 
than any of the minor harpies. "•'" For t h i s reason i t was necessary 
that l i m i t s be set to the sovereign's power over h i s subjects, and at 
t h i s point of lim i t a t i o n , the l i b e r t y of the subject began. This l i b e r t y 
was f i r s t seen i n the form of sacrosanct p o l i t i c a l rights, the breach of 
which by the sovereign would j u s t i f y an uprising against him. 
More recently i t has been thought that i t was not enough merely 
to seek to l i m i t the power of the r u l e r s , but that the l a t t e r should 
also be i d e n t i f i e d with the people, making the interests and w i l l of 
the people one and the same with the i n t e r e s t s of the r u l e r s . This 
would be the ultimate security against tyranny, for no nation would 
want to tyrannize i t s e l f . "Let the r u l e r s be effectually responsible 
to i t , promptly removable by i t , and i t could afford to trust them with 
1. J.S. M i l l , 'On Liberty', page 6. 
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pow'er of which i t could i t s e l f dictate the use to be made" M i l l then 
goes on to point out that these ideas, of the people having power over 
themselves and being self-governing, are wanting, "The 'people' who 
exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom i t 
i s exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of i s not the government of 
each by himself, but of a l l over each. The w i l l of the people, moreover, 
p r a c t i c a l l y means the w i l l of the most numerous or the most active 'part' 
of the people; the majority, or those who succeed i n making themselves 
accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, 'may' desire to oppress 
a part of t h e i r number; and precautions are as much needed against this as. 
2 
against any other abuse of power," The fear of oppression of individuals 
under a democracy i s j u s t as r e a l for M i l l as under a despotism, for i n the 
former i t i s the strongest party which takes the reins of government, and 
against v/hich we must be on our guard. Society can practice a s o c i a l 
tyranny over separate individuals when i t "issues v/rong mandates" and 
"meddles where i t should not" ? And even thoughthese measures might not be 
maintained by such rigorous sanctions as would be so under a non-democratic 
regime, nevertheless, they are to be fought against, for they can be no le s s 
h o s t i l e to individual l i b e r t y , Y^hat M i l l i s actually r a i l i n g against i s what 
he sees as the nevi p o l i t i c a l despotism spawned by p o l i t i c a l democracy. He 
i s a f r a i d of the tendency of a government given power through an elective 
system to be inveigled by the majority that supports i t to ignore or even 
suppress the views of minorities, thereby suffocating i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
I n other words, what i s fashionable for the majority v / i l l 
1. J.S. M i l l , 'On Liberty', page ?, 
2. J.S. M i l l , 'On Liberty', page 8. 
3. J.S. H i l l , 'On Liberty', page 9. 
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become the rule f o r a l l . l^ov, because of the fundamental need to 
preserve i n d i v i d u a l i t y , a l i m i t to collective interference with the 
in d i v i d u a l miust be ascertained. M i l l sees the l i m i t to the encroach-
ment of majority opinion as an i n t r i n s i c good f o r mankind and as an 
antidote to the p o l i t i c a l despotism i n a democracy. 
But the question which now arises i s , where should the l i m i t to 
col l e c t i v e interference be placed? The ideal sort f o r i s the balance 
between the independence of the individual and society's control over 
him. To f i n d i t i s the task which M i l l set himself. He considered the 
state of a f f a i r s regarding individual freedom and i t s place i n the social 
structure to be ambiguous and uncertain. The conduct of individuals i s 
i n some instances governcid- by Law and i n others, not appropriate f o r 
l e g a l sanctions, by public opinion. But human a f f a i r s are gravely i n 
need of such rules to be made more d e f i n i t e . Up to the present, rules 
that have held sway have arisen out of opinion and custom. M i l l thinks 
that opinions should be supported by reasons, and i f not they are merely 
personal preferences. I n some cases these preferences have been held 
by a large section of society, but t h i s does not give them more weight, 
f o r i t i s s t i l l only one opinion multiplied. Very often the view which 
has held the most powerful influence has been that adopted by a superior 
class i n i t s own int e r e s t s . But M i l l ' s basic fear i s of the pressure of 
the majority. I n England he considered the "yoke of opinion""^ to be 
heavier than that of the law, but that the l a t t e r as compared with the 
s i t u a t i o n i n some other countries i s l i g h t e r i n England. This he thinks 
i s because of the customary i n c l i n a t i o n to think of government as being a 
threat to private i n t e r e s t . However, the approaching state of af4i-r s i s 
1. J.S. M i l l , 'On Liberty', page 13. 
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one i n which the majority w i l l i d e n t i f y themselves with governmental 
power, and opinion. When t h i s condition i s realized a threat to 
indiv i d u a l l i b e r t y w i l l come from government and he no less dangerous 
than that from public opinion. 
TiVhat then i s required i s some means of tes t i n g the rightness or 
wrongness of government encroachment on individual l i b e r t y not based 
merely on personal preference. Without such a measure those who would 
advocate government interference i n a particular matter have no more 
moral authority than those who would oppose i t . 
M i l l thought that he had found a basic guiding principle f o r t h i s 
task. I t would govern the relationship between society and the individual 
i n a completely comprehensive way, embracing a l l the means of control and 
compulsion, legal or moral, which might be brought against the individual: 
"That principle i s , that the sole end for which mankind are 
,warranted, i n d i v i d u a l l y or c o l l e c t i v e l y , i n i n t e r f e r i n g 
with the l i b e r t y or action of any of t h e i r number, i s s e l f -
protection. That the only purpose f o r which power can be 
r i g h t f u l l y exercised over any member of a c i v i l i z e d community, 
against his w i l l , i s to prevent harm to others. His own good 
either physical or moral, i s not a s u f f i c i e n t warrant"1 
Nor i s i t j u s t i f i e d to claim that the individual might be compelled to 
act or not act f o r his own good or happiness. He may be reasoned with 
or piirsuaded to change his conduct, but may only be coerced i f his acts 
are h o s t i l e to other persons; i n t h i s sphere of conduct he i s accountable 
to society; but conduct whichconcems no other person but himself i s aa 
absolute r i g h t . Herein l i e s the sovereignty of the individual of which 
M i l l was so jealous to safeguard. So, when he postulated that a l l mankind 
has no r i g h t to silence one dissenter, he was asserting freedom of judge-
ment; the individvial i s not to be coerced but convinced. Presume t h i s as 
1. J.S, M i l l , "On Liberty', page 15-
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a r i g h t , as M i l l did, and you have the essence of a l i b e r a l society; 
f o r t h i s i s a moral q u a l i t y of a mature person . guided by reason. A 
l i b e r a l society was , f o r J.S. M i l l , one which f u l l y recognized t h i s 
r i g h t and structured i t s p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s accordingly. I t was 
not merely that individual judgement was to be tolerated; a society based 
on M i l l ' s conception of l i b e r t y makes t h i s r i g h t a positive thing and a 
defining characteristic of a happy individual i n a c i v i l i z e d community. 
I t was t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i b e r t y which led M i l l to favour popular 
l i b e r a l government. But the l a t t e r was not sought by him because i t 
would produce e f f i c i e n t administration. I n fact i n t h i s direction he had 
certain misgivings, unlike his father, who trusted too readily i n an 
extended suffrage. J.S. Mm was more concerned about the ethical good 
that h i s p o l i t i c a l ideology of l i b e r t y would produce, the elevated moral 
character which he believed p o l i t i c a l freedom would c u l t i v a t e . This type 
of personality, that of the reasonable human being, would grow only i n 
an atmosphere of free discussion of public issues, where p o l i t i c a l 
decisions were shared, where one could take responsibility f o r ones own 
moral convictions. 
The c u l t i v a t i o n of the improved human being i s i n l i n e with much 
of the l i b e r a l thinking of the age. As we shall see i n our discussion of 
the various authors, human progress was at the core of t h e i r philosophy. 
M i l l shows himself to be a f i r m believer i n the inevitable progress of 
mankind when he .ass\imes that man has "come of age" i n that he i s now 
capable of improvement i n an atmosphere of freedom, as contrasted with 
the barbaric state of society i n which l i b e r t y as a principle of government 
would be ineffectual as a means to human amelioration. Man as a progressive 
being was an essential part of M i l l ' s social philosophy, f o r he regarded 
any appeal on ethical questions to the principle of u t i l i t y as essentially 
bound up with the interests of human progress. 
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But i n expounding his basic principle of self-protection. M i l l 
has also revealed his concern for a broader based social philosophy. 
For v/hen he states that acts by individuals damaging to others are not 
to be allovfed by society, said society can j u s t i f i a b l y punish these via 
the lav;; and v/hen he states that the individual i s to be compelled to 
perform certain actions, such as i n defence of the realm, or giving 
evidence I n court, he i s showing his concern f o r the individual as part 
of a wider comniunity w i t h i n v?hich each private c i t i z e n has certain 
obligations. Society affords protection for the individual; i t makes 
possible his r i g h t to l i b e r t y ; but t h i s r i g h t cannot exist i n a vacuum -
i t presupposes the acceptance and performance of certain duties for the 
maintenance and prosperity, even for the very survival of society. Moreover, 
society i s not something which i s a l o g i c a l e n t i t y existing separately 
from the individuals that comprise i t . Society i s each and every i n d i v i -
dual. M i l l would have repudiated Rousseau's concept of the general w i l l as. 
l o g i c a l l y untenable and would have said that only individual w i l l s real 
e n t i t i e s . So the society exists not for any good over and above each 
i n d i v i d u a l , but f o r each individual's good. 
I t i s because of the paramount importance of the s p i r i t u a l welfare 
of each individiaal, that there i s a sphere of individual a c t i v i t y into 
which the society as repi-esented by government may not .trespass. This, 
according to M i l l , i s the area of a person's l i f e and actions whicli effect 
no one but himself: 
" I t comprises, f i r s t , the invfard domain of consciousness, 
demanding l i b e r t y of conscience, i n the most compre-
hensive sense; l i b e r t y of thought and feeling; absolute 
freedom of opinion and sentiment on a l l subjects, 
p r a c t i c a l or specxilative, s c i e n t i f i c , moral, or theological. 
The l i b e r t y of expressing and publishing opinions..." 
"....liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan 
of our l i f e to s u i t our own character; of doing as we 
l i k e , subject to such consequences as may follow; without 
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we 
do does not harm them even though they should think our 
conduct f o o l i s h , pervex-se, or wrong," 
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" . . . l i b e r t y w i t h i n the same l i m i t s of combination among 
.individuals; freedom to unite f o r any purpose not 
involving harm to others; the persons combining being , 
supposed to be of f u l l age, and not forced or deceived." 
The greater freedom from interference with the individual by the state 
i s a measure of hviman progress, and mankind i s the beneficiary. 
But J.S, M i l l was not only anxious about the oppressiveness of 
p o l i t i c a l power. I n the essay 'On Liberty', he appeals also f o r a 
genuine t o l e r a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l i t y by public opinion. Differences 
between individuals are to be valued, disagreement and new ideas to be 
welcomed as essential ingredients f o r a c i v i l i z e d community. M i l l ' s 
fear was not j u s t one of government, but of a majority that would be 
incl i n e d to suppress a minority because i t happened to be di f f e r e n t or 
unconventional. He came to hold t h i s view because by 1859» tie had seen 
what hi s father, James I v i i l l , and the other Radicals had not forseen -
that p o l i t i c a l reforms did not usher i n the Millennium, and that l i b e r t y 
was not to be achieved by a reshaping of p o l i t i c a l organization. M i l l 
saw quite clearly that a l i b e r a l government was not i n i t s e l f enough f o r 
the achievement of l i b e r t y ; what must follow was the establishment of a 
l i b e r a l society. Hence, the emphasis on social philosophy, as much, i f 
not mc^te, than p o l i t i c a l philosophy - and the re a l i z a t i o n that there 
existed a larger social context of which p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s were no 
more than a part. 
J.S. M i l l was certainly not unconceimed however about the power of 
government, as we have already seen. I n his chapter on "Liberty of 
thought and Discussion", he emphatically puts the case f o r open government 
against tyranny or corrupt government. This i s seen as a necessary 
condition f o r a healthy l i b e r a l society. Society needs freedom of thought 
1. J.S. H i l l , 'On Liberty', page 18. 
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and discussion to give i t l i g h t . I n t h i s respect press freedom i s 
essential i n a l i b e r a l society. Neither l e g i s l a t i v e nor executive 
must be allovred to censure which opinions and doctrines the public 
can be cognizant of. I n the suppression of ideas that c o n f l i c t with 
those of the r u l i n g body, mankind may be deprived of novel ideas which 
are b e n e f i c i a l : 
" I f the opinion .is r i g h t , they (mankind) are deprived 
,of the opportunity of exchanging error f o r t r u t h ; i f 
wrong, they lose what i s almost as great a benefit, 
the clearer perception and l i v e l i e r impression of t r u t h , 
produced by i t s c o l l i s i o n with error."! 
But even i f an opinion i s false, i t would s t i l l be an e v i l to s t i f l e i t , 
because t h i s would be an assumption of i n f a l l i b i l i t y . The danger of a 
government arrogating to i t s e l f such absolute certainty i s that i t might 
pursue, not the common good, but i t s own good. 
In M i l l ' s analysis of l i b e r t y we f i n d the notion of impermanence 
i n the a f f a i r s of the world. Everything i s i n a state of change, but 
p o t e n t i a l l y , change f o r the better. One cannot afford to be certain 
about opinions here and now because they may be rejected, as false by 
future generations, j u s t as the present age has rejected doctrines held 
dear i n past times. A l l i s subject to questioning, but everything can 
be made r i g h t . But i t might be said, i n c r i t i c i s m of t h i s view, that 
such a sceptical uncertainty would lead to a paralyses of human action 
by government or indiv i d u a l . This i s not so, says M i l l . What ought to 
be s t r i v e d f o r i s to arrive at a viewpoint only a f t e r using ones a b i l i t y 
to the utmost. And while there i s no such thing as absolute certainty 
of the t r u t h , human action must be based on the best assurance possible. 
Moreover, when we assume the t r u t h of an opinion against an action, say 
1. J.S. M i l l , 'On Liberty', page 24. 
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against subverting the society f o r e v i l self-regarding ends, we do not 
proclaim t h i s opinion, to be true to prevent i t s refu t a t i o n ; we hold that 
i t i s true because we have heard a l l of the arguments against i t and they 
have not been seen to refute i t . This p r i n c i p l e of allowing opinions to 
be contested by a l l possible means, without fear of persecution, i s what 
gives a society i t s r i g h t to act on such assumed t r u t h . I t might be 
argued though, that allowing error to be promulgated w i l l be deleterious, 
euid therefore such error should be suppressed. I n M i l l ' s opinion i t 
would not be beneficial to suppress such error; we may use only ra t i o n a l 
argument, to dissuade the person from holding i t , f o r suppression i s 
gratuitous i n that i t rejects the practice of searching f o r t r u t h . Error 
i t s e l f i s to be respected, f o r i f i t be honest, i t i s to be placed higher 
than mechanically accepted t r u t h . Honest error a r i s i n g from some experience 
v/hich i s incomplete i s i n fact a d i l i g e n t interpretation of experience, 
though i t may be f a u l t y . The imposition of b e l i e f i s anathema to M i l l , 
f o r i t involves no personal e f f o r t of free enquiry. 
The idea of interpretation of experience i s important f o r M i l l , as 
i t was f o r other Liberal writers of the Victorian era. V/hat i t r e a l l y 
stood f o r was discussion. Man i s capable of correcting his mistakes not 
by experience alone, but by a combination of experience and discussion. 
Here i s another essential ingredient of M l l i a n l i b e r t y and one which 
pervaded much of Victorian t h o u ^ t about l i b e r t y , as we shall see as 
our thesis develops. M i l l i s perhaps r e f l e c t i n g i n a d i f f e r e n t context 
the classical concept of reason as a vehicle.fpr. attaining t r u t h : 
"V/rong opinions and practices gradually y i e l d to fact 
-and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any 
effec t on the mind, must be brought before i t . Very 
few facts are able to t e l l t h e i r own story, without 
comments to bring out t h e i r meaning. The whole 
strength and value, then of human judgement, depeni 
on the one property, that i t can be set r i g h t when 
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i t i s wrong, reliance can be placed on i t only 
when the means of s e t t i n g i t r i ^ t are kept 
constantly at hand. I n the case of any person 
whose judgement i s r e a l l y deserving of confidence, 
how has i t become so? Because he has kept his 
mind open to c r i t i c i s m of his opinions and conduct. 
Because i t has been his practice to l i s t e n to a l l 
that could be said against him; to p r o f i t by as much of 
i t as was j u s t , and expand to himself, and upon occasion 
to others, the f a l l a c y of what was fallaccious."^ 
Is t h i s view of M i l l ' s not a p a r t i a l simulation of the Platonic d i a l e c t i c , 
which r e l i e d on a l i n g u i s t i c analysis as a means of problem solving? The 
point made i s , that t h i s kind of c r i t i q u e i s necessary i f we are to know 
something of a subject, to be aware of every viewpoint and shade of 
opinion about i t , and come to our tentative considered b e l i e f v i a honest 
discussion. 
M i l l also condemns the pragmatic appro£ich to t r u t h . The supposed 
c r i t i c i s m of M i l l ' s position here, to which he w i l l not y i e l d , i s that 
i n c e rtain urgent circumstances governments may have to act on very 
uncertain b e l i e f s , and that some of these beliefs are i n fact to be 
adhered to because of t h e i r usefulness to society rather than because 
they are true. This he says, i s simply to transfer the assumption of 
f a l l i b i l i t y from the b e l i e f i n the t r u t h of an opinion to the usefulness 
of that opinion. And i s not the usefulness of an opinion a debatable 
matter j u s t the same, and should i t not also come under the scrutinizing 
process of honest and rigorous enquiry? But more strongly, a c r i t i c might 
say, regarding r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , that some converts f e e l so staunchly 
that t h e i r b e l i e f i n a god or a future l i f e i s true to the point of 
assuming i n f a l l i b i l i t y , and that i t i s dangerous to challenge such deep 
convictions, Right or wrong they are useful to society. 
1. J.S. M i l l , 'On Liberty', pages 27-28. 
- 22 -
I n M i l l ' s answer to the question, he emphasizes again his concern 
fo r the individuals' freedom of thought and expression. Assuming 
i n f a l l i b i l i t y i s not to be taken as meaning a feeling of certainty f o r 
a p a r t i c u l a r doctrine, but the imposition of that doctrine on others 
while preventing them from hearing the other sides of the question. 
History i s crov/ded with examples of the upholders of the laws of church or 
state persecuting b e l i e f s , which l a t e r became the orthordoxy, and then the 
upholders of the l a t t e r persecuting dissenters from the new doctrine. M i l l 
does not believe i n the naivete that t r u t h always triumphs despite i t s 
persecution; he holds that suppression of t r u t h may be a bulvrark against i t s 
progress, and thus to human progress. I n th i s respect he i s concerned that 
r e l i g i o u s revivals often bring with them a revival of bigotry and intolerance, 
attitudes which are prevelant among the English middle classes, who are 
easily provoked into' a c t i v i t i e s of persecution towards those who dissent 
fVom t h e i r cherished b e l i e f s . The effect of public opinion i n t h i s respect 
i s no less effective than the law, i n that i t may have such a mischevious 
e f f e c t on a person as to deprive him of his livehood. Such social 
intolerance i s h o s t i l e to l i b e r t y of thought and discussion and inconsistant 
with the t r u l y l i b e r a l society v/hich M i l l desired. And again, the theme 
of progress i s heard i n t h i s c r i t i c i s m of M i l l ' s , f o r i f individuals 
must disguise t h e i r opinions f o r fear of persecution or being considered 
immoral or i r r e l i g i o u s , then many who have good i n t e l l e c t s but not bold 
temperaments might be prevented from benefiting mankind. Thus a Liberal 
Society requires i n t e l l e c t u a l freedom; individual and social progress can 
only be nourished i n such an atmosphere, an atmosphere i n which large 
subjects are debated f r e e l y without the fear of being s t i f l e d by the 
disapproval of powerful p o l i t i c a l or. social forces. But even when an 
opinion i s t r u e , i t s t i l l benefits by i t s free descussion. Examination 
of the reasons fo r holding i t , breaths l i f e i n t o what might become a dead 
dogma. And i t i s also important to give genuine consideration and study 
- 23 -
of the case which i s opposed to ones own. Without t h i s knowledge ones 
own opinion loses i t s rationale and i s l i t t l e more than a prejudice. 
M i l l believed that social well-being must be reconciled to individvial 
well-being. He was interested i n the s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n of the whole 
personality. To be a f u l l y developed, self-realized human being the 
expression of emotion, of thought and action are necessary. This does 
not mean individual anarchy - f a r from i t - the power of control over the 
properties of thought, duty and harmony i n the personality, must also be 
cul t i v a t e d . But essentially i t i s self-control to which the individual 
should aspire. There are no doubts that compulsion for the pvirpose of 
external order i s necessary, but the mature human being i s i n t e r n a l l y 
controlled. I n d i v i d u a l i t y i s thus vigorously stressed as a sine qua non 
of personal vrell-being; and the reasons given f o r the safe-guarding of 
freedom of thought and discussion also "require that men should be free 
to act upon t h e i r opinions, to carry these out i n t h e i r l i v e s , without 
hindrance, either physical or moral, from t h e i r fellow-men, so long as 
i t i s at t h e i r own r i s k and p e r i l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , while M i l l holds 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a healthy society, he lays great stress 
on men acting on opinions, "at t h e i r own r i s k and p e r i l . " Actions 
however, cannot be given the same free scope as opinions. And even 
opinions, when t h e i r expression might lead, to acts harmful to others or 
to society as a whole, become prohibited. The example M i l l gives here 
i s that of public oratoj^y intended to i n c i t e people to unlawful acts. 
I n cases such as t h i s , interference with, and l i m i t a t i o n of, individual 
l i b e r t y by governments, i s f u l l y j u s t i f i e d . But so long as a person's acts 
are not a nuisance to other people, so long as they concern himself alone, 
1. J.S. M i l l , 'On Liberty', page 69. 
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then they must':be as free as opinions, to be carried out without fear of 
harrassment. Thus, d i f f e r e n t human characters, and d i f f e r e n t ways of 
l i v i n g , odd though they may seem to conventional society, ought to be 
tolerated and even encouraged, provided they do not resul t i n harm to 
others. 
With t h i s proviso; namely, that actions are done at one's "own 
r i s k and p e r i l " , and without "molesting others", IiJil l argues that 
individual freedom i s fmidamental, not only to the free development of 
a person, but also as an integral part of c i v i l i s a t i o n . With the l i b e r t y 
of the individual accepted as an i n t r i n s i c good, i t s l i m i t a t i o n i n the 
interests of the wider society could be decided with f a c i l i t y and 
confidence. But the problem was that the degree of individual spontaniety 
to iirhich M i l l aspires f o r a t r u l y l i b e r a l society was i n s u f f i c i e n t l y 
recognized i n his day. I t ought to be regarded as an i n t r i n s i c good, 
but the f a c t as that i t was scorned by society and even by some reformers. 
Once again, i n speaking of l i b e r t y as good i n i t s e l f , M i l l i s i n the 
realms of the metaphysical; he i s appealing to a self-evident t r u t h of the 
value of individual freedom which he seems to suggest i s inescapable i f 
one follows the dictates of reason. I n support of his case he quotes 
Baron Wilhelm Von Humbolt , an eminent german p o l i t i c i a n and philosopher. 
I n a t r e a t i s e on, "The Sphere and Duties of Government", t h i s German 
savant declares: 
"the end of man i s that which i s prescribed by eternal 
-or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by 
vague and transient desires, ( i t ) i s the highest and 
most harmonious development of his powers to a complete 
and consistent whole." 
that therefore the object, 
"towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct 
h i s e f f o r t s , and on which especially those who design 
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to influence t h e i r fellow-men must ever keep t h e i r 
eyes, i s the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of power and development," 
that f o r t h i s there are two requisites, "freedom and variety of 
situations;" and that from the union of these arise "individual vigour 
and manifold d i v e r s i t y , which combine themselves i n originality.""^ This 
s t o i c a l adherence to the "immutable dictates of reason", which urges 
mankind to value i n d i v i d u a l i t y so highly i s , with certain qualifications 
about the l i m i t a t i o n s of individual l i b e r t y , the quintessence of M i l l ' s 
ideology. The mature man must be encouraged to think f o r himself and 
not be bound by custom, to which a too close attachment w i l l stunt the 
growth of his d i s t i n c t i v e q u a l i t i e s as a human being. For use effects 
functioning, and effects improvements i n the important human fa c u l t i e s 
of, "perception, judgement, discriminative feelings, mental a c t i v i t y , 
and moral preference." To be a worthwhile individual, i t i s necessary 
to use ones mental f a c u l t i e s i n making choices f o r oneself, i n planning 
one's own l i f e , otherwise i f a man follows only the dictates of custom, 
then he leads a l i f e which i s unexamined, brutish, and neglectful i n i t s 
use of the variety of human aptitudes. Man must aim at self-development 
and improvement, at self-mastery over his impulses, thereby creating his 
own character. 
What we have encountered here i s a s p i r i t e d defence of individualism 
as a means of countering the tyranny of the majority and of custom. I f a 
society i s to thrive and expand i n desirable directions then, that 
behaviour which i s regarded as uncustomary by the conforming majority 
must be allowed the greatest possible purview, so that those ideas 
1. quoted J.S. M i l l , 'On Liberty', page 71. 
2. J.S, M i l l , 'On Liberty', page 72. 
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advantageous to mankind might be made available to the community at 
large. To prevent the variety of talents and attributes from having 
t h e i r own specific growth and development would be unnatural f o r human-
kind, because individual differences abound and require d i f f e r e n t con-
di t i o n s f o r t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l and a r t i s t i c growth. People who are 
genetically d i f f e r e n t and have l i v e d d i f f e r e n t l y , think d i f f e r e n t l y , 
and therefore, need special conditions f o r t h e i r development. 
Throughout M i l l ' s social philosophy the dominant theme i s 
individualism. The aim of individual l i b e r t y , we learn i s not merely 
concerned to r e s t r i c t the power of government. The power of the state 
may be one tyranny; but j u s t as exacting might be the tyranny of custom, 
and of public opinion acting through the agency of a representative 
government or through other forms of social pressure. Tyrannies, no 
matter from what quarter they stem, are a threat to the fundamental 
individualism necessary to a t r u l y l i b e r a l society. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
ind i v i d u a l l i b e r t y f o r M i l l i s that i t i s not only an i n t r i n s i c good but 
also an instrumental good - i t i s seen as the foundation of growth, as a 
springboard to that human progress i n which the l i b e r a l s so passionately 
believed. There are no l i m i t s to t h i s progress f o r mankind when i t i s 
based on the b e l i e f i n the freedom of the individual to direct and plan 
his own l i f e . M i l l saw l i b e r t y as an inalienable r i g h t , but he also saw 
i t as a fundamental requirement f o r a t r u l y c i v i l i z e d society based on 
the rule of reason. Therefore, the practice of l i b e r t y i s the practice 
of the r a t i o n a l method i n the a f f a i r s of men, but accompanied by an 
appeal to imagination, and social f e e l i n g . Only by following t h i s 
application of l i b e r t y can the benefits of c i v i l i z a t i o n be realized. 
I n "Representative Government" we encounter similar views to 
those expressed i n the essay 'On Liberty'. Questions of a s t r i c t p o l i t i c a l 
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nature are not pre-eminent. M i l l sees the major threat to democracy 
i n the p o l i t i c a l power of a majority used to repress minorities. Once 
more the emphasis i s on what the e a r l i e r liberalism had f a i l e d to 
observe, that a l i b e r a l government could only be realized i n the context 
of a l i b e r a l society. That p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are but a component 
i n the larger social composition i s a new p o l i t i c a l concept. Society i s 
a t h i r d factor a f f e c t i n g the relationship between government and individual, 
and an important one playing a major part i n the establishment of i n d i v i -
dual l i b e r t y . The fear of a public opinion intolerant of the individual, 
or of minorities, might be seen as a touch of realism on M i l l ' s part, 
contrasting sharply with the e a r l i e r idealism of his predecessors. But 
also, as a highly sensitive and i n t e l l e c t u a l personality. M i l l was perhaps 
r e f l e c t i n g his anxiety that mediocraty might be detrimental to individual 
d i s t i n c t i o n . 
The best form of government f o r the rea l i z a t i o n of progress through 
reform was representative government based on the principle of individual 
l i b e r t y . Despotism cannot ever be good government where men are more than 
p r i m i t i v e , because i t contradicts or i s contrary to individualism, indepen-
dence of mind and the free exercise of the miiltifarious human faculties 
necessary f o r personal f u l f i l m e n t and the enrichment of society. M i l l 
believed that a cardinal feature of good government was to bring about 
improvement i n human character: 
"One of the benefits of freedom i s that under i t the 
..ruler cannot pass by the people's minds, and amend 
t h e i r a f f a i r s f o r them without amending them. I t i s 
true, a despot may educate people; and to do so r e a l l y 
would be the best apology f o r his despotism. But any 
education which aims at making hmnan beings other than 
machines, i n the long run makes them claim to have 
control of t h e i r own actions."^ 
1. J.S. M i l l , "Representative Government", page I84. 
- 28 -
I n addition M i l l held representative government to be superior to a l l 
other forms of administration because i t placed sovereignty within the 
power of the whole community and gave each c i t i z e n a voice i n the execution 
of that power. An e n t i r e l y popular government was the only kind which 
would r e s u l t i n the achievement of t h i s end, and rested on two principles: 
"The f i r s t i s , that the r i g h t and interest of every or any 
person are only secure from being disregarded, when the 
person interested i s himself able, and habitually disposed, 
to stand up f o r them. The second i s , that the general 
prosperity attains a greater height and i s more widely 
diffused, i n proportion to the amount and variety of the 
personal energies enlisted i n promoting i t . " ^ 
Once more, individual self-dependence and individual paxticipation and 
expression are i n the foreground of M i l l ' s thinking. The power of s e l f -
protection i s a security against the e v i l s of others. The self-dependence 
of each i n d i v i d u a l , or of groups of individuals, i s better and more 
e f f i c i e n t f o r human v/ell-being than paternalism, cruel or benevolent. A 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g democracy i n which individuals, either acting alone or i n 
concordance, take part i n public a f f a i r s i s the only type of government 
commensurate with individual l i b e r t y andfia r e s u l t i n g human progress. 
However, as i t i s impossible i n a complex c i v i l i z a t i o n f o r each individual 
to make a personal contribution to public l i f e , then representative 
government must be the ideal form of popular government. 
Power i s a great danger i n a democracy, j u s t as i t i s i n any other 
form of government. The dominant class may work fo r i t s own advantage 
to the disadvantage of others, whether i t be a despot and his privileged 
supporters, the middle classes, or the labouring classes. The primary aim 
i s how to ensure that t h i s undesirable state of a f f a i r s be avoided. The 
power of sectional interests i n a representative system of government must 
1. J.S. M i l l , "Representative Government", pages 156-7. 
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not be allowed to prevail over other sections of society, nor override, 
through t h e i r lack of insight, what i s i n the interests of the common 
good, and the r e a l i z a t i o n of jus t i c e i n society. So, J.S. M i l l was not 
enamoured of democracy i f i t meant that through numerical majority a 
d i s t i n c t class i n society vrould a t t a i n control over the rest. This, i n 
his opinion, was a misconception of what pure democracy meant. I t did not 
mean that a simple majority be allowed to rule the whole people; i t 
meant equal representation i n government of a l l the people. I n the 
practice of the former idea of democracy, the r e s u l t i s not the equal 
representation of a l l c i t i z e n s , but simply a r e f l e c t i o n of the voices of 
the numerical majority, which to M i l l was l i t t l e better than government 
by p r i v i l e g e , because i t disfranchised minorities. While agreeing that 
a minority must be overruled by a majority when matteijs of state business 
are being deliberated upon by a representative assembly. M i l l did not 
accede to the veiw that the minority should have no votes and thus be 
denuded of representation altogether. This was a crass i n j u s t i c e sorely 
i n need of reform which must be remedied by the application of a t r u l y 
equal democracy i n which a l l sections of the electorate would be represented 
proportionately instead of disproportionately: 
"A majority of the electors would always have a 
majority of the representatives; but a minority 
of the electors would always have a minority of 
representatives. Man f o r man, they would be as 
f u l l y represented as the majority. Unless they 
are, there i s not equal government, but a 
government of inequality and p r i v i l e g e : one part 
of the people rule over the rest: there i s a 
part whose f a i r and equal share of influence i n 
the representation i s withheld from them; contrary 
to a l l j u s t government, but above a l l , contrary to 
the principle of democracy, which professes equality 
as i t s very root and foundation. 
1. J.S. M i l l , "Representative Government", page 249* 
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The application of proportional representation in an effort to l i m i t 
some of the power of the numerical majority and allov/ minority interest 
to be heard, and bring their influence to bear, would, says M i l l , 
eradicate some of the greatest evils of democracy. I t would not, however, 
prevent complete power s t i l l remaining with the numerical majority - the 
ev i l would be less pernicious perhaps, aving to the temperate influence 
of the minority groups, but class government would s t i l l remain a real 
threat, and the minority would be only as safe as the majority would l e t 
them be. 
A further safeguard which M i l l favoured, as a defence against the 
advent of universal suffrage producing a House of Commons manipulated by 
the sectional interests of the labouring classes, was plural voting. M i l l 
recognized distinctions of quality amongst individual men, and declared for 
f a c i l i t i e s for the gifted few to develop their talents in the service of 
the community. He also believed that some opinions should carry greater 
weight than others because they are wiser. Thus M i l l vindicated 
pl u r a l i t y of voting on a qualification of intellectual superiority. Level 
of education would be used as the test, and provide a ground by which 
pl u r a l i t y of votes would be accorded. This is Mill's antidote for; 
"preserving the educated from the class legislation 
,of the uneducated; but i t must stop short of enabling ^ 
them to practice class legislation on their own account." 
So, with these two constitutional redoubts, proportional representation, 
and plural voting, J-S. M i l l declared himself in support of universal 
suffrage and representative government. 
But i t was not solely his belief i n democracy which persuaded M i l l 
to accept a universal franchise. I t was also his belief that democracy 
1. J.S. M i l l , "Representative Government", page 284. 
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would asaist human progress. Among the objections made to the extension 
of the suffrage at the time was that lower class voters were too 
ignorant and irresponsible to be given such power. That M i l l shared this 
fear to some extent is reflected in his advocacy of constitutional safe-
guards. But his point of view was different from that of others, in that 
he believed mankind to be ever capable of improvement. Men would learn 
to be responsible by practising responsibility. Democratic government 
and individual liberty would prove to be the educative forces for the 
cultivation of the intelligence of the lower ranks of society, and con-
comitantly, democracy and liberty would be the agents of progress towards 
a greater c i v i l i z a t i o n . 
J.S. M i l l was dominated in his analysis of liberty by the ideas of 
the earlier liberal thinkers. But i n addition, he introduced an ethical 
valuation of liberty which the older liberalism had lacked. However, he 
never really got to grips with the problems of individual liberty from the 
standpoint of wag'e-eamers in an industrial society. A very weak point 
i n his thinking about liberty is his attempt to delimit the area of 
personal freedom - those actions he termed self-regarding which affect 
no one but the agent, and which are to be sacrosanct from the interference 
of both stat.eand society. The question might be asked: just how important 
are these self-regarding actions? Might i t not be said that an action w i l l 
be t r i v i a l indeed i f i t affects no one but the agent, thus affecting him 
only t r i v i a l l y . I t would have given Mill's argument greater forte i f i t 
could have been shown that certain intrinsic individual natural rights 
existed which must never be trespassed upon; but Mill's utilitarianism 
prevented him from such a clear commitment. He was, in fact, somewhat 
ambiguous on this question. On the one hand, he attached such intrinsic 
value to individual liberty that i t prevented him from f u l l y adopting 
the Benthamite doctrine of right being created by law, and the state 
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being the diispenser. of liberties for the individual. Though he did 
touch on the relationship of freedom and responsibility, emphasizing 
the importance of self-mastery and self-fulfilment to social progress, 
he l a i d rather too great a weight on the idea that compulsion was a 
curtailment of liberty. Personal liberty i s dependant on social and 
legal rights and obligations; this aspect of liberty. M i l l did not 
actually explore. As we shall see later, this theme was taken up by 
T.H. Green. 
- 33 -
Chapter 2 
James Fitzjames Stephen 
J.S. M i l l , i t might be said, had not solved a problem i n his 
analysis of liberty, but had siii;>ly exposed one. This seems to be the 
position taken \ip "by J.Y, Stephen, who preferred the earlier Benthamite 
interpretation of lib e r t y based on u t i l i t y , and vho repudiated Mill's idea 
that l i b e r t y was a "good i n i t s e l f " as mere sentimentality. M i l l , he 
thought, was a "deserter of the proper principle of r i g i d i t y and 
ferocity,""^ which belonged to the older u t i l i t a r i a n school of Philosophical 
Radicalism. I t was this tradition that Stephen was proud of, and which 
he f e l t that J.S. M i l l had betrayed for weaker sentiments expressed in 
the essay "On Liberty". 
Stephen begins his criticisms of M i l l by challenging his central 
thesis. As we have seen. M i l l stated his principle for allowing inter-
ference with individual l i b e r t y as being the self-protection of the 
individual and society and the prevention of harm to others. Any conduct 
liilda concerns the person alone is to be regarded as absolutely private. 
This sovereign area of li b e r t y encompasses inner consciousness, conscience, 
unexpressed thought and feeling, opinion and sentiment, private tastes 
and pursuits. None of this, Stephen points out, does M i l l attempt to prove, 
1. J.P. Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", page 12, 
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In furtherance of his criticism of Mill's liberty-principle, 
Stephen gives his own definition of the concept of liberty as i t relates 
to human actions: 
" A l l voluntary acts are caused by motives. A l l motives 
may be placed in one of two categories - hope and fear, 
pleasure and pain. Voluntary acts of which hope is the 
motive are said to be free. Voluntary acts of which 
fear is the motive are said to be done under compulsion, 
or omitted under restraint: A woman marries. This in 
every easel is a voluntary action. I f she regards the 
marriage with the ordinary feelings, and acts from 
ordinary motives, she is said to act freely. I f she 
regards i t as a necessity, to which she submits in order 
to avoid greater e v i l , sljie i s said to act under comr-
pulsion and not freely." 
Accepting this definition of liberty, xath which Stephen assumes M i l l 
would concur, then the la t t e r position can be summarized as: 
"No one is ever j u s t i f i e d in trying to affect any one's 
conduct by exciting his fear, except for the sake of 
self protection," 
or 
" I t Can never promote the general happiness of mankind 
that the conduct of any persons should be affected ^ 
appeal to their fear except i n the cases excepted." 
Put i n this way, Stephen cannot see Mill's assertions as self-evident 
truths. To condemn the use of fear as a means of affecting human 
conduct, as he seems to think M i l l does, is paradoxical to Stephen. 
Morality, religious or otherwise, leans very largely on fear as aij 
governing factor i n human conduct; for example fear of the law, fear 
of God's wrath, or even of the reproach of one's ovm conscience. 
Mill's claim that no interference with a person's conduct is to be 
tolerated unless on grounds of self-protection is not proved according 
to Stephen, for i f - morality is grounded i n the sanction of society or of 
God, such interference with individual freedom cannot be deemed immoral 
1. J. F. Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", page 57. 
2. J. P. Ste4)hen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", page 57. 
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as Mill's theory would imply, Stephen thinks that he makes this point 
a f o r t o i r i by presuming that M i l l would condemn the Almighty as immoral -
"a tyrant trampling on liberty" - i f he punished an individual for acts 
other than for "the purpose of protecting others.""^ Morality is more 
than singly allowing each individual to do what he likes so long as he 
does not hurt others. Moral systems exist to bring about benefits to 
society i n general through the in^rovement of individuals, independently 
of Mill's liberty-principle. 
Stephenls criticisms, i f we accept them, severely weaken Mill's 
theory of li b e r t y . In condemning interference as a means of influencing 
individual action, Stephen believes that M i l l undermines morality 
because the la t t e r presupposes a prohibitive system. Without coercion 
of one form or another, few people, says Stephen, would conform to the 
moral standards necessary for a civilized society. The legislator, or 
public opinion controls conduct i n a systematic way iMoh circumstances 
would compel i n a more haphazard fashion: 
"The laws which punish murder or theft are substituted 
for private vengence, which, i n the absence of law, 
would punish those crimes more severly, though i n 
irregular manner,"^ 
Coercion i s not to be shunned as an e v i l threatening individual liberty. 
Coercion, whether by legal sanction, or the sanction of the disapproval 
of others, creates a fear necessary to morality, and, according to 
Stephen, man is constituted to respond to such fear by his very nature. 
But the main ground on which Stephen claims to have refuted M i l l , on the 
question of coercion, i s that M i l l did not show i t to be e v i l i n i t s e l f 
1, J.F. Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", page 58. 
2. J.F. Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", page 6 l . 
- 3 6 -
fundamentally, but merely suggested that i t had harmful effects. The 
point that Stephen makes is that i t i s the use to which coercion is put 
which is important for i t s condemnation or otherwise. 
M i l l held that liberty could only be properly realized i n a state 
i n which the populous had reached a standard of civilization which would 
enable them to benefit from free and equal discussion. At this stage 
of human advancement compulsion against mature adults, could not be 
ju s t i f i e d , even for their own good. Stephen challenges this basic tenet 
of Mill's theory of liberty. Accepting that there is an area i n which 
a person must be allowed to pursue his own tastes, the larger truth, says 
Stephen, i s that those who are stronger and wiser i n a particular sphere 
of l i f e ought to conpel other less fortunate individuals. This must be 
so, because the great mass of adults are not capable of knowing and 
seeking their own best interests. And i n order to maintain his position 
of no compulsion of adults i n their own interests. M i l l would have to 
prove, according to Stephen, that a l l men are equally wise, and, thus, 
know their own good themselves. I f this is not the case, then i t would 
have to be proved that the wise i n a community are not obliged to help 
those of lesser wisdom. In Stephen's opinion the possibility of a stage 
i n human progress when "free and equal discussion" does duty for com-
pulsion i s a chimera. Referring to the facts of human experience, he 
argues that M i l l has claimed too much for free discussion as an ivaprover 
of conduct through i t s removal of Ignorance, Misconduct is not caused 
by ignorance in most cases, we are told, but is the result of human 
wickedness or weakness, A man, for example, does not get drunk because 
he is ignorant, but because he is weak and foolish and governed by the 
desire for immediate pleasure. 
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Mankind, says Stephen, are a multifarious agglomoration of people 
who are incapable of being affected or inproved by free discussion and 
who are t o t a l l y indifferent to the refinements of Mill's concept of 
libe r t y . In sharp contrast. to Mills' sanguine view of the prospects for 
the progress of mankind, Stephen says: 
"Men are so constructed that whatever theory as to 
goodness and badness we choose to adopt, there are 
and always w i l l be i n the world an enormous mass of 
bad and indifferent people - people who deliberately 
do a l l sorts of things which they ought not to do, and ^ 
leave undone a l l sorts of things vrtiich they ought to do." 
Thus, i f human beings are capable of improvement. Mill's liberty-principle 
w i l l not be the agent for achieving i t . The agent for any such progress 
w i l l be coercion. 
The Nineteenth Century was the time of the reform b i l l s , which 
increased the franchise piecemeal. The ine v i t a b i l i t y of the increase- i n 
democracy was accepted by M i l l and Stephen. Both men held reservations 
about i t s benefit. M i l l believed that safeguards against government by 
the uninformed masses could be bu i l t into the constitution, such as 
proportional representation and plural voting; but he also placed great 
f a i t h i n the power of education to make responsible citizens of the 
labouring classes i n society, Stephen did not entertain the same measure 
of enthusiasm for universal suffrage as did the so-called progressives 
such as M i l l . One thing of which Stephen was certain was that the 
establishment of universal suffrage would not usher in the age of 
equality. P o l i t i c a l power would remain concentrated but present i t s e l f 
i n a different form: 
"The result of cutting i t up into l i t t l e bits is simply 
that the man who can sweep the greatest number of them 
into one heap w i l l govern the rest,"-'-
1. J.F. Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", page 211, 
- 3 8 -
Stephen believed that i n any government the strongest man would be sure 
to rule. By a process of natural selection, those qualities most 
appropriate to the situation w i l l give power to the persons who have 
them. I t i s the case that i n a military government the qualities of 
the soldier w i l l prevail; i n a monarchy the qualities most valued by 
the king w i l l ensure power to his minions and i n a iemocra.<sy those vho 
inile " w i l l be the wire pullers and their friends.""^ But to suggest that 
these rulers w i l l be equal to those over whom they rule is a chimera. 
As the form of government changes so w i l l the qualities which make for 
leadership. These might be strength of character, artfulness, business 
acumen, or oratory. But leaders there w i l l be, those vtio w i l l direct 
the mass of the people no matter what the form of government. 
The advent of democracy i n the form of universal suffrage could 
not be equated with equality, nor with the liberty, Stephen contended. 
Against this i t might be claimed, of course, that with one man one vote 
a l l men have equal voting power, and a fundamental freedom attends the 
right of each elector to choose his parliamentary representative. Stephen 
ignores this consideration and concentrates on the merits and demerits 
of popular government i n other ways. Like many of his contemporaries 
he looked upon democracy with a certain foreboding and was unable to 
give i t the unqualified blessing that some progressives heaped upon i t . 
Though accepting popular institutions as inevitable, he f e l t urged to 
point out their shortcomings. One major fear which he had, i n this respect,was 
that wilfa-universal stiff rage the rule of wisdom over f o l l y might be 
reversed. Men might be elected to govern by the great untutored mass of 
mankind who were not the most suitable to the task, thus inverting the 
1. J.F. Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", page 211. 
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"natural relation" whereby the "wise and good rule" the "foolish and 
Toedii"^ Another disadvantage of popularly elected institutions is the 
lack of continuity i n enacting legislation. This i s because personal 
authority i s lacking. The main obstacle here^ Stephen maintains, is the 
result of the party system, which creates a situation whereby that party 
not i n office does i t s utmost by constant criticism to prevent the other 
from governing. As a result the governing party very often abandons 
what i t considers ought to be done i n favour of what i t is most l i k e l y 
to be allowed to do by the opposition. 
Universal suffrage was not without i t s dangers to a man like 
J.F. Stephen. I t would certainly not bring about equality i n any 
important sense of the term because no such thing was possible, even i f 
desirable. I t did not add very much i n the way of liberty either. In 
fact, Stephen f e l t , as did some other li b e r a l thinkers of the age, that 
attempts to establish forms of equality would directly l i m i t liberty -
the l i b e r t y to exercise ones own natural talents and follow one's 
inclinations i n many respects. This line of thinking was in fact also 
entertained by M i l l , and here the two protagonists partially ag^e; but 
the difference which makes the difference between them was that Mill,.though 
highly dissatisfied with the present low state of human nature, unlike 
Stephen, looked optimistically to a future state when a more favourable 
human condition would f a c i l i t a t e equality among men. 
In Stephen's experience., liberty must be seen i n context - the 
context of time, place and circumstance. Whether liberty was good or 
bad would depend on these provisbs. The whole matter is so highly 
1. J.P. Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*', page 212. 
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conplex that i t is not possible to be r i g i d l y guided by a sinrple 
principle of the kind stipulated by M i l l , Stephen thus advises us to 
be cautious and: 
"confine ourselves to such remarks as experience 
suggests about the advantages and disadvantages 
of liberty and compulsion respectively i n 
particular cases, 
In his criticism of M i l l we learn more about the shortcomings of liberty 
than i t s advantages. And we learn a great deal about the benefits of 
compulsion. The essence i t seems of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" is 
the advocacy of strong government administered by efficient laws - a 
reinforcement of the authoritarian tradition of Thomas Hobbes rather than 
an espousal of nineteenth century liberalism. As Stephen interpreted 
i t , the modem democratic state ought not to have liberty and equaliiy 
as i t s basis; on the contrary, i t ought to be a despotism i n the hands 
of the gifted minority benevolently wielding great power. 
1. J.F. Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", page 85. 
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Chapter 3 
Walter Bagehot 
The next of our nineteenth century p o l i t i c a l philosophers Tirtio 
concerned himself with ideas of liberty, and iriio, like J.S. M i l l , 
looked to a nobler future for mankind, was Walter Bagehot. His main 
ideas on these themes are contained i n his works, "Physics and 
Politics" eJid "The English Constitution". Like M i l l , he believed that 
human progress was inevitable. He stressed the concept of government 
by free discussion as developing out of a more primitive state of society 
when custom and despotism was dominant, A p o l i t i c a l constitution based 
on the principle of discussion, he held, was to be identified with 
progress, 
Bageliot believed i n an environmental determinism -that the increases 
i n scientij'ic knowledge were affecting changes i n politics and economics, 
and that natural selection made for continuous iiq>rovement i n mankind and 
his c i v i l i z a t i o n . He believed that progress i n man was a result of the 
passing on of useful acquired characteristics from one generation to 
the next. Quoting Maudsley on the "Psychology and Pathology of the Mind" 
page 73t Bagehot states: 
"Powsr that has been laboriously acquired and stored up 
as statical i n one generation manifestly i n such cases 
becomes the inborn faculty of the next; and the develop-
ment takes place i n accordance with that law of 
increasing speciality and complexity of adaption to 
external nature which is traceable through the animal 
kingdom, or i n other words, that law of progress from 
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the general to the special i n development irtiich 
the appearance of nerve force amongst natural 
forces and the conplexity of the nervous system 
of man both i l l u s t r a t e . As the v i t a l force 
gathers up, as i t were, into i t s e l f inferior 
forces, and might be said to be a development 
of them, or, as i n the appearance of nerve 
forces, simpler and more general forces are 
gathered up and concentrated on a more special 
and con^lex mode of energy; so again a further 
specialization takes place i n the development 
of the nervous system, whether watched through 
generations or through individual l i f e . " ^ 
In this way, says Eagehot, the past is linked to the present and the 
present to the future; a cultivated individual is able to pass on to 
his offspring the capacity for cultivation via inheritance of appropriate 
nervous mechanisms, and this continues with conpound interest for 
generations to come, 
Bagehot then, had a passionate, i f somewhat naive f a i t h , i n human 
progress based on the ndioley unscientific thesis that physiological 
development and cultural development are casually connected. According 
to him the progress of civilization has proceeded i n the following way. 
Earlier prD.meval societies were organized on a patriarchal model; this 
Bagehot refers to as a "pre-economic age". Out of this patriarchal 
system i n which the eldest male parent dominated the entire aggregated 
household come a separation of families to form a plurality cf tribes 
or nations,, The scriptures t e l l us that the families of Jacob and Esau 
become two separate nations. But the holding together of Jacob's 
children and i t s development into a community i s , Bagehot thinks, the 
consequence of a state claiming allegiancies beyond those pertaining to 
family. Bagehot is arguing that there is a natural progression from 
primitive patriarchal society to more conqplex improved forms of society, 
1."" W. Bagehot, "Physics and Politics", page 9, 
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just as the selective breeding of animals transmits improvements ffom 
one generation to the next. The ages of single authoritatian governments 
was an improvement on the t r i b a l system, for i t established communities 
under the rule of law, which was absent from the earlier patriarchal 
state. That these absolutist type of regimes suppressed liberty did not 
at this stage mean they were to be condemned. The repudiation of free 
thought at this time was a necessary e v i l , for i t laid a firm foundation 
for the jiBTct stage of development by disciplining early man into a person 
better f i t t e d for the improved civilization to come. Under these early 
despotic governments the law of states harnessed every man to his place 
i n the scheme of things. What he was born to he stayed at and f u l f i l l e d 
his duties therein. Custom froze each individual i n a hierarchical 
mould. 
Now this state of things i s , Bagehot says, correct for this 
earlier world, for these are the "ages of servitiide" i^ich prepared 
the way for later "ages of freedom,""'' Bagehot places great weight 
on the importance of training, claiming that ideas of liberty and euqality 
are only relevant when, through an apprenticieship under more ri g i d 
societies: 
"the soft minds and strong passions of youthful nations 
are fixed and guided by hard transmitted instincts."^ 
Thus, the ages of governing elites controlling their subjects by binding 
laws is seen as an essential precursor, a necessary yard-drill for 
toughening the sinues and nerves which are to be so fundamental to the 
1, W, Bagehot, "Physics and Politics", page 30. 
2. W. Bagehot, "Physics and Politics", page 30. 
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ages of freedom: 
"The ages of monotony had their use for they trained 
men for ages when they need not be monotonous," 
Like J,S, M i l l , Bagehot lauded the need for variations i n a 
society as necessary to the progress of civi l i z a t i o n . I t was the yoke 
of r i g i d customary discipline, which had served i t s purpose well as a 
formative stage of development, which had to give way to circumstances 
i n which new ideas could be discussed freely without fear of sanction. 
This is what Bagehot refers to as the stage of civilization when the 
essential pre-requisite i s variability. But this new freedom of ideas 
must not result i n the repudiation of certain of the virtues of the 
earlier stage of development, so that var i a b i l i t y must also be accompanied 
by legality i f a nation is to survive the transmutation to the new 
stage of enlightenment. So, what is required for the progress of a 
society i n which Bagehot so proudly believes is a fine balance between 
sufficient legality to unify a nation, but not so much as to s t i f l e the 
variety so essential to change and progress. Despotism has i t s uses, 
he thinks, especially i n earlier stages of development, or when a nation 
is at war. But i n order that r i g i d custom be loosened to make way for 
progress an element of freedom of discussion is required. 
"'Old law rests', as Sir Henry Maine puts i t , 'not on contract but 
2 
on status'" This procrustean state of civilisation was broken out of, 
says Bagehot, because of the advent and growing influence of government 
by discussion. The mould of custom was f i r s t fractured i n the ancient 
1. W, Bagehot, "Physics and Politics", page 30. 
2. W. Bagehot, "Physics and Politics", page 157. 
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republics of G-reece and I t a l y : 
•"Libe:rty said, l e t there be l i g h t , and like a ^ 
sunrise on the sea Athens arose' says Shelley..." 
Bagehot contends that liberty i n a s t a t ^ whether i t be a republic or a 
monarchy, is a system of government having i t s sovereign power apportioned 
among many persons and among whom discussion is free. I t was discussion 
by men of their common interests and actions which nurtured the 
originality necessary to the progress of civilizations. Because of the 
incessant spur i n some men to better their conditions of l i f e , the 
customary r i g i d i t y of a number of earlier societies was eased and custom 
gave way to inovation and freedom. The great importance of government 
by discussion is that i t straight away presupposes the f a l l i b i l i t y of 
authority, for to follow discussion of a subject where i t may lead, and. 
f i n a l l y come to a decision based on the outcome of that discussion, 
means that freedom of choice has come to take pride of place over 
established authority, 
Bagehot's ideas presented i n "Physios and Politics" show that the 
2 
quintessence of his concept of li b e r t y i s a "polity of discussion". Free 
discussion of opinion enables v a r i a b i l i t y and originality of ideas to 
emerge; i t makes for tolerance among men and furnishes civilization with 
the means to continuous improvement. But i t also creates irtiat Bagehot 
seems to hold as the qualities of the ideal l i b e r a l man, "This qioality 
I c a l l 'animated moderation.'"^ I t i s , he thinks, of profound usefulness 
in practical l i f e . He sees i t i n the writers such as Homer, Walter Scott 
and Shakespeare, and he calls i t "this union of l i f e with measure of 
1, W. Bagehot, "Physics and Politics", page 158, 
2, W, Bagehot, "Physics and Politics", page 200. 
3, W« Bagehot, "Physics and Politics'!, page 201. 
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s p i r i t with r e a s o n a b l e n e s s , " H e also sees i t i n the English generally, 
but amongst statesmen nAio r e f l e c t i t he singles out Lord Patmerston as 
something of a paragon: 
"'He went," i t has been said, with a great swing;' 
but he never tumbled over; he always managed to 
p u l l up 'before there was any dangerI'l 
So, here we have another benefit which an atmosphere of free discussion 
bestows - a quality which gives a man good judgement of iritiat i s right, 
and good i n t e l l e c t , but both: i n s u f f i c i e n t balance to avoid one-sidedness. 
This i d e a l of the l i b e r a l statesmen i s shaped i n a government of 
discussion because i n such an atmosphere extremes of opinion cannot 
f l o u r i s h . A l l of these advantages which free government eiffords f ar 
outweigh the disadvantages, and so Bagehot endorses^ Montesquieu when he 
says: 
"whatever be the cost of t h i s glorious l i b e r t y , 
we must be content to pay i t to heaven,"^ 
Bagehot was zealously i n favour of government by discussion, the 
core of his concept of l i b e r t y . One of the many benefits which he claimed 
f o r t h i s form of government was that i t improved i n t e l l e c t and created 
w e l l balanced men. Holding t h i s degree of enlightenment one would have 
e3q)ected hi.m perhaps to have been w i l l i n g to extend his principle of 
discussion to the populous at large by befriending universal suffrage, 
a p o l i c y wtiich might encourage the ordinary c i t i z e n to take an interest 
i n discussion of the p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s of the nation stimulated by his 
power to play a part i n electing h is parliamentary representative. 
1. W. Bagehot, "Physics and P o l i t i c s " , page 2Q1, 
2o W, Bagehot, "Physics and P o l i t i c s " , page 202. 
3. W, Bagehot, "Physios and P o l i t i c s " , page 204. 
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Unlike M i l l , nho, as we have seen, expressed f a i t h i n the educative 
role that democracy would play, Bagehot, i n "The English Constitution" 
1866, lamented that democracy would be accoiq^anied by intimidation, disorder 
and corruption, and he was not favourab]y disposed towards the establish-
ment of universal suffrage for another hundred years. But l i k e emergent 
nations that often have to learn to govern themselves by practice, i t 
seemed to be Mi l l ' s view that, the enfranchised citizens would only learn 
to make mature and educated judgements about p o l i t i c s by way of a process 
of learning through involvement. True enough J.S. M i l l had forbodings 
about what:; he c a l l e d the "tyranny of the majority", but he was much 
more sanguine than Bagehot about the inevitable enfranchisement of the 
working man. Bagehot, who believed along with J.F. Stephen that l i b e r t y 
and equality were incompatible concepts, feared that democracy, i n i t s 
p o t e n t i a l to bring about greater equality, might r e s u l t i n the destruction 
of l i b e r t y . The l i b e r t y of individuals to express t h e i r individualism 
and pursue t h e i r own peculiar self-fulfilment might be smothered by the 
blanket of d u l l mediocrity: 
"when England delivers herself over to 'the 
j.aingled mass of men',"l 
Bagehot and J.S. .Mill were l i b e r a l s who were much i n agreement 
about the threat to l i b e r t y i n t h e i r time. They wanted power for the 
middle c l a s s , but were f e a r f u l of the challenge to l i b e r t y which might 
2 
come as a r e s u l t of the "despotic power" which universal suffrage would 
give to the working c l a s s . The problem with idiich both men concerned 
themselves was how to make democracy work i n a way which would avoid 
the e v i l of opportunist party p o l i t i c i a n s pandering to the ignorant 
1. &. Watson, "The English Edeology", page 157. 
2. Vr. Bagehot, "The English Constitution", page 6. 
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multitudes of the lower classes. The aim was to preserve government 
by discussion and the guidance of the l e s s wise by the wise. A front a l 
attack on l i b e r t y was seen by both men i n constitutional reform irtiich 
would give greater executive power to the House of Commons, I n 
•Representative Government', M i l l recognized the authority of the 
Commons over the Monarchy and House of Lords, the l a t t e r unrepresentative 
i n s t i t u t i o n s being invested with power only as a safeguard against 
errors of the popular assembly. But the preservation of li b e r t y , he 
thought, would be gained: 
"by d i s j o i n i n g the office of control and cr i t i c i s m " (the 
popular assembly) "from the actual conduct of a f f a i r s , 
and devolving the former on the representatives of the 
many, while seburing for the l a t t e r , under s t r i c t 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the nation, the acquired knowledge 
and p r a c t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e of a s p e c i a l l y trained and 
experience few." 
I t i s at t h i s juncture that Bagehot parts coii;>any with M i l l . 
Bagehot ragarded M i l l ' s account of how the constitution works as 'a paper 
description' divorced from r e a l i t y . M i l l had not seen the iinportant 
function of the Cabinet as a highly authoritative state management 
committee. Both men looked for antidotes against the 'tyranny of the 
majority', and i t s threat to l i b e r t y . M i l l saw the solution partly i n 
e l e c t o r a l reforms. Bagehot stringently attacked such proposals as 
v i t i a t i n g to parliamentary government. By giving more power to the 
party machine outside Parliament, they would n u l l i f y the independence 
of the member of parliament, and thus, s t r i k e at the roots of moderation 
i n the House of Commons. The way then to preserve l i b e r t y from the 
onslaught of working class despotism was not by the way of excluding 
only some working people from p o l i t i c a l power by electoral devices, but 
1, J.S. M i l l , "Representative Government", Chapter 5, quote by 
R.S. Crossman i n Intro, to Bagehot, "English Constitution", 
page 7-8, 
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by having them a l l controlled and guided by t h e i r betters. Their 
betters were the representatives of the a r i s t r o c r a t i c and middle 
cl a s s vho resided i n parliament and made up the Cabinet, 'the 
e f f i c i e n t secret of the constitution: 
"The e f f i c i e n t secret of the English Constitution may 
be described as the close union, the nearly coroplete 
fusion, of the executive and l e g i s l a t i v e powers."^ 
The focus of t h i s conjoining of executive and le g i s l a t u r e i s the 
Cabinet: 
"a board of control chosen by the l e g i s l a t u r e , out of 
persons whom i t t r u s t s and knows, to rule the nation ... 
A Cabinet i s a combining committee a 'hyphen' which 
j o i n s , the 'buckle' which fastens, the l e g i s l a t i v e part 
of the state to the executive part of the state. I n 
i t s origin i t belongs to the one, i n i t s function i t . 
belongs to the other."^ 
The Cabinet i s e f f i c i e n t because of "party loyalty, collective respons-
i b i l i t y and secrecy,"'^ Thus, Bagehot's solution to the problem of 
depriving the working class from p o l i t i c a l power and hence, i n his view, 
preserving l i b e r t y was to make certain that the power of decision-
making was the exclusive right of the e f f i c i e n t part of the Constitution, 
the Cabinet. I n addition to t h i s measure i t would also be neccessary 
to improve working class conditions for the purpose of ensuring that they 
remain l o y a l to the Crown, while at the same time keeping them i n 
ignorance of vho r e a l l y holdsithe power i n government. 
The shield against the worst effects of universal suffrage "the 
rule of an ignorant, miserable and vicious democracy,"^ i f a l l attenipts 
1. W. Bagehot, "The English Constitution", page 65. 
2. W. Bagehot, "The English Constitution", page .67, 68, 
3. W. Bagehot, "The English Constitution", page 21, Intro by 
R.S. Crossman. 
4. Quoted byR.S. Crossman i n Intro to "The English Constitution", 
by W. Bagehot, page 10. 
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t.o delay i t f a i l e d , was, i n Bagehot's view, to make sure that "the 
democracy s h a l l be educated and comfortable and moral," ^  and, perhaps 
more important, excluded from a l l effective power concerning decision 
making i n government, Bagehot was even more gravely anxious than M i l l 
about the threat to B r i t i s h l i b e r t i e s from democracy. But as history 
has shown, Bagehot was i n one way proved wrong. Despite his gloomy 
forboding, the enfranchisement of the working classes i n the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries has proceeded with equanimity, and the comr-
bination of government by discussion and universal suffrage appears a 
success. However, i t might equally well be said that t h i s success owes 
more to the growing power of the Cabinet, the middle class domination of 
parliament and the lack of p o l i t i c a l consciousness amongst the working 
cla s s than i t does to any of Mill ' s dreams having come true. 
1. Quoted by R.S. Crossman,in In t r o , to "The English Constitution", 
by W. Bagehot, page 10, 
-51-
Chapter it-
Lord Acton 
I n e3q)anding t h e i r ideology of li b e r t y , the Victorian l i b e r a l 
and liberal-conservative p o l i t i c a l thinkers were not merely concerned 
to set out d e t a i l s of a l i b e r a l p o l i t y . As well as being interested 
i n the p r a c t i c a l aspects of governmental reform, they were also infused 
by a burning idealism. Each of the authors we have already considered, 
with perhaps the exception of J.P. Stephen, has shown an e x p l i c i t 
b e l i e f i n the idea of human progress towards a higher morality for man-
kind. This idea i s c l e a r l y marked i n the work of Lord Acton, His 
earnest quest for the good i n human conduct was not even surpassed by 
J.S. M i l l . The ideology of l i b e r t y iMch Acton propounded was indelibly 
groiinded i n morality, and therefore, p o l i t i c a l organization and reform 
had to be modelled i n accordance with the moral law. Acton, l i k e M i l l , 
was an ideologue mainly concerning himself with general principles -
he was engrossed i n what he called ",... the reign of i d e a s , T h e idea 
of the l i b e r t y of man was the essence of h i s ideology:' 
"Liberty i s not a means to a higher p o l i t i c a l end. 
I t i s i t s e l f the highest p o l i t i c a l end,"2 
This kind of thinking i s reminiscent i n J.S. Mill ' s objectivism, which 
seemed to be placing l i b e r t y i n the realm of a natural law, immutable 
1, Acton, quoted by &. Watson, "The English Ideology", page l 6 . 
2. Lord Acton, "History of Freedom", page 22, 
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and e t e r n a l . But Acton's concept of l i b e r t y was imbued with a religious 
fervour quite foreign to M i l l , Acton i d e n t i f i e d l i b e r t y with the cause 
of morality, a morality which was founded on re l i g i o n . Mans duty was to 
r e f l e c t &od's wishes. Freedom meant freedom of conscience, which meant 
freedran to avoid s i n . Man i s obliged to act morally on earth as a 
consequence of his obligation to fiod. A strong moral commitment permeates 
Acton's doctrine of l i b e r t y which i s fundamentally grounded i n t h i s 
r e l i g i o u s reverence. I n t h i s metaphysical setting the in d i v i d u a l i s t 
approach to the l i b e r t y of M i l l and Bagehot becomes transformed i n Acton 
for: 
"Liberty i s not the power of doing what we lilce, . 
but the right of being able to do what we ought." 
A l l p o l i t i c s then must find t h e i r rationale i n eth i c s . Liberty i s seen 
as an e t h i c a l concept and cannot be separated from duty; and duty i s 
above the state or society because i t i s sanctioned only by God: 
"The feeling of duty and re s p o n s i b i l i t y to G-od _ 
i s the only . a r b i t e r of a Christian's actions." 
When Acton says that l i b e r t y i s the supreme object of p o l i t i c s i t i s 
because he sees l i b e r t y as an e t h i c a l concept which involves freedom 
of conscience, the protection of the weak, representation i n Government, 
the exstinction of slavery and the ascendance of free opinion. I n this 
way, l i b e r t y i s not merely negative, but becomes a positive and creative 
p r i n c i p l e aiding the individual to achieve self-fulfilment, 
. Liberty, i n Acton's view, cannot be establised a r b i t r a r i l y ; i t i s 
slow growing and l a t e matiiring. This i s because i t presupposes the 
existence and development of other things, Acton thought i n developmental 
1, G.E. Pasnacht, "Acton's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy", page 19. 
2. G.E. Fasnacht, "Acton's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy", page 20. 
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and progressive terms. I n his definition of .liberty he f i r s t states 
the conditions necessary to i t s existence: 
"1, Long and ardious experience, 
2, a rampart of t r i e d convictions, 
3, accumulated knowledge, 
4, a f a i r l e v e l of general morality, 
3, education, 
6, courage, ^ 
7. s e l f - r e s t r a i n t . " 
Flowing from these conditions he says: 
"Liberty i s the assurance that every man s h a l l be 
protected i n doing what he believes h is duty 
against the influence of authority and majorities, 
custom and opinion,"^ 
We see here the same emphasis placed on the protection of the individual 
as was stressed by J.S. M i l l and Bagehot; but the more strongly e t h i c a l 
character of Acton's view of l i b e r t y places greater inportance on a man 
doing what i s h i s 'duty' and being protected i n this from the sources of 
encroachment mentioned above. So l i b e r t y for Acton might be the highest 
p o l i t i c a l end, but i t i s not the only or highest purpose i n man's 
existence. Li b e r t y must be subject to r e s t r i c t i o n s for the sake of the 
attainment of more supreme aims. These supreme aims are the moral object 
of obeying G-od. Acton regarded true freedom, to be freedom of conscience 
inspired by G-od because i t liberated man from secular absolutism. I n 
t h i s way C h r i s t i a n i t y , i s the handmaiden of l i b e r t y by making conscience 
a thing private and independent of the authority of the state. 
I n propounding t h e i r ideas of l i b e r t y . M i l l , Stephen and 
Bagehot, have a number of ideas i n common. These are a b e l i e f i n 
progress, fear of despotism by a tyrant or by the influence of popular 
1, G-.E. Fasnacht, "Acton's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy", page 29, 
2. G.E. Fasnacht, "Acton's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy", page 29. 
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democracy, a b e l i e f i n a f l e x i b l e constitution and government by 
discussion, the ascendancy of middle class power over the working 
classes, and a b e l i e f i n the power of ideas. I n considering Acton's 
position we fi n d that he has, more than any of the other writers, 
attached his concept of l i b e r t y to the notion of conscience. Emmuel Kant 
said that two things f i l l e d him with awe - the s t a r r y heavens above and 
the moral law within. I t was a s i m i l a r b e l i e f i n an i n f a l l i b l e moral 
law and i t s influence upon conscience which Acton f e l t could alone give 
true meaning to l i b e r t y . I t i s , therefore, e s s e n t i a l to give some 
consideration to Acton's analysis of conscience i f we are to f u l l y 
understand h i s concept of l i b e r t y . 
Through his notion of conscience, Acton was able to delimit 
personal l i b e r t y , as M i l l had attempted to do. But M i l l had nothing 
to which he could anchor his sovereign area of personal li b e r t y , apart 
from a vague appeal to a natural law. Acton however, added another dimention 
to the concept of l i b e r t y by stating that i t rested upon the notion of 
C h r i s t i a n conscience. And, as the Chr i s t i a n i s answerable only to God 
on matters of conscience, the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for a sacrosanct area of 
personal l i b e r t y i s that conscience i s guided by the voice of God. For 
Acton, l i b e r t y and Liberalism depends on the idea of conscience which 
urges man to obey the inner l i g h t of God's commands i n preference to 
those of man, Bagehot said that government by discussion presupposed 
tolerati o n as e s s e n t i a l to freedom; Acton said that conscience produced 
toleration, and because conscience i s i n f a l l i b l e i t promoted l i b e r t y . 
I t does t h i s because each conscience respects the consciences of others, 
and i n t h i s way l i b e r t y i s increased by limiting authority. 
Lord Acton's b e l i e f i n the sanctity of conscience and i t s 
importance to l i b e r t y greatly influenced his thinking about government. 
- 55 -
He preferred democracy to any other form of government, but he was not 
amenable to what he referred to as absolute democracy. This was because 
"absolute government contradicts the Divine Law."''" To be governed by any 
form of absolutism i s the denial of government by discussion and reason. 
Thus, the nation must be guided and controlled by i t s representatives i n 
government. Acton saw i n direct democracy the p o t e n t i a l i t y for a unity 
of power which would be a threat to l i b e r t y , and he therefore advocated 
that power be divided as a pre-requisite of freedom. He was i n favour 
of a federation, which he believed would be a protection against the 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power. Under a federal system, l i k e that of America, 
Acton believed that: 
"constitutional s e c u r i t i e s against democratic tyranny 2 
and popular dictatorship were greater and more effective," 
than they were under the B r i t i s h system of representative democracy. 
Acton was not an enthusiastic democrat, but towards the end of his l i f e 
he modified his e a r l i e r views a f t e r seeing that democracy had been 
successful i n England, France and America, His i n i t i a l fears had been 
governed by his b e l i e f i n moral responsibility, which he was afraid men 
would discard on being influenced by the mass. His federal constitutional 
checks were therefore e s s e n t i a l as he saw i t to prevent the majority 
from abusing i t s power and thereby jeopardising l i b e r t y . 
1. G.E. Fasnacht, "Acton's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy", page 104. 
2. -G.E. Fasnacht, "Acton-*.s P o l i t i c a l Philosophy'', page 99. 
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Chapter 5 
Thomas Henry Green 
Acton had viewed l i b e r t y not simply as a negative concept to be 
i d e n t i f i e d with the absence of legal or other r e s t r a i n t s , but as some-
thing p o s i t i v e : 
"an active and creative pr i n c i p l e the motive 
and source of a l l l i f e . . . " " ' -
T.H. Green also took up t h i s sense of the meaning of l i b e r t y and defined 
i t as: 
"a positive power or capacity of doing or 
enjoying something worth doing or enjoying." 
Acton was also echoed by Green i n his insistence that conscience i s a 
kind of supreme court of appeal i n moral c r i t i c i s m of the state. Acton 
stressed the idea of personal rights i n obligations or duties when he 
suggested that each individual conscience must respect the consciences 
of others. Furthermore, he declared that man retained an area of 
personal freedom which rested on an obligation to obey the voice of God, 
as i t revealed i t s e l f i n the conscience of man, enjoining him to do what 
he ought, not what he would l i k e . I t i s with these notions of positive 
freedom, rig h t , obligations and duties that we now proceed to an exam-
ination of the concept of l i b e r t y i n the work of T.H. Green, p r i n c i p a l l y 
i n "Lectures on the p r i n c i p l e of P o l i t i c a l Obligation". 
The work of T.H. Green marks a clear departure, not only from the 
1. G.B. Fasnacht, "Acton's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy", page 29. 
2. .Quoted by G.H. Sabine i n , "A History of P o l i t i c a l Theory", page 6lO. 
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principles of Benthamite u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , but also from the modified 
u t i l i t a r i n a i s m of J.S M i l l , Green can perhaps be c l a s s i f i e d as belonging 
to what Dicey has referred to as the 'Period of Collectivism' i n 
19th century Liberalism from about I865 to I9OO: 
"By collectivism i s here meant the school of opinion 
often termed socialism, which favours the intervention 
of the state, even at some s a c r i f i c e of individual 
freedom for the purpose of conferring benefit upon the 
mass of people."^ 
Dicey points out the vagueness of the term collectivism and states 
that a person may be said to be a c o l l e c t i v i s t i n being opposed to 
cer t a i n tenets of individualism, yet be at variance with iriiat might 
propertly be called socialism. I t would perhaps be near to the truth 
to place T.H. Green i n t h i s qualified category of c o l l e c t i v i s t . Green's 
c o l l e c t i v i s t views were i n effect a re-statement of lihat liberalism 
meant. Green, l i k e M i l l , did i n fact regard l i b e r t y as the chief end of 
citiz e n s h i p but he made great play of his notion of 'positive freedom' 
involving the development of a s o c i a l system which would enable i t s 
members to enjoy more of the benefits of c i v l i z e d l i f e . The l e g i s l a t i o n 
necessary for t h i s purpose would r e s t r i c t the a c t i v i t i e s of certain 
individuals; but t h i s could be approved under Green's 'positive freedom' 
as creating conditions necessary to the common good. I n the tradition 
of ancient Greek idealism, Green saw the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the state as 
the promotion of the good l i f e for mankind. He. placed inportance on 
duties and obligations as well as rights, and advocated a greater sense 
of c i v i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n place of ruthless competition and s e l f -
i n t e r e s t which individualism tended to encourage. With t h i s aim of 
achieving a more co-operative l i f e for society, state limitation of some 
forms of l i b e r t y could be vindicated. 
1. A.V. Dicey, "Law and Public Opinion i n England", page 64. 
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What T.H. Green t r i e d to do was to show how personal l i b e r t y , so 
precious to the l i b e r a l temerament, depended on s o c i a l and le g a l rights, 
obligations and duties. Green was concerned with what constitutes a 
moral community, and on t h i s turned his ideas of moral freedom. Rights 
are equated with l i b e r t i e s . Rights and obligations are a duel s o c i a l 
relationship i n a s o c i a l system - the former gives man his freedom, while 
the l a t t e r gives him his duties. I n his lecture on 'The Grounds of 
P o l i t i c a l Obligation', Green notes; 
"my purpose i s to consider the moral function or object 
served by law, or by the system of rights and obligations 
which the state enforces, and i n so doing to discover 
the true ground of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for obedience to law." 
I t i s the 'moral function' with which Green was much occupied, for he 
believed that genuine l i b e r a l i s m must follow the guidance of moral 
purposes. The moral purposes he sought were the establishment of a 
more hiuiane'life for the bulk of the population. Thus, we have the 
ideas of a general good to be shared by a l l iirtiich should be the cr i t e r i o n 
of government action. 
I f follows from t h i s kind of theorizing that the cr i t e r i o n for 
l e g i s l a t i o n would be severely limited i f i t rested on individual l i b e r t y 
alone. With his concept of positive freedom entailing that conditions 
be provided for personal fulfilment, the principle of le a s t regulation 
of free choice would be t o t a l l y inadequate to t h i s end. Human needs 
cannot always be assessed i n terms of freedom of choice because many 
situations and conditions of society under which people exist do not 
provide the opportunity for choice at a l l . What Green was saying was 
that l i b e r t y i s not individual but s o c i a l . I t i s concerned with the 
quality of l i f e and society. With such terms of reference, a government 
must a c t i v e l y set about creating the right conditions for human progress. 
1. T.H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of P o l i t i c a l Obligation", 
page 2 9 o 
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by the appropriate l e g i s l a t i o n . I t must influence morality by removing 
those obstacles which stand i n i t s way, such as poverty and degradation, 
lack of education and f a c i l i t i e s for personal improvement. The e t h i c a l 
character of Green's thinking about ?Aiat l i b e r t y stands for i s quite 
c l e a r . I t involves a relationship between dndividuaj. and community; 
man needs a measure of individual l i b e r t y , but man i s also a s o c i a l being 
bonded to the larger s o c i a l group. 
The question lAiich interested Green was, what was the value of the; 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the community on irtiich each of i t s members were so 
dependent? He believed that the answer to t h i s question was that i n s t i -
tutions i n c i v i l l i f e were to be j u s t i f i e d on the ground that they 
provided for the exercise of man's w i l l and reason, the possession of 
which made a moral l i f e possible. W i l l enables a man to achieve s e l f -
s a t i s f a c t i o n by determining his actions, while reason gives man the 
capacity to see the perfection towards which his nature might be fashioned. 
Reason he thought guided the w i l l and thus, made man a f^ee agent, and a 
moral agent. And with t h i s insight into the moral self-perfection which 
i s possible, each man i n society contributes to the improvement of society 
as a whole. Green gives t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a communitys i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
vAien they f u l f i l these c r i t e r i a of making the moral l i f e possible, the 
status of a 'natural law',''' which involves a system of rights and 
obligations. But he does not hold natural rights and obligations as 
meaning that man retains certain sacred inalienable rights which he 
brought with him from a state of nature. Accepting that the conception 
of n a t u r a l rights i s untenable, he i s at pains to j u s t i f y that there i s 
another sense of natural rights and obligations which does e x i s t . What 
1, T.H. Green, "Lectiares on the Principles of P o l i t i c a l Obligation", 
page 3 3 , section 7o 
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Green means by ' n a t u r a l ' here i s simply 'necessary' as a means t o the 
r e a l i z a t i o n of the t r u e end of human so c i e t y . Green d i s t i n g u i s h e s r i g h t s 
and o b l i g a t i o n s from moral d u t i e s , p o i n t i n g out t h a t though the l a t t e r 
are r e l a t e d t o the former, the d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t moral du t i e s cannot 
be enforced by law. A person can be l e g a l l y enforced t o act i n a 
c e r t a i n way according t o a duty, but the very nature of a duty i s t h a t 
i t r e s t s on c e r t a i n d i s p o s i t i o n s and motives, which because of t h e i r 
p u r e l y mental character do not admit of eforcement: 
" I t appears, then t h a t l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s - o b l i g a t i o n s 
which can p o s s i b l y form the subject of p o s i t i v e law -
can only be o b l i g a t i o n s t o do or abstain from c e r t a i n 
a c t s , not d u t i e s o f a c t i n g from c e r t a i n motives, or 
w i t h a c e r t a i n d i s p o s i t i o n . " ^ 
The k i n d of outward acts t o which l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s should be applied 
are. Green t e l l s us, those which are necessary (and would not be achieved 
otherwise) t o the maintenance of the soc i e t y and the achievement of the 
moral. £nd t o which the existence of the so c i e t y i s the means. The f u n c t i o n 
of l e g a l i t y i s not, i n Green's view, merely t o p r o t e c t the l i b e r t y o f the 
i n d i v i d u a l . This theory has served i t s purpose i n soci e t y , but i s no longer 
r e l e v a n t . I n the i n t e r e s t s of a so c i e t y on the move, a society progressing 
t o higher forms of c i v i l i z a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y from a moral po i n t of view, 
i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i b e r t y t o do as he pleases i n a sine 
qua non. But Green's conception of m o r a l i t y was not p a t e r n a l i s t i c : 
"The r e a l f u n c t i o n o f government being t o maintain con d i t i o n s 
of l i f e i n which m o r a l i t y s h a l l be possible, and m o r a l i t y 
c o n s i s t i n g i n the d i s i n t e r e s t e d performance, or self-imposed 
d u t i e s , 'paternal government' does i t s best t o make i t 
impossible by narrowing the room f o r the s e l f - i m p o s i t i o n o f 
d u t i e s and f o r the play of d i s i n t e r e s t e d motives."^ 
Green repudiates the theory of n a t u r a l r i g h t s as t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
understood, i . e . derived from some s t a t e of nature and re t a i n e d i n a 
1. T.H. Green, "Lectures on the P r i n c i p l e s of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n s " , 
page 37» s e c t i o n 14. 
2. T.n". Green, "Lectures on the P r i n c i p l e s of P o l i t i c a l O bligations", 
pages 59-40, s e c t i o n 18. 
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contract between people and government. To Green i t i s the moral end 
of l e g i s l a t i o n which i s in^ortant and what he accepts as being 'natural 
r i g h t s ' are those powers necessary for a member of society to achieve the 
moral end. And law i s j u s t i f i a b l e on these grounds alone. There can be 
no r i g h t s without obligations; man claims rights from society, and society 
counter-claims obligation from man, and the end product of t h i s r e l a t i o n -
ship i s the moral perfection or i d e a l of man. This arrangement rests on 
the recognition of a common good accepted as a personal good by each 
in d i v i d u a l member of society. Each individual i s thus, an end i n himself 
and his l i b e r t y i s ensured through universal recognition of the same 
freedom for a l l . These rights or l i b e r t i e s are basic to the development 
of a moral personality, for without them the individual i s unable to 
accept the common good as h i s own good. However, rights are only conferred 
on individuals as they are members of a society who have sublnitted to 
common aims and interests:. Without organized i n s t i t u t i o n s to direct the 
l i f e of society i n a l l directions of the common good, no individual rights 
could e x i s t : 
"To ask why I am to submit to the power of the state i s 
to ask irtiy I am to allow my l i f e to be regulated by that 
complex of i n s t i t u t i o n s without which I l i t e r a l l y should 
not have a l i f e to c a l l my own, nor should be ablesto ask 
for a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of what I am called on to do," 
Because r i g h t s are derived from membership of a society, i t follows that 
unsocial actions claimed as rights by anyone are a contradicition, for 
being a member of society e n t a i l s the s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n of ones powers to 
an extent which harmonizes with the exercise of the power of the other 
members of that society. The objection to t h i s , that one might claim the 
r i g h t to r e s i s t because he had not consented to the r e s t r i c t i o n of his 
T.H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of P o l i t i c a l Obligation", 
page 122, section 114. 
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powerii i s countered by G-reen, i n that, not consenting would e n t a i l a 
f o r f e i t u r e of a l l rights f o r that person. This i s because powers, as 
r i g h t s , are obtained only as a resul t of membership of a society. 
G-reens e t h i c a l model was not individual l i b e r t y per se, but a 
mutual relationship between ind i v i d u a l and community. Without t h i s , 
no r e a l i n d i v i d u a l development i s possible, he thought, f o r t h i s depends 
on the existence of a society capable of creating social bonds s u f f i c i e n t l y 
strong t o ensure the survival and advancement of the group. The develop-
ment of the human personality can only be realized i n group membership, 
and i n playing a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n the functioning of that group. And 
the s o c i a l group, 6-reen held, was a natural consequence of the nature of 
man - there was i n him a convulsion t o be a member of a society, and i t 
was t h i s that was more inportant than force i n holding society together 
and making progress possible. I n other words, i t was the social group, 
rather than the i n d i v i d u a l through which the laws of survival worked, a 
/ view, as we s h a l l see lateiQ.tbatvBs diametrically opposed to Spencer's 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n of the concept of natural selection. 
The new liberalism, of T.H. G-reen acknowledged the social impulse 
as natural t o man, and rejected laissez-faire type individualism as 
being at variance with the ideal moral p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of mankind. The 
ide a l end of moral development i s the moral eqaulity of every member of 
a society, each respecting the other's freedom of thought and action as 
responsible cit i z e n s . For t h i s state to be realized, force i n society 
must be reduced t o the minimum, f o r i t detracts from the individual as 
a moral agent himself. This kind of thinking clearly brings out Green's 
position regarding the function of the social group. Society i s not an 
end i n i t s e l f , but i s as Kant said, a "Kingdom of ends, each person being 
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' aulend i n himself". Realization of the aim of moral self-determination 
and moral d i g n i t y i s the reason f e r the. existence of a c i v i l i z e d 
community wi t h i t s system of r i g h t s , obligations and duties as Green saw 
them. These individual ends are recognized and supported by the 
community beca\ise the common good can be realized only through each 
individual being conscious that his achievement of his own well-being 
depends- on membership of the community, i&nd the individual realizes that 
his own personal rights or freedoms must accept some l i m i t a t i o n i n 
deference to the social interests of the entire community. 
Different though Green's views were from the ea r l i e r l i b e r a l thinkers 
we have examined, there remains a basic l i b e r a l element i n his moral 
theorizing which provides an important l i n k with them. This i s his 
insistence on the individual as a moral end i n himself f o r which a society 
exists, and not the other way round. Self-abnegation f o r the sake of the 
state was not Green's advocacy. The individual i s obligated to the social 
system because the - l a t t e r alone can secure his r i g h t s . But t h i s l i b e r a l 
l i n k i s with J. S. M i l l rather than with the e a r l i e r Benthamite t r a d i t i o n , 
f o r Green placed greater emphasis on the ethical than on the legal 
conception of the relationship between individual and community, Bentham 
had claimed that rights were derived from law; but Green regarded law as 
no more than the instrument of fundamental moral principles emerging from 
a growing and progressing public opinion, Natural law, necessary to the 
community, meant j u s t i c e , equity, and humanity, the source from which 
j u r i s t i c law i s infused with s p i r i t . Law then, must work i n close contact 
with morals r- the l a t t e r being the task master f o r government. Green 
believed i n the moral idea of a social conscience which both guides the 
making of, and i s protected by law. This i s also a t r u l y l i b e r a l element 
i n Green's thinking; l i k e Acton be believed that each man must be allovfed 
freedom of conscience f o r i t i s the essence of a l i b e r a l society that each 
man be allovxed to judge f o r himself. This moral freedom was the keystone 
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bf Green's liberalism, but i t could not exist except for a relationship 
to society which entails obligation to that society. I t is only i n the 
context of a society that an individual personality can be endowed with 
l i b e r t i e s . The good l i b e r a l government minimizes coercion and encourages 
moral s e l f - c o n t r o l , and avoids f r u s t r a t i n g the individixal's s e l f -
expression whenever possible. Bach c i t i z e n i s a free participant i n a 
free society i n which government guides and controls i n the l i g h t of the 
idea of freedom of action and judgement f o r a l l men i n so f a r as these 
arise out of a sense of social responsibility. To enable men to achieve 
the l e v e l of sophistication necessary to act and judge responsibly. Green 
looked to the social function of education. He believed, l i k e most other 
l i b e r a l thinkers, i n the idea of social progress. In modem society, the 
policy of education f o r a l l would ensure that the benefits of c i v i l i z a t i o n 
accrue to every one of i t s members. Here was a clear indication of the 
moral superiority of modem nations over ancient ones, f o r did not the 
c i v i l i z a t i o n of antiq u i t y deny i t s c u l t u r a l goods to a l l but an 
aristocracy? 
A f t e r a consideration of Green's idea of what l i b e r t y meant i n the 
l a s t quarter of the 19th century, i t i s evident that he was making a 
Restatement of liberalism. The older l i b e r a l s had attempted to exclude 
the state from i n t e r f e r i n g too much with individual l i b e r t y and the 
operation of market forces. State l e g i s l a t i o n he saw as necessary f o r the 
regulation of commercial and i n d u s t r i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the interests of 
the community at large. Government and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s were 
interlaced so closely that they must both contribute to the ethical progresj 
of society. This change of view brought an entir e l y new meaning to 
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l i b e r a l i s m and to the concept of l i b e r t y , to such an extent that i t raises 
the question whether Green should be included amongst l i b e r a l thinkers. 
Spencer would have said not, f o r i t was his view, that liberalism stood 
fundamentally f o r individualism. Had liberalism not believed that the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the state be kept to a minimum, and had i t not looked to 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l safeguards as a bulwark against interference with freedom 
either from popular despotism or party despotism? Green j u s t i f i e s his 
restatement of l i b e r a l ideology and i t s consequences f o r l i b e r t y with his 
concept of 'positive freedom' which viewed the state as a positive agent 
working via l e g i s l a t i o n to improve the general welfare of i t s citizens. 
Some of the positive actions which he believed the.state should undertake 
were compulsory education f o r a l l , financed by the state, more large scale 
sanitary arrangements f o r the promotion of improved health, better 
standards of housing to improve l i v i n g conditions- and l e g i s l a t i v e control 
of private contracts. Interference w i t h existing property and contractual 
rights was, a f t e r a l l , legitimate where these were hostile to the common 
good. 
T. H. Green might be c l a s s i f i e d as a ' l i b e r a l s o c i a l i s t ' by some. 
But on the other hand i t could be cogently argued that quite properly he 
did not seek to make individual l i b e r t y an end i n i t s e l f , but more 
correctly savr i t as a means to happiness. Md as he was concerned to make 
the advantages of the c i v i l i z e d l i f e open to a l l men, then he was i n 
essence attempting to give a more practical r e a l i z a t i o n to the u t i l i t a r i a n 
p r i n c i p l e of the "greatest happiness of the greatest nvimber". So perhaps 
t h i s inteirpretation places Green more f i r m l y i n the l i b e r a l philosophical 
camp than i n the s o c i a l i s t one. But as his philosophy of liberalism was 
meant to embrace the interests of the community as a whole and thus move 
i t away from i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with middle class interests, to t h i s extent 
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he does, have an a f f i n i t y with many who would give themselves the name 
of s o c i a l i s t . 
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Chapter 6 
Herbert Spencer 
I f the work of Green i s seen as an i n t e l l i g e n t and appropriate 
reaction t o changed circumstances then, that of Herbert Spencer must 
appear to be something of an anachionism. I t i s essentially a 
defence of the kind of individualism and materialism attacked by G-reen 
i n terms of the new preoccupation with evolution made popular by the 
works and followers of Darwin. Spencer i s i n fact the classic represen-
t a t i v e of the school known as Social Darwinists. Though Spencer shared 
the common be l i e f with the other l i b e r a l thinkers i n the i n e v i t a b i l i t y 
of progress f o r mankind, to him thi s did not mean the mitigation of bad 
social conditions by state action. He believed dogmatically i n the 
progress of man through the evolutionary process of the survival of the 
f i t t e s t . To him pain and suffering were necessary burdens which would 
produce good results f o r mankind by enabling only the best to survive. 
Tar the state t o tamper with t h i s process would only thwart these 
b e n e f i c i a l r e s u l t s . 
To understand Spencer's conception of liberalism and the nature of 
l i b e r t y i n t h i s context we must f i r s t look b r i e f l y at how he attempted 
to r e l a t e his social theories to b i o l o g i c a l evolution, f o r i t was t h i s 
irtiich, he thought, gave, his social philosophy i t s s c i e n t i f i c unde]>-
spinning. The basis of his view rested on vdiat he called the "law of 
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iaqual freedom,""' Equal freedom was the freedom of each indimdual 
creature to struggle f o r existence and for the f i t t e s t to survive, IHiis 
so-called freedom of the evolutionary process seen as an' inexorable 
" l i f e force" was analogous to the great systems of natural law of the 
17th Century* Fundamental to t h i s evolutionary theory was an idea 
Spencer came upon when studying physiology, From Von Baer's embryology 
he learned of the law of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and integration, that the 
development of every organism i s a change from homogeneity to hetro-
geneity,"^ This idea was seen AS the cosmic pri n c i p l e working i n the 
physical b i o l o g i c a l and social universes. Spencer deduced organic 
evolution from the conservation of energy principle and argued that 
nature progressed from energy to l i f e , then to mind, mind creating society, 
society evolving to c i v i l i z a t i o n , and from then on to more highly developed 
c i v i l i z a t i o n s o The progress t o higher social organization would only 
come from the survival of the f i t t e s t i n the evolutionary struggle. 
Quoting from his work "Social Statics" I 8 5 I , Spencer says : 
"Note f u r t h e r , that t h e i r carnivorous enemies not only 
remove from herbivorous herds individuals past t h e i r 
prime, but also weed out the sickly; the malformed, and 
the least f l e e t or powerful. ^ the aid of which 
pu r i f y i n g process, as w e l l as by the f i g h t i n g so 
universal i n the pairing season, a l l v i t i a t i o n of the 
race through the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of i t s i n f e r i o r sample 
i s pz^vented; and the maintenance of a constitution 
oon^letely adapted to surrounding conditions, and 
therefore most productive of happiness, i s ensured."3 
Arguing on t h i s basis, progress i n human a f f a i r s i s thus, only ensured 
i f the weak and incapable are thrust aside f o r the sake of the survival 
1, H. Spencer, "The Man v The State", page 14O, 
2, H, Spencer, "The Man • The State;", page 21, 
3, H. Spencer, "The Man v The State"', page 139. 
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of the strong and the best. This relentless process. Spencer saw as 
the "decrees of a large, farseeing benevolence,"'^ 
Survival of the f i t t e s t v i a natural selection enabled some of the 
species, homosapiens, t o endure i n the savage and primitive times. But 
t h i s survival mechanism, says Spencer, s t i l l continues to work i n more 
advanced environments. C i v i l i z e d men can survive only by developing 
capacities other than brute strength. C i v i l i s e d l i f e requires special 
types of i n t e l l e c t , and the a b i l i t y to defer immediate g r a t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
the sake of greater goods to come. The way to progress, we are t o l d i s 
bound t o r e s u l t i n misery f o r some because they are not f i t t e d f o r the 
evolving conditions of society. To attenpt to remove the unhappy con-
d i t i o n s i s f u t i l e f o r the evolutionary process i s winding i t s way forward 
and shaping mankind to i t s t e l e o l o g i c a l purposes. The unhappiness, misery, 
and degradation which i t wrecks i n i t s way are necessary evils vriiich must 
be borne: 
",,. No power on earth, no cunningly-devised laws of 
Statesmen, nowoi-ld-rectifying schemes of the humane, 
no commimist panaceas, no reforms that men ever did 
broach or ever w i l l broach, can diminsh^ them one j o t . 
I n t e n s i f i e d they may be, and are; and in preventing 
t h e i r i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n , the philanthopics w i l l f i n d 
ample scope f o r exertion. But there i s bound up with 
the change a 'normal' amount of suffering, which cannot 
be lessened without a l t e r i n g the very laws of l i f e . " 2 
A measure of syiq}athy among men. Spencer t e l l s us, i s acceptable, but 
only i n so f a r as i t does not in t e r f e r e with the "law of equal freedom", 
f o r i n t h i s case i t might resu l t i n the "pure e v i l " of suspending " i n 
some p a r t i c u l a r department of l i f e the relationship between c o n s t i t u i t i o n 
and conditions'i"^ Tlllhen t h i s occurs suffering may be decreased temporarily 
1. H. Spencer, "The Man v The State", page IW. 
2. H. Spencer,"The Man v The State", page IW. 
3. H. Spencer,'The Man v The State", page lAX), 
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but i n the long run i t i s i n fact increased, because those who are not 
the f i t t e s t f o r l i f e are allowed^; to survive and multiply and become an 
encumbrance t o those better adapted f o r existence. 
The support f o r his thesis Spencer took from Darwin's woric, 
"Origin of the Species"; but was inaccurately conveyed by his analogy. 
Darwin was not committed to the view that the f i t t e s t are the best. Nor 
to the idea that the survival of the f i t t e s t j u s t i f i e d the annihilation 
of the less f i t . Unlike Spencer, he was aware of the essential part 
balance played i n nature - Spencer's position was nearer t o that of 
Lamazk than t o that of Darwin. The b e l i e f i n the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics seems t o play a prominent part. I t was t h i s view of 
evolution which led Spencer t o think that i t was the individual and not 
the social group which evolved. Society, he understood, to r e f l e c t the 
advancement of i t s members. A l l his thinking on ethics, p o l i t i c s and 
economics was coloured by t h i s idea of organic evolution. He saw society 
as the outcome of natural development and not as something which was 
manufactured by government. Society he deemed, i s i n a sense, a natural 
organic struciuremade up of the interdependent i n s t i t u t i o n s of government, 
r e l i g i o n , industry, commerce and so on. I t cannot be moulded or shaped 
as communists or s o c i a l i s t s think, nor arranged as many Liberal Acts of 
Parliament were designed t o arrange i t . 
Spencer eulogised the liberalism of the past as being guided by the 
true principles of individual l i b e r t y . The l e g i s l a t i o n r e f l e c t i n g these 
principles he claims are legion. Some of the exajnplea given by him are: 
the repeal'^of the Combination Acts, and the ending of measures which 
interfered with the freedom of t r a v e l f o r artisans; the freedom f o r 
Catholics t o practice t h e i r r e l i g i o n ; the acts irtiich forbade the buying 
and bonding of negroes. There was also the Reform B i l l , and the 
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Municipal Reform B i l l which narrowed the p o l i t i c a l serfdom, thus l i f t i n g 
coercion of the many by the few. These measures, and many more favourable 
t o i n d i v i d u a l freedom, were brought about either by li b e r a l s themselves, 
or under the influence of l i b e r a l principles. The philosophy of 
lib e r a l i s m at t h i s time was t o emphasize voluntary cooperation and weaken 
compulsory cooperation. But the liberalism of the present. Spencer 
asseirbs, has l o s t sight of i t s true principles of l i b e r t y , i t presents an 
ideology which i s reflected i n increasing coercive l e g i s l a t i o n and th i s 
diminishes the freedom of action of individuals. Liberal policies i n the 
past, we are t o l d , were of "a kind 7*iich abolished grievances, and 
attenuated e v i l s , which were the cause of much unhappiness. These were 
negative measures, which came to be recognized as a positive advantage. 
I t was t h i s kind of thinking which led Liberals, Statesmen and voters 
a l i k e , t o view liber a l i s m as standing f o r a po l i c y of positive social 
welfare. This confusion about what liberalism r e a l l y stands f o r has, 
says Spencer, been brought about by mistaking the indirect relaxation of 
re s t r a i n t (true concept of liberalism) with more direc t measures requiring 
coercive l e g i s l a t i o n (false conception of li b e r a l i s m ) . 
The consequences of what Spencer deems t o be a reversal of l i b e r a l 
p o l i c y are, he thinks, clear to see. The measures which he condemns as-
unnecessary State interference with the freedom of the individual began 
at the time of the second administration of Lord Palmerstom (l86o), but 
we s h a l l confine ourselves t o some of the examples which Spencer gives; 
of State encroaching l e g i s l a t i o n under Gladstone's f i r s t ministry and 
l a t e r . There i s the i n s t i t u t i o n of the State Telegraphy -System, 
accompanied by the p r o h i b i t i o n of private telegraphing agencies; the 
authority of the Secretary of State t o regulate hired conveyances i n London; 
regulations t o prevent the spread of cattle diseases; a Beer House 
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Regulations Act; and a sea-birds Preservations Act, Then there i s the 
Education Act which provides f o r the setting up of School Boards with 
the power to purchase sites f o r schools, some of vhldci may allow free 
education paid f o r by the l o c a l rates, and to make schooling compulsory. 
There were additional Factories and Workshops Acts, placing r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on the employment of women and children i n fTuit-preserving and curing 
works. Then, under another ministry, there was i n 1880, a law vrtiich 
forbade conditional advance notes i n payment of sailors wages; a further 
law was enacted t o increase l o c a l authority power t o compel school 
attendance. I n 1882, the Board of Trade was given power t o grant licences; 
t o generate and s e l l e l e c t r i c i t y , and municipal bodies were enabled t o 
levy rates f o r e l e c t r i c - l i g h t i n g . And so Spencer goes on enumerating 
the fu r t h e r compulsory l e g i s l a t i o n which he feared would come i n the 
future involving more and more r e s t r i c t i o n s on the l i b e r t y of the i n d i v i -
dual c i t i z e n . Broadly speaking. Spencer was opposed t o a great deal of 
the regulation of industry, t o sanitary regulations, t o public charity 
and state support f o r education. A l l of these measures, iriiich would be sanc-
tioned under T,H, Green's conception of "positive freedom", were anathema 
to Herbert Spencer. 
I t might be claimed as a counter t o these fears of state regulation 
that they are j u s t i f i e d on the grounds that they are brought about by a 
democratic legislature created, and sanctioned i n i t s operations, by 
the people themselves. Spencer repudiates t h i s reasoning, saying, that 
the coercion doled out, remains a curtailment of the individual l i b e r t y 
regardless of whether the subject had a voice i n creating the l e g i s l a t i v e 
body by democratic process, or whether i t was a despotism established 
against his wishes: 
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" I f men use t h e i r l i b e r t y i n such a way as to surrender 
t h e i r l i b e r t y , are they thereafter any less slaves? I f 
people by a p l e b i s c i t e elect a man despot over them, do 
they remain free because the despotism was of t h e i r own 
making?"1 
Spencer i s here expressing the same fear of despotism by popular consent 
as was expressed by a l l the other writers we have consulted with the 
exception of T.H. G-reen. This i s t o be expected, f o r Spencer clearly 
belongs to the e a r l i e r l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n . Despite the f a c t that his 
laissez-faire concept of l i b e r t y would stand against p r a c t i c a l l y a l l 
measures of reform and e f f o r t s to promote social welfare, he claimed that 
true l i b e r a l i s m should concern i t s e l f with challenging the assumption 
of unlimited parliamentary authority, as i t did the assunrption of unlimited 
monarchical authority. Thus, he stresses: 
1 
"that the l i b e r t y which a c i t i z e n enjoys i s to be 
measured, not by the nature of the governmental 
machinery he liv e s under, whether representative 
or other, but by the relativegPaucity of the 
r e s t r a i n t i t inposes on him." 
A l l coercion of the in d i v i d u a l , a l l restraints on his l i b e r t y must be 
l i m i t e d t o those necessary t o prevent the transgressions of the l i b e r t y 
of others. 
This c r i t i c i s m of the growing power of government over the i n d i v i -
dual i s taken up again i n Spencer's chapter "The Great P o l i t i c a l 
Superstition". His attack i n t h i s section of 'Man v The State' i s 
directed against what he refers to as "the divine r i g h t of parliament",^ 
which he regards as a superstition no more credible than the b e l i e f i n 
the divine r i g h t of kings. Spencer's purpose i s to challenge the idea 
that a government's authority i s unlimited. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the 
1. H. Spencer, "The Man v The State", page 78. 
2. H. Spencer, "The Man v The State", page 79. 
3. H. Spencer, "The Man v The State", page 151. 
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absolute power of the monarch i n e a r l i e r times was that his power was 
delegated to him by divine w i l l . Ptodem government cannot claim such 
supematiiral aegis. But, claims Spencer, governments have s t i l l tended 
to hold on to t a c i t acceptance of such luilimited power as though t h e i r 
law-making was under the behest of God. I n t h i s way has arisen the 
b e l i e f that an Act of Parliament has unlimited authority. But Spencer 
refuses to be influenced by the suggestion, and disputes the concept of 
a Sovereignty of Parliament as he would the sovereignty of a despotic 
r u l e r ; Rulie by the many, or the r i g h t of the majority, does not give 
unlimited authority to the legislature i t elected. 
Spencer then proceeds to show that the so-called " r i g h t of the 
majority i s a purely conditional r i g h t , v a l i d only within specific l i m i t s . " 
He points out that i f an organization were established f o r the purpose 
of following a p a r t i c u l a r programme of aims, and the majority of i t s 
members were to decide to follow a course of action incompatible with 
these aims, then the rest of the members would not be duty bound by sucly 
a decision. The action would be pronounced 'xiltra v i r e s ' , and i t would 
be asking the membership to give support f o r policies which were beyond 
the organization's terms of reference. I n the same way, members of a 
state would only be obliged to follow a maj.ority decision i f i t were i n 
l i n e w i t h the objectives agreed to when the government was established. 
I n t h i s case a contract would stand, but i f the government were to carry 
out p o l i c i e s , i n the name of the majority, which were not specified at 
the outset, then no contract between a l l the members of the society wauld 
be v a l i d , and f o r the minority to be coerced in t o acceptance of these 
po l i c i e s by the majority, i s sheer tyranny. Spencer here expresses the 
same fear of the 'tyranny of the majority' as did J-S. M i l l . Thus, i t 
1. H. Spencer, "The Man v The State", page I56, 
1 
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would seem that a supremacy of a majority over a minority can only be 
morally j u s t i f i e d i n the case where the proposal i s i n accordance with the 
purpose of society as such. The w i l l of the majority, then, may only be 
forced w i t h i n d e f i n i t e l i m i t s , beyond which i t s power must be restrained. 
I n discussing the idea of "nat.ural r i g h t s " Spencer's interest i s i n 
how f a r the in d i v i d u a l has rights against the community. To know t h i s i s 
essential t o knowing the proper function and scope of government. He 
rejects the current thinking of his day that there are no such things as 
natural r i g h t s . The evidence f o r the existence of "natural rights" i s f o r 
Spencer overwhelming. Are not t r i b e s regulated i n t h e i r conduct by custom 
p r i o r to the advent of government? The Bechuanas, the Koranna Hottentots, 
the Arancanians, the Kirghizes are a l l controlled by custom. The authority 
of such customs are so revered by primitive men that they l i m i t the power 
of government when i t i s established. These customs have the authority 
to overrule governmental power because they avow certain individual rights 
which guarantee certain personal actions and possessions. Spencer's point 
i s that r i g h t s are not the creation of the law, but were recognized before 
the existence of law, deep i n the heritage of custom. Further evidence 
t o support t h i s contention that "natural rights" pre-date government i s 
that t h e i r exists almost universal correspondence i n the rights revered by 
d i f f e r e n t nations. The same kinds of aggressions against others are almost 
universally condemned: homicide, t h e f t , adultery, breach of contract, l i b e l , 
false witness and so on. This basic conformity amongst nations about 
essential rights i s : 
"because the alleged creating of rights was nothing else 
than giving formal sanction and better d e f i n i t i o n t o 
those assertions of claims and recognitions of claims 
which naturally originate from the individual desires . 
of men who have to l i v e i n the presence of one another." 
1. H. Spencer, "The Man v The State", page I67. 
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I f t h i s be the case, that man possesses certain natural r i g h t s , then i t 
i s the duty of the state to preserve them, to sanction and defend them. 
This makes government the servant of the individual and not vice versa. 
The idea of "natural r i g h t s " i s based on Spencer's evolutionary 
individualism. The assumption he makes i s that l i f e i s j u s t i f i a b l e . I f 
l i f e i s j u s t i f i a b l e , then l i f e sustaining a c t i v i t i e s are also j u s t i f i a b l e . 
Individual l i b e r t i e s are l i f e sustaining so individual l i b e r t i e s are 
j u s t i f i a b l e and thus must be 'natural'. Social l i f e i s prompted by the 
'natural' needs of the i n d i v i d u a l . Living and working i n groups not only 
ensures the survival of the groups qua groups, but more important, recognizes 
the r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l . And, i t i s the maintenance of individual 
r i g h t s on i^iLchthe; l i f e of society depends. I t would seem thai, according 
to Spencer, that the individual has natural r i g h t s which are to be protected 
by government, and that there can be no unrestricted state power over 
individuals i n any sense of the divine r i g h t s which once belonged to kings. 
Thus, the idea that the power of popular government i s unbridled, because 
i t s sovereignty resides i n the w i l l of the majority, i s declared by 
Spencer to be a p o l i t i c a l superstition. Government i s merely a committee 
of management which, while i t obtains i t s authority from those who elect 
i t ' , must not go beyond the specific l i m i t s of i t s terms of reference, even 
i f sanctioned by the majority, f o r even these terms of reference are 
conditional on the maintenance of certain basic "natural r i g h t s " of the 
individual which existed p r i o r to government. 
Prom what Spencer has said, the concept of liberalism which he seeks 
to maintain i s that which concerns the freedom of the individual against 
state encroachment and interference. This i s i n contrast to T.H. Green's 
theory of liberalism, which was a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of state interference i n 
the l i v e s of individuals f o r the purpose of improving t h e i r social 
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well-being, and i n t h i s way increasing t h e i r l i b e r t y by providing them; 
with greater opportunities f o r self-expression and f u l f i l m e n t . Spencer's 
theory emphasizes the "natural l i b e r t i e s " of men, and condemns state 
interference with these as an intrusion and as self-defeating. Preserving 
the conditions favourable to the evolutionary process alone w i l l lead to 
human progress. 
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Chapter 7 
Francis C. Montague 
The l i b e r a l ideology of l i b e r t y i n the 19th century was not 
something s t a t i c . I t did not even embrace a blue-print f o r an ideal 
society as was the case with communism or even socialism. This fact 
has emerged quite cle a r l y from the works of the writers we have con-
sidered so f a r , f o r each individual p o l i t i c a l philosopher has expressed 
his own personal view as to the meaning and function of l i b e r t y . In. the 
l a s t quarter of the l ^ t h century increased government l e g i s l a t i o n which 
inte r f e r e d with individual freedom became necessary to meet the changing 
circumstances which individualism had brought i n i t s t r a i n , and a change 
of emphasis from individual and negative ideas of l i b e r t y to collective 
and positive ideas of l i b e r t y becajne more and more apparent. Thus, 
l i b e r t y to some of the l i b e r a l thinkers v/as not something which eould be 
delimited and set up as a personal r i g h t to freedom as J-S. M i l l , Acton 
and Spencer had attempted to do. That Liberty meajit more than individual 
freedom from the interference of others, or of the state, i n ones 
a c t i v i t i e s , was the view, as we have seen, of T.H.i'Green. This was also 
the b e l i e f of F.C. Montague as presented i n his book; "The Limits of 
Individual Liberty". 
Montague's contention was that the high hopes of the advocates of 
ind i v i d u a l l i b e r t y f o r the progress i t would achieve f o r mankind had not 
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been j u s t i f i e d . The basic idea held by the ideologues of individualism 
was, says Montague, that the elimination of unnecessary restraints and 
privileges would produce the good society, and the acts of statesmen 
would become gratuitous. This idea rested upon the assumption that 
human nature was basically good, but that society, being bad, corrupted 
i t . I f the individual were l e f t to follow his own good i n s t i c t s and 
reason, without the debasing interference of the i n s t i t u t i o n s of society, 
he would more readily do what was r i g h t . This kind of thinking relegated 
the state to the protection of individual freedom against disorder. And 
such f a i t h was placed i n the efficiency of the freedom of the individual 
that i t was believed l i t t l e else need be secured to guarantee progress: 
"His unsatisfied desired w i l l constrain to industry; the 
- multitude of workers w i l l involve competition; and 
competition w i l l stimulate to t h e i r richest growth a l l 
the virtues and a l l the fa c u l t i e s of man. This doctrine 
may be called the doctrine of negative freedom. Few 
speculative doctrines have had so f a i r a t r i a l i n 
practice."^ 
But the achievement which the propounders of individual freedom 
had looked f o r had not ensued. A hundred years of pursuing a policy of 
individual freedom, Montague asserts, had not produced the expected 
human greatness and happiness. The v a r i a b i l i t y i n J.S. M i l l ' s sense, 
which individual freedom i t was thought would produce, had not resuLted 
i n the fullness of human character. Nor had i t made men content. The 
fact was, according to Montague, that discontent and pessimism was the 
order of the day and was reflected i n the melancholy which pervaded art 
and l i t e r a t u r e . And the reason f o r such a state of a f f a i r s was the belief 
i n a freedom which was unqualified. Other l i b e r a l thinkers had held that 
1. i'.C. Montague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 4. 
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progress to a better society would only come by maJcing man as free as 
possible. Montague had doubts about the t r u t h of t h i s proposition 
promulgated as a law of social movement. I f unqualified freedom entailed 
unlimited competition with a l l i t s grossness, could t h i s be termed human 
progress? Some pra c t i c a l men might think so, but the more poetic and 
r e l i g i o u s temperament regarded progress as a unifying process accompanied 
by a peaceful t r a n q u i l i t y and achievement. The ruthlessness of a com-
p e t i t i v e milieu i n which c o n f l i c t gave vi c t o r y to the strong by trampling 
down the weak was anathema to the i d e a l i s t and to be rejected as human 
progress. Thus, unqualified freedom and i t s concomitant, unlimited 
competition wffi'e morally offensive. The question which Montague seeks to 
answer i s what i s the true principle of social l i f e ? Is i t competition 
or co-operation? The answer to t h i s question has profound consequences 
for the theory of p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y . Those who count true freedom to 
mean every man being l e f t to himself w i l l acclaim unbridled competition 
as natural and-beneficialBut those who aver, that progress i s bound up 
with co-operation, w i l l say that the organization which t h i s makes 
inevitable w i l l necessarily c u r t a i l individual freedom for the sake of 
the benefit of the group. The l a t t e r postulate comes within the concept 
of socialism and was regarded i n Montague's day as being irreconcilable 
with freedom. But t h i s 'Socialist' attitude was also embraced by l i b e r a l s 
such as T.rl. Green who, i n contrast to M i l l and Spencer, did not think 
that society could be improved f o r the majority of mankind by allowing 
each individual to behave as he desired except i n cases where gross 
i n j u r y to his neighbours resulted. 
The ideal sought f o r by such thinkers as Green and Montague was 
a s i t u a t i o n i n which each individual contributed to the advancement of 
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the community at large, gind not merely to his own aggrandizement. 
Individualism was what the c a p i t a l i s t had strived f o r against the con-
s t r a i n t s which the unequal power of the landed classes wielded over him 
at a time when the English constitution worked i n favour of the land-
owners. The l i b e r t y which the c a p i t a l i s t wanted was individual l i b e r t y 
to promote his business as he saw f i t . He attained t h i s aim and enjoyed 
free trade and l i g h t taxation, and the achievement of great wealth. This, 
.says. Montague, i s why the c a p i t a l i s t so readily embraced laissez-faire 
individualism. But the great prosperity of the c a p i t a l i s t class was 
largely at the expense of the labouring classes, whose poverty made them 
no match f o r t h e i r wealthy masters, even though the law was impartial: 
"As between r i c h and poor, an equal law gives 
free play to unequal force."•'• 
The endeavour of the workman thus became the need to protect himself by 
l e g i s l a t i o n favourable to his class. Spencerian survival of the f i t t e s t 
was no answer f o r the working man - t h i s was a philosophy of the strong 
and privileged. The economic salvation of the labouring classes lay i n 
a c o l l e c t i v i s t approach to the amelioration of t h e i r degradation, and 
they paid l i t t l e heed to the c a p i t a l i s t cry of individual freedom. 
2 
"The workman i s ambitious rather f o r his class than f o r himself." I t i s 
t h i s state of things brought about by industrialism, universal male 
suffrage and a new p o l i t i c a l awareness i n the working classes which had 
resulted i n a d i f f e r e n t l e g i s l a t i v e emphasis among statesmen. Thus, the 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of the state had increased, giving a more 'positive' 
slant to ideas of l i b e r t y i n the name of common action f o r the public 
good, as opposed to the principle of laissez-faire individualism. 
1. F.C. Montague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 10. 
2. F.C. iVIontague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 11. 
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Measures had been taken by the state to help support the poor, provide 
f o r education and health, to redistribute income via taxation and to 
assert i t s r i g h t to interfere with freedom of contracts. These were 
a l l positive state actions f o r the common good which could not have been 
j u s t i f i e d under e a r l i e r l i b e r a l principles of negative individual l i b e r t y . 
The government, says Montague, must interfere i n the l i v e s of 
individuals, f o r t h i s i s essential to the improvement of the l i f e of 
artizans and of labourers. I f progress i s to mean anything, then a more 
sa t i s f y i n g l i f e f o r the great mass of the people must be achieved, and 
the oppressive sense of waste removed. A new, more rat i o n a l approach to 
l i b e r t y and liberalism i s what Montague argues f o r . What i s seen as the 
most important task i n society i s not the protection of individual freedom 
at a l l costs, but the reconstruction of society. Liberalism has no time 
f o r consistency; i t must not be bridled by the principles of Ricardo, M i l l , 
and Spencer when the exigencies of the age c a l l f o r a radical change of 
view. This change of policy i s regarded as rat i o n a l because i t i s necessary 
on p r a c t i c a l grounds. No doctrine can be preferred to common sense when 
common sense t e l l s us that human suffering i s unnecessary. 
But to f u l l y understand Montagues position regarding his concept 
of l i b e r t y , we must examine his analysis of the r e l a t i o n between the 
individual and society. I n the second chapter of his book "The Limits 
of Individual Liberty", he c r i t i c a l l y analyses the idea of individual 
l i b e r t y i n English p o l i t i c a l theory. Liberal thinkers from John Locke 
to Herbert Spencer have, claims Montague, assumed the individual to be a 
simple primary f a c t . Society i s nothing more than the relationship between 
these elements. The state, which ensures the continued existence of 
society has been viewed as a necessary e v i l . The function of the state 
from t h i s standpoint i s to protect each c i t i z e n against the violent 
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encroachment of his fellows, and to protect the nation against the violence 
of other nations. Any other functions which such a state may j u s t i f i a b l y 
undertake f o r the good of i t s members must be regarded as the result 
of abnormal circumstances. This p o l i t i c a l theory, says Montague, pre-
supposes a mutual exclusiveness between state action and individual l i f e : 
"The individual i s expansive, organic, l i v i n g ; the 
state i s r i g i d , mechanical, lifeless."•'• 
And the progress of the individual w i l l mean the shrinking of the 
influence of the state i n his l i f e . 
Such a view of man and.society was not a self-evident t r u t h f o r 
Montague as i t was f o r some of his fellow l i b e r a l s . Indeed, he t e l l s us, 
Pericles, Fabius, Plato and Cicero ; i n ancient times would not have under-
stood the opposition i t presupposed between state and c i t i z e n . The states 
of a n t i q u i t y conducted t h e i r a f f i a r s as though the l i f e of both state and 
c i t i z e n were one: 
"... a state was a corporation, citizenship a privilege, 
personal freedom the r i g h t to discharge public duty. 
The body p o l i t i c secured to i t s members everything which 
made l i f e worth l i v i n g ; and i n return i t s members held 
t h e i r l i v e s only f o r the service of the body politic'.'^ 
S i m i l a r l y , i t would have been d i f f i c u l t f o r the men of the Middle Ages 
to understand the modern concept of freedom which Montague was c r i t i c i s i n g . 
The idea of re s t r a i n t s on the individual would not have been comprehended 
because i t was the organization of the universal church which defined the 
purview of individual l i f e . But also i n modem times, says Montague, the 
English notion of freedom i s not entertained too widely on the Continent. 
Republicans and Socialists there do not seek to reduce the influence of 
the state and public opinion to the minimum, but desire that they operate 
1. F.C. Montague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 25. 
2. F.C. Montague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 2?. 
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i n a way that RepublicaJis or Socialists approve of. 
I t seems peculiar to Montague that Englishmen should favour a 
concept of l i b e r t y which views government and i n s t i t u t i o n s with such 
suspicion. The l i b e r t y which the Englishman hallows is both negative 
and unsocial. The individual i n English p o l i t i c a l thought has been 
regarded as supreme. This has been taken f o r granted. But, asks Montague, 
what would the nature of the individual be p r i o r to and apart from society?' 
Montague c r i t i c i z e s the preoccupation with individualism i n the three 
schools which have had much influence on English ideas of l i b e r t y . These 
are the Schools of Hobbes and Locke, which claimed that the social system 
stems from the o r i g i n of a social contract; the School of Bentham which 
based social organization on the principle of u t i l i t y ; and the School of 
Spencer which claims that the social system rests upon natural laws of 
evolution v i a natural selection. 
The Social Contract Theory, though proved to be false, says Montague, 
has, even so, contributed to 19th century doctrines of freedom. The 
quintessential aspect of the theory of the Social Contract i s that 
p o l i t i c a l associations arose from the agreement of individuals to sacri-
f i c e some part of t h e i r natural r i g h t s i n order to receive protection from 
authority. But the view held was that the less individual l i b e r t y was 
given up to authority the better, so that p o l i t i c a l association was accepted 
merely as a lesser e v i l than i s o l a t i o n . Competitiveness and self-seeking 
was s t i l l esteemed within the confines of a social contract. And t h i s 
a t t i t u d e has greatly influenced the modern doctrines of negative freedom. 
In Bentham's p o l i t i c a l theory we f i n d that, although he rejected the concept 
of a social contract, he preserved Locke's notion of human actions being 
governed by the avoidance of pain and the enjoyment of pleasure. This, 
Bentham called the u t l i t y p r i n c i p l e , which he claimed was the foundation 
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and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a society; the raison detre of society was thus, 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number, for t h i s resulted i n the 
largest amount of pleasure and the smallest amount of pain. But again 
individualism i s at the heart of t h i s theory, f o r Bentham puts natural 
individual man as the cause which makes p o l i t i c a l association inevitable. 
Bentham, Montague t e l l s us, sees society as no more than a collection of 
individuals, each cleaving to his own idea of the good l i f e f o r himself. 
Society exists to further t h i s individual endeavour. But Montague thinks 
that there i s more to a social system than t h i s . He speaks of the "organic 
incorporation of the individual to society", of "a s p i r i t u a l nature i n man" 
and "a moral purpose i n the state."•*• The individual of the Social Contract 
and Benthamite schools do not recognize such sentiments as devotion to the 
state, and f i n d state interference with i t s members to be an intrusion on 
individual l i b e r t y . 
I t i s the School of Herbert Spencer to which Montague next turns his 
attack. Spencer's approach i s equally i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . The creation of 
Society i s seen as stemming from the nature of the individual. Society 
i s a natural organism which has evolved to meet the needs of the evolving 
i n d i v i d u a l . Ifatural forces, chemical, mechanical; animal inst i n c t s such 
as hunger, t h i r s t , reproductionj and the f i n e r i n s t i c t s of love and powr 
love of beauty, and even talents and virtue s , express themselves i n the 
struggle f o r survival which i s the cause of human development and social 
progress. But claims such as these are wholly incompatible with the 
social misery of the present times. They have been put to the test and 
they are obviously wanting. 
1. F.C. Montague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 40. 
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Montague called into question t h i s entire approach to l i b e r t y . 
Accepting that individual energy i s required to make a nation r i c h , he 
questioned whether t h i s alone can c i v i l i z e a nation. Great objects, he 
believes, are achieved by men working c o l l e c t i v e l y . This i s true, he t e l l s 
us, i n the r e l i g i o u s , moral, a r t i s t i c and s c i e n t i f i c f i e l d s as well as in. 
the p o l i t i c a l and economic. He condemns the self-centred and self-contained 
individual as being l i t t l e removed "from the strong and s o l i t a r y beast, 
Both are l i m i t e d i n t h e i r a c t i v i t y to self-pleasure, but for c i v i l i z e d 
achievements beyond t h i s they are helpless. 
Montague i s at pains to refute the contention that the qualities of 
society are determined by the qu a l i t i e s of the individual, the idea that 
society can be deduced from individual biology and psychology. His case 
i s that we cannot deduce society, from the individual, because the l a t t e r 
cannot have a separate existence from society. Nor can we on the other 
hBid deduce the individual from society, f o r society cannot exist indepen-
dently of the individual. The t r u t h might be, he thinks, that there i s an 
inter a c t i o n between the individual and society, and that neither can be 
understood without the other. He makes the point that the individual i s 
only what he i s i n r e l a t i o n to other things. Thus, i t makes sense to say 
that the individual can only be understood i n his relationship to the 
t o t a l i t y of people, events, and circumstances. With regard to the r e l a t i o n -
ship e x i s t i n g between an individual and other individuals, Montague i s 
saying that personality i s a social term having meaning only i n a social 
context i.e. man's relationship with his fellows. For how can a man be 
regarded as moral or p o l i t i c a l except i n his moral and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n -
ship with others? I t seems to be the case then, that i n order to ascertain 
1. F.C. Montague, "The Limit of Individual Liberty", page 51. 
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the relationship between man and society, the structure of society must 
be known, which means that the individual cannot be usefully studied 
without also studying society. So the proposition that knowledge of the 
individual explains society i s confounded because society i t s e l f has to 
be r e l i e d on f o r an explanation of the individual. Thus, man can only be 
studied as a social animal, and not as a separate e n t i t y existing apart 
from society. Any study of the biology and psychology of man must be from 
an environmental stantpoint. The proposition which Montague believes true 
i s that interaction between the individual and society means that they 
determine each other. 
This view of p o l i t i c a l science determines Montague's conception of 
l i b e r t y . The individual i s inextricably t i e d to society. He i s a member 
of a social and p o l i t i c a l community from the beginning of l i f e . The social 
orgajiization which has shaped his parents and a l l others he w i l l associate 
with, w i l l also shape him, because as a c i t i z e n he w i l l have received the 
influence of the principles and i n s t i t u t i o n s on which the state i s founded. 
This social organization has developed over a long time to sati s f y the 
wants of human beings and make f o r t h e i r greater security. And, claims 
Montague, research into the early history of i n s t i t u t i o n s has taught us 
that social union i s a growth natural to mankind, and that freedom f o r 
individuals has meaning only i n a social context, f o r l i b e r t y without laws 
i s a nonsense. Thus, only membership of a society can lead to freedom. 
In t h i s way Montague seems to be echoing T.ri. Green i n that rights imply 
obligations f o r both the subject and the state. 
Montague outlines the areas i n which the state ought to discharge 
functions. I n doing so he gives power of influence to the state that 
would have been anathema to e a r l i e r l i b e r a l philosophers, as i t was to his 
contemporary, Herbert Spencer, Apart from the state being responsible f o r 
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public defence and f o r keeping order i n the dominions with which a l l l i b e r a l s 
would concur, he extends the interference of the state i n many areas which 
not a l l l i b e r a l thinkers would have found palatable. For example, the 
state, he says, should undertake i n d u s t r i a l enterprise i n countries where 
private capital i s not p l e n t i f u l f o r the task of production. Roads, 
railways, postal and telegraph systems should be under the exclusive control 
of the state. He i s also concerned that the d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth be 
regulated by the state. He rejects the acceptance of market forces 
governing the d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth as wasteful. Enormous fortunes, he 
says, must be discouraged becacsie of t h e i r corrupting influence upon t h e i r 
possessors, and upon the rest of the population who observe i t s resulting 
indolence, luxury and extravagance. Graduated taxation i s to be exercised 
to reduce the inequalities of wealth. The state must also relieve the 
distress of paupers. Public money i s to be invested i n land or houses to 
be l e t or sold. The state should also take responsibility f o r providing 
the best possible education f o r i t s citizens; and t h i s entails a good 
primary, good intermediate, and a good academic system of education. I t 
i s also the duty of the state to care f o r the health of the c i t i z e n , 
establishing laws against the adulteration of food, f o r the safety of shops, 
houses, mines and facto r i e s , and f o r the l i m i t a t i o n of hours of labour f o r 
women and children. Furthermore, the state should make f a c i l i t i e s available 
f o r recreation and e d i f i c a t i o n of the citizens, such as parks, museums, 
gymnasiums, l i b r a r i e s , schools of ar t and science.- I n a l l of these measures 
the state interferes i n the l i f e of the individual to provide conditions 
and f a c i l i t i e s f o r his well-being - positive actions which provide him 
with the opportunities f o r s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t i f he so chooses to take 
advantage of them. 
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These fundamental points of Montague's are i n l i n e with the concept 
of 'positive freedom' which T.H. Green regarded as so important to human 
happiness. Merely to prevent the citizensfrom robbing and murdering one 
another i s not the t o t a l function of the state. And a free society i s 
not to be measured by i t s lack of state interference i n the liv e s of i t s 
members. The freedom of unlimited competition and unrestrained discussion, 
which some philosophers advocate f o r normal development, says Montague, i s 
not adequate to i t s task. The strong may benefit from free competition, 
the i n t e l l i g e n t and educated from milimited discussion; but f o r the weak, 
free competition means hopelessness and death, and f o r the unenlightened 
unsusceptible mind, free discussion i s a nonsense. V/hat the state must do 
i s to organize society so that as many of the underprivileged i n the pop-
u l a t i o n as possible can benefit from c i v i l i z a t i o n and take part i n i t s 
a c t i v i t i e s : 
"But take such people i n hand without too nicely sparing 
t h e i r precious i n d i v i d u a l i t y . D r i l l them without remorse 
i n the routine of elementary schools; provide them at 
moderate rents with houses f i t f o r men and women; give 
them a chance of growing up healthy and i n t e l l i g e n t . 
Then competition may do them good. They are armed f o r 
the struggle. I t i s no longer a butchery, but a f a i r 
f i g h t . They have come within the range of discussion. 
They are able to draw an inference and act upon i t . They 
have^the beginnings of hope, of ambition, of public s p i r i t , 
of c u r i o s i t y and taste."^ 
The kind of freedom which allows that a man should be free to do 
what he l i k e s i s destructive of social organization and therefore defeats 
man's higher purposes. According to Montague, the society which i s freest 
i s the one organized f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n of the highest purposes, and t h i s 
organization involves not only individual constraints but positive action 
by government. 
1. F.C. Montague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 175. 
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Montague's conclusion i s t l i a t man has not yet come of age; he has 
not progressed s u f f i c i e n t l y beyond the savage state to the state of 
perfection necessary to enable him to repudiate force i n measures of 
reform and replace i t by argument and rational, persuation. I t seems to 
him (and here we observe an a f f i n i t y w ith J.F. Stephen) that a policy 
of the greatest i n d i v i d u a l freedom consistent v/ith the maintenance of a 
c i v i l society i s not the v/ay to human progress. This being so, then 
coercion t o further t h i s endeavour, provided that i t i s exercised 
responsibly, must not be ruled out, Montague declares, that the working 
classes who have obtained p o l i t i c a l power are by no means enlightened, and 
i n such a state are not amenable to improvement by persuasion alone. 
Therefore, restrainsls and sssistence are necessary for t h e i r improvement, 
Emphazing the way i n which the individual's actions are inextricably 
t i e d up Y / i t h the social actions, Montague further attacks M i l l ' s d i s t i n c -
t i o n , (as d i d Stephen) between self-regarding acts and social acts. Though 
M i l l conceded that no hioman actions could be devoid of influence upon 
society, he maintained that punishment ought not to be administered unless 
the action d i r e c t l y injured society. The example given by M i l l to 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s principle wasthiait of a drunkard, who was not to be punished 
f o r being a drunkard because t h i s was a self-regarding act of inj u r y to 
his own body, but only f o r the harm which his drunkeness 4 i d to .tfee community 
i n the form of violent acts etc. But Montague says: 
"A confirmed drunkard v/eakens his community for every 
useful purpose, f o r national defence, f o r the production 
of wealth, f o r p o l i t i c a l progress, f o r j o i n t moral and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l improvement. He does something worse than 
t h i s . He transmits to his children a bad constitution 
and a powerful impulse to vice. I n each of these respects 
a dininkard offends, and offends most heinously against the 
public v;elfare,"l 
1, F.C. Montague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 186, 
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Thus, Montague maintains against M i l l that a l l actions must have con-
sequences fbr other men as well as f o r the agent, and which w i l l merit 
reward or punishment. Because these so-called self-regarding acts have 
social r e s u l t s . M i l l ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between self-regarding and social 
acts i s impossible to maintain, and we can only t r u l y speak of the degree 
of social acts. I n the example given, drunkeness would be punished v/hen 
a man v/as sentenced f o r not being able to pay his debts or maintain his 
family, because the l a t t e r defaulting would be a resu l t of the habit of 
drunkeness. M i l l might claim that drunkeness i n this case was being 
punished i n d i r e c t l y . Montague asks, i f i t i s punished i n d i r e c t l y then why 
not d i r e c t l y ? For, i f as vfould be the case, a man unable to pay his debts 
or support his family, due to a general commercial depression would not be 
punished, then i n the case of the drunkard, the difference vfhich makes 
the difference i s the habit of drunkeness, and whether or not drunkeness i s 
punished i s a matter of the degree of i t s consequence. V/hat freedom then 
the i n d i v i d u a l may have rests with society and what i t considers as expedient 
to i t s continuation and progress. Conceptions of l i b e r t y such as M i l l ' s , 
which lay down sacrosanct principles are without foundation, claims Montague, 
for man receives his whole character and endowment from his interaction 
T / l t h society, and cannot act apart from society, 
Montague attacks the I n d i v i d u a l i s t view, also held by M i l l , that the 
i n d i v i d u a l i s the best judge of his own happiness. Very often, thinks 
Montague, individuals miss the greater happiness because, i n t h e i r eagerness 
to seize pleasure, they do not consider i t s source or q u a l i t y . But 
Montague even questions that men are able to know v/hat i s most pleasurable 
fo r them. Furthermore, he does not accept that the end of human action 
and happiness i s always pleasure; and i n th i s case the individual v v i l l be 
even less competent to judge what i s best f o r himself. High value i s 
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placed on education i n moral judgement, and as the greater part of mankind 
are not trained to any degree of sophistication i n moral matters, then 
they cannot know what w i l l make them happy. I t i s here again that the 
state i s important i n the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l , because i t i s largely 
the state which i s responsible f o r the moral education of i t s citizens i n 
the moral precepts of the society. But the current elementary education 
i n moral matters, he fe e l s , i s not enough to give the individual the degree 
of moral maturity necessary to make him the best judge of his own happiness 
i n t h i s respect. Even when man iis able to judge what action villi make him 
the most happy, he does not foUovi his better judgement, but instead 
yields to the baser side of his nature: 
"They see vrhat i s r i g h t ; they f a i n do what i s r i g h t ; 
tliey would often be glad of some s l i g h t external 
influence which would constrain them to act i n 
accordance with t h e i r own better nature. But for ^ 
want of strength they actually choose to do wrong," 
I t i s thus clear to Montague that i t i s the duty of the state to interfere 
i n the l i v e s of individuals to a much greater extent than e a r l i e r l i b e r a l 
thought would.hEwe allowed. Without such interference, societyvwould be unable 
to achieve the higher moral ends on which the true happiness of individuals 
depends, 
I f l i m i t a t i o n s on individual actions are necessary to the good of 
manlcind, so are l i m i t a t i o n s on the freedom of discussion. Society has an 
intei-est here too. Freedom of speech to say anything w i l l r e s i i l t i n 
encouraging men to do irresponsible actions, Montague contends. Such 
actions would be punished by the law, and so should the encouragement of 
those actions. He goes even further than t h i s , claiming that i n some 
instances the state should also coerce those who i n c i t e others to transgress 
1, F.C. Montague, "The Limits of Individual Liberty", page 190, 
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the morality of the age. He maintains that the predominating morality 
of the age must be^protected by the state's guardianship. The state, he 
thin k s , would be r i g h t I n punishing those who Impugned moral principles 
which were generally accepted by society, as w e l l as those who violated 
them. M i l l would have objected to t h i s view on the grounds that i f such 
expression of view did not do harm to others, i t ought to be encouraged, 
for i t might prove to be beneficial to mankind by resulting i n a better 
moral p r i n c i p l e being established. Innovators, M i l l thought, were 
important to the progress of society. Montague also allows this p o s s i b i l i t y , 
and thus, recommends a wider l a t i t u d e i n the discussion of morals. But the 
p r i n c i p l e of l i m i t a t i o n s on freedom of discussion, he thinks, must stand 
because of i t s usefulness to society, f o r discussion of p o l i t i c a l and 
reli g i o u s Issues may a l t e r men's.thinking on these subjects and produce 
b e l i e f s v;hlch might have profound consequences fo r society. For example, 
a persuasion that private ov/nershlp of land i s iniquitous might ferment 
ag i t a t i o n against i t . Another examiple i s that a religious sect might 
believe that f a i t h alone j u s t i f i e d t h e i r conduct, and were thus outside 
the prevailing moral law of the land. I n cases such as these, the accepted 
moral code woiild be upset, and therefore, state coercion to prevent the 
propagation of such doctrines would be j u s t i f i e d . 
Like other Victorian l i b e r a l thinkers, Montague believed In human 
progress. He saw the continuance of past, present and future as an 
evolutionary process shaping hianan progress towards ever higher achievements. 
Though admitting the need fo r the coercion of Individuals i n certain 
circumstances, he had great confidence i n the use of reason i n the a f f a i r s 
of men. Reason, he thought, would eventually lead them to a greater 
understanding of one another, and to a greater cooperation i n the creation 
of• a better society. 
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Montague's concept of l i b e r t y , l i k e that of &reen's, placed rather 
more significance upon the notion of positive freedom than i t did upon 
negative freedom. I t also involved the cooperation of individuals i n a 
society as a necessary condition f o r the progress of mankind, thus i t 
repudiated the laissez-faire individualism of Herbert Spencer, Common 
action f o r the public good entailed interference i n the lives of individuals, 
A l i b e r t y too concerned about individual r i g h t s , which only the few could 
enjoy at the expense of the many, was not, i n Montague's opinion, what 
li b e r a l i s m stood f o r . He stressed the importance fo r human progress of 
creating conditions f o r the development, rather than the variety of human 
character. Therefore, the reconstruction of society f o r the benefit of 
a l l was of more value t o human happiness than mere negative individual 
l i b e r t y . Philosophically, he could not entertain any notion of natural 
indefeasible r i g h t s . He argued that rights can only have meaning i n the 
context of society, and as the nature of society changes so does the nature 
of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . 
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Chapter 8 
Henry Maine 
I n his book "Popular Government", Henry Maine strikes a cautionary 
note against the trend tov/ards increasing l e g i s l a t i o n under a l i b e r a l 
democracy. Clearly, his views contrast sharply with those of Green and 
Montague, Maine sets himself the task of testing and evaluating the 
ideas of popular government, democracy, and progress. I n describing what 
l i b e r t y means i n the context of p o l i t i c a l democracy, he takes his cue 
from Thomas Hobbes, who said that p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y was p o l i t i c a l power: 
"When a man bums to be free, he i s not longing f o r the 
.'desolate freedom of the wil d ass', what he wants i s a 
share of p o l i t i c a l government. But, i n wide democracies, 
p o l i t i c a l power i s minced into morsels, and each man's 
portion of i t i s almost i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y small."^ 
Like J.F. Stephen, Maine takes the view that one result of democracy i s 
that the individual i s weak but the masses are strong. At least those who 
lead the masses have a great accumulation of power at t h e i r disposal. The 
power of the people i n a democracy i s not t h e i r own power i n so f a r as i t s 
exercise i s i n the hands of t h e i r leaders. The people w i l l be controlled 
by them i n one way or another, by. cunning, eloquence or the s k i l l e d 
application of commonplaceat This i s the consequence of government resting 
upon a suffrage which gives each man a fragment of p o l i t i c a l power, as 
Hobbes had said. By i t s e l f , t h i s fragment of power i s not efficacious to 
1. H. Maine, "Popular Government", page 29. 
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to i t s holder, but i t i s to the p o l i t i c a l leader, the • wire-puller', who 
u t i l i z e s these fragments. The v/ork of the 'vjire-puller', says Maine, i s 
made possilbe by Party fe e l i n g , a force which is of paramount influence 
on human nature. He likens i t to the primitive combativeness of mankind 
which sets totem against totem. In other words, ordinary men belong to 
one party or another, not by any rat i o n a l conviction, but because of the 
emotional appeal of popular oratory which i s the work of the • v/ire-puller', 
who must exploit t h i s inborn tendency to belong to one .f.action or another, 
by vrhipping up party p o l i t i c a l fervour and l o y a l t y . The effect of t h i s 
process w i l l be that the leaders w i l l cease to voice Opinions other than 
those instrumental i n a t t r a c t i n g the greatest support with the electors. 
Maine sees the extension of the suffrage to be i n the interest of parties, 
and thus, a highly valued devise of the 'wire-puller'. But the result, 
he says, of an electoral system where every adult male and female has a 
vote, and expresses that vote, v / i l l be that government and law w i l l 
descend to a standard which expresses only the average opinion. 
I t i s i n the expression i n government of the average opinion 
following on .the establishment of universal suffrage that Maine sees a 
danger. I t i s thought, he says, that such a p o l i t i c a l constitutional 
change w i l l : 
"promote progress, nev; ideas, new discoveries and 
inventions, new arts of l i f e . " ^ 
But i n the long term, he thinks, a f t e r i n i t i a l destruction of present 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , the result w i l l be, not the Radicalism with which the 
advocates of universal suffrage have been associated but mischievous 
form of Conservatism" which w i l l : 
1. H. Maine, "Popular Government", page 34. 
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"drug society with a potion compared with which 
Eldonine would be a salutory draught."^ 
But Henry Maine is^also concerned about the affect of too much 
government intervention i n the a f f a i r s of the individual and how i t 
might a f f e c t human motives. He fears the demoralizing effect which high 
taxation would have on those vrho are w i l l i n g to work hard and save, and 
on t h i s question he i s at one with Herbert Spencer. Democratic l e g i s l a t i o n , 
when carried beyond moderation, no matter how philanthropic i t s aims, i s 
seen by the t h r i f t y and industrious of mankind as f i s c a l l y oppressive. 
Maine sees the motives which impell men to work and create wealth, and 
which result i n inequalities of wealth d i s t r i b u t i o n , as resulting from the 
struggle f o r existence and the survival of the f i t t e s t , which Spencer had 
so ably expounded i n "Man v the State". I f government based on universal 
suffrage thwarts these human motives, then i t w i l l be acting against a 
fundamental individual freedom, the freedom to be unequal, a^d also setting 
i t s face against a law of human nature. The greater benefit f o r human 
happiness i s thus, i n Maine's view, not more power i n the hands of the 
state to regulate the live s of individuals, but the freedom of private 
enterprise, and individual s t r i v i n g f o r greater personal economic acquisi-
t i o n as the f r u i t of success i n universal competition. 
Democratic government i s seen by l i b e r a l s and progressives generally 
to be "the comer stone of l i b e r t y " . But Henry Maine declares that i t has 
gross shortcomings as a system under which l i b e r t y might f l o u r i s h . To begin 
with, he points out that one of the main d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r democracy l i e s i n 
the nature of man himself. I f democracy is government by the multitude, then 
how can the multitude exert i t s w i l l . The fact i s that only individuals can 
1. H. Maine, "Popular Government", page 35. 
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have w i l l s ; to speak of a collective w i l l i s l o g i c a l l y untenable, f o r 
i t i s attempting to make a class a real e n t i t y . Thus, to t a l k of the 
' w i l l of the people' or 'public opinion', as p o l i t i c i a n s do, can only 
mean: 
"that a great number of people, on a great number of 
questions, can come to an i d e n t i c a l conclusion, and 
foxmd an indentical determination upon i t . " l 
Maine points out that only on the simplest of questions can t h i s be the 
case. On complex questions of p o l i t i c s , trained minds are needed, so to 
think that the great mass of the population can have sound opinions on 
such questions i s merely f a n c i f u l . And i f such opinions were depended upon 
fo r the puirpose of l e g i s l a t i o n , then the result would be ruinous, and 
progress would be thwarted. The t r u t h , Maine t e l l s us, i s that the Demos 
does not have a w i l l of i t s own, making public opinion ^ an independent and 
spontaneous thing, but that i t simply adopts the opinion of one man or a 
few men. This influence upon, or making of, public opinion might be 
engendered by party leaders, or by the press. 
Maine considers that representative government of the English model 
has been a successful form of popular government because the electoral body 
which chose a number of persons to represent i t was not large, and because 
the expressed views of these representatives were not fettered by the 
dictates of t h e i r constituents. They merely vouchsafed to give general 
support f o r certain public p o l i c i e s . This system reduced the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of popular government because of the smaller number of persons who decided 
public questions. But t h i s system i s being eradicated and replaced by one 
based on the assumption that the greater mass of the enfranchised citizens 
can decide important p o l i t i c a l questions themselves. And the parliamentary 
1. H. 1/Iaine, "Popular Government", page 88. 
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representative i s becoming, Maine thinks, a mere mouthpiece of the 
opinions of those who appeal to the people who sent him to the House 
of Commons. This system i s thatof the Party Caucus, which defeats the 
p r i n c i p l e of representative government. Tfifhat has emerged then, to replace 
the unfettered representative i s the instructed delegate, a practice which 
v i t i a t e s the l i b e r t y of the parliamentary representative by c u r t a i l i n g his 
freedom of action. Such practice, says Maine, has arisen as a result of 
the growth of the House of Commons and the variety of opinion clamouring 
f o r expression, the consequence of which might be a revolutionary consti-
t u t i o n a l change, i n that the l e g i s l a t i v e authority of the House of Commons, 
v r i l l be usurped completely by a Cabinet of executive Ministers leading 
the party i n power. 
Henry Maine thought i t to be an error to equate democracy with 
progress: 
"The delusion that Democracy, when i t has had a l l things put 
blinder i t s f e e t , i s a progressive form of government, 
l i e s deep i n the conviction of a particular p o l i t i c a l 
school; but there can be no delusion grosser. I t 
receives no countenance either from experience or from 
p r o b a b i l i t y . " ^ 
England has been made famous, he states, by "the work of minorities, not 
by that of majorities, and much of the reform of the past four hundred 
years, he believes, would not have been realized under an extended franchise 
and large electoral body. Much of the progress which has taken place such 
as the reformation of r e l i g i o n , the t o l e r a t i o n of dissent, the introduction 
of power driven machinery which made the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution, would have 
been prohibited by the conservatism and resistence to change of the mass 
of the population: 
1. H. Maine, "Popular Government", page 97-
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"Even i n our day, vaccination i s i n the utmost danger 
-and we may say generally that gradual establishment 
of the masses i n power i s one of the blackest omens 
f o r a l l l e g i s l a t i o n founded on s c i e n t i f i c opinion, 
which requires tension of mind to understand i t , and 
self-denial to submit to i t . " l 
But l e g i s l a t i o n has become the sign of the times, and, Iiiaine contends, 
w i l l not abate u n t i l the l e g i s l a t i v e power and f u l l authority of the 
state i s vested i n the people as a whole. Democracy, he says, has come 
to be seen as inevitable, and i r r e s i s t a b l e , and because of t h i s i t has been 
given the complimentary name of Progress. But there i s no t r u t h i n the 
proposition that parliamentary reform and l e g i s l a t i v e innovation w i l l be 
always ben e f i c i a l . A more sound proposition, he believes, would be that 
the scope f o r a l l refoim has s t r i c t l i m i t a t i o n s : 
"We can no more argue that, because some past reforms 
-have succeeded, a l l " reforms w i l l succeed, than we can 
argue that, because the human body can bear a certain 
amount of heat, i t can bear an indefinite amoxuit."^ 
And with the growing desire f o r more and more l e g i s l a t i o n , the chances of 
establishing bad l e g i s l a t i v e measures grow more probable. Here Maine i s 
u t t e r i n g Spencer's warning about the unforseen consequences of l e g i s l a t i o n . 
Maine believed i n slow piecemeal reform, accepting the application of the 
Darwinian r u l e , "small changes benefit the organism,"^ as f i t t i n g f o r 
communities of men, and that sweeping p o l i t i c a l reform i s dangerous. 
As our survey has shown, Henry Maine was somewhat hostile to popular 
government; he saw the movement to f u l l democratic government and universal 
suffrage not as an essential element i n an age of progress, as some l i b e r a l 
thinkers did, but as probably not helpful to progress at a l l . He also 
1. H. Maine, "Popular Government", page 98. 
2. Hij-JIaine, "Popylar Government", page I50. 
3. H. Maine, "Popular Government", page 171. 
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viewed ideas of equality as incompatible v;ith ideas of l i b e r t y because 
he believed that democracy, generally accepted by progressives as 
essential to equality, would, i n f a c t , inevitably lead to tyranny. He 
held t h i s opinion because he feared the susceptability of a credulous 
Demos to the manipulation of 'wire-pullers' using the party system to 
t h e i r own and not the public's advantage. He also had great misgivings 
about the benefit of the growing volume of reforming l e g i s l a t i o n , which 
he regarded as the mark of popular governments i n t h e i r efforts to gain 
mass support. 
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Chapter 9 
Henry Sidgwick 
I n the examination of the usage of the woid 'Liberty', Sidgwick 
concentrates on that aspect of i t s meaning which: 
" i s opposed not merely to physical constraint but to 
the moral r e s t r a i n t placed on human inclinations by 
the fear of painful consequences re s u l t i n g from the 
action of other human beings."^ 
On t h i s question of moral r e s t r a i n t , Sidgwick takes issue with the 
Hobbist judgement that freedom i s impaired only by the moral r e s t r a i n t 
of government action. Ho¥bes had held that the "State of Nature" i n 
which no government existed was a state of unlimited l i b e r t y , though at 
the same time, one of perpetual fear of one man f o r another. This idea 
i s a nonsense to Sidgwick, f o r to be restrained by the awe of ones law-
less neighbour i s as inconsistent with l i b e r t y as to be restrained by the 
awe of the magistrate. Sidgwick thinks that l i b e r t y thrives more i n an 
organized or ordered p o l i t i c a l society than i n a Hobbesian state of nature, 
and that l i b e r t y i s endangered by the fear, engendered by human beings 
generally, i n t h e i r capacity to place restraints on the l i b e r t y of other 
human beings. Because t h i s i s the true state of things, i t i s the case 
that legal penalties, though they must diminish l i b e r t y generally, provide, 
a greater l i b e r t y , i n that they furnish protection from private r e s t r a i n t : 
" I t may be said that the end of government i s to 
.promote l i b e r t y , so f a r as government coercion 
1. H. Sidgwick, "The Elements of P o l i t i c s " , page 45 
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prevents worse coercion by private individuals."^ 
Sidgwick also distinguishes between 'constitutional l i b e r t y ' and 
• c i v i l l i b e r t y ' i n a democracy. The former means that a community's 
subjects are free when they are restrained only by the w i l l of the 
subjects acting as a corporate body. This i s when coercion i s exercised 
by the consent of the majority of citizens under a democratic constitution. 
But such a conception of freedom, Sidgwick believes, though important, i s 
d i r e c t l y contrary to the notion of freedom which can be the possession of 
every member of a society. I t i s obvious to Sidgwick, as i t was to M i l l 
and others, that a government whose power i s vested i n a mass electorate 
can place r e s t r a i n t s upon the minority i n the name of the majority, and 
thus, put into practice a form of tyranny against that minority. Yet a 
despotic government might exercise only that amount of coercion necessary 
to protect the individual from a worse coercion by private citizens. I t 
i s then, l i b e r t y i n the sense of the absence of physical and moral coercion, 
the c i v i l l i b e r t y , of individuals, with which Sidgwick i s largely concerned 
at t h i s juncture. 
The safeguarding of the freedom of the individual has been embraced, 
says Sidgwick, as the ultimate purpose of interference by government i n the 
l i v e s of i t s c itizens. But t h i s i s not the case i n practice, f o r those 
who profess t h i s type of i n d i v i d u a l i s t approach to government actually go. 
much f u r t h e r than t h i s i n t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e aim, and seek to protect the 
subjects from pain and enable them to g r a t i f y t h e i r desires. Thus, 
Sidgwick emphiasizes that the u t i l i t a r i a n view of individualism i s adhered 
to by those who might actually disclaim any allegiance to i t . 
Sidgwick examines b r i e f l y the~ chief heads of governmental interference 
i n terms of the " I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c Minimum". These are the r i g h t of 
1. H. Sidgwick, "The Elements of P o l i t i c s " , page 46. 
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personal security, the r i g h t of private property and the r i g h t of 
f u l f i l m e n t of contracts f r e e l y engaged upon. And i n Sidgwick's opinion 
the kind of l e g i s l a t i o n recommended and adopted can not be j u s t i f i e d on 
the p r i n c i p l e of freedom as an absolute end. What i s required f o r j u s t -
i f i c a t i o n i s a u t i l i t a r i a n p r i nciple which holds that the protection of 
individuals i n piirsuit of t h e i r ends promotes the general happiness. Thus, 
with regard to i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c l e g i s l a t i o n , Sidgwick takes f o r his basis 
the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference as interpreted from a u t i l i t a r i a n 
p osition. He states the general aims of i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c l e g i s l a t i o n to be: 
"1 . To secure to every sane adult freedom to provide 
f o r his own happiness, by adapting the material 
world to the satisfaction of his needs and desires, 
and, establishing such relations with other human 
beings as may i n his opinion conduce to the same end; 
2. to secure him from pain or loss caused d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y by the action of other human beings -
including i n t h i s loss any damages due to the non-
performance of engag-ements made without coercion or 
deception; while 
5. throwing on parents the duties of care, sustenance, 
and education of children, u n t i l they are able to 
provide f o r themselves, and regulating family 
relationships - and to some extent the r e l a t i o n of 
the sexes generally - with a view to the better 
performance of such parental duties."^ 
I t i s Sidgwick's conclusions about the u t i l i t a r i a n interpretation 
of the "Individual Principle" applied to governmental action which guides 
his thinking i n areas of governmental interference which goes beyond 
the " I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c Minimum". His position on t h i s point i s stated i n 
his discussion of s o c i a l i s t i c interference. Sidgwick's thinking concerning 
governmental interference of t h i s kind i s i n harmony with the emphasis 
placed on the increasing role of government i n the a f f a i r s of the i n d i v i -
dual, referred to by Dicey as the "Period of Collectivism", which we 
1. H. Sidgwick, "The Elements of P o l i t i c s " , page 58. 
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e a r l i e r noted i n connection with the theory of T.H. Green. Sidgwick 
states: 
" I t i s uhiversally recognized that the present d r i f t 
of opinion and practice i s i n the direction of 
increasing the range and volume of the interference 
of government i n the a f f a i r s of individuals."1 
I n t h i s respect, state socialism has been contrasted with individualism. 
The task which Sidgtvick sets himself on t h i s subject i s to remove the 
confusion of thought which these supposed diametrically opposed concepts 
have created. 
Sidgwick's judgement on t h i s question i s that a good deal of the 
increase i n governmental interference which the older laissez-faire school 
of thought f i n d so alarming, i s compatible with vigorous individualism. 
For, what t h i s governmental intervention i s meant to achieve f o r the 
i n d i v i d u a l i s , i n f a c t , a protection against the harm which other men 
might do to person or property. To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s point, we are given 
the example of interference f o r sanitary purposes. I t would be accepted 
as a p r i n c i p l e by any i n d i v i d u a l i s t , says Sidgwick, that the government 
must take steps to prevent one private person causing harm to others by 
allowing his house or business to be a source of disease or nuisance. And 
with the increasing complications of human liv i n g , which ind u s t r i a l c i v i l i -
zation brings with i t , new occasions f o r governmental interference are 
j u s t i f i e d , either on grounds of preventing new mischiefs, or the removal 
of long-standing ones, which increased s c i e n t i f i c knowledge has revealed. 
Sidgwick i s fu r t h e r opposed to the view of "Absolute Individualism" 
because i t i s found wanting both on psychological and sociological grounds. 
The psychological aspect of the question i s involved with ideas of paternal 
interference by government i n the l i f e of the individual. The "Absolute 
1. H. Sidgwick, "The Elements of P o l i t i c s " , page 143. 
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I n d i v i d u a l i s t " point of view i s that government should not coerce i n d i v i -
duals i n t h e i r own interest because men themselves are better able than 
government to ascertain t h e i r own best interests, and by seeking these 
they w i l l achieve the worthy aim of self-reliance and enterprise. Here 
we have the 'negative' aspect of l i b e r t y expressed i n the t r a d i t i o n a l 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c manner. Sidgwick, v/hile expressing some affection f o r 
t h i s argument, also emphasises the 'positive' aspect of l i b e r t y of 
T.H, Green, saying that a system i n which each private individual seeks 
his own in t e r e s t with as l i t t l e r e s t r a i n t placed on him as possible does 
not necessarily lead to the r e a l i z a t i o n of the greatest happiness f o r the 
aggregate of persons. This i s , Sidgwick believes, because a c t i v i t y 
conducive to the interests of a private individual may diverge from the 
interests of a l l . Thus, from the sociological aspect of the question, the 
best i n t e r e s t of society as a whole, the common good, i s not served by a 
t o t a l laissez-faire type i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c approach to government. But 
Sidgwick's stance i s by no means purely s o c i a l i s t i c . He accepts the 
motive of s e l f - i n t e r e s t as essentially the flywheel of society, and rejects 
large scale s o c i a l i s t i c schemes f o r reconstructing the social order i n a 
way which would make too many inroads into the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c basis of 
society. Any changes then, brought about by s o c i a l i s t i c interference of 
government, i s f o r Sidgwick, only acceptable as supplementary and subor-
dinate to a basically i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c system of society. 
I n his e f f o r t to j u s t i f y a measure of s o c i a l i s t i c intervention, 
Sidgwick i s at pains to show that a s t r i c t l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c conception 
to governmental l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t y does not make for the individual's 
interest being s u f f i c i e n t l y conducive to the common interest. He argues 
that even on s t r i c t i n d i v i d u a l i s t grounds the appropriation of natural 
resources by a few individuals r e s t r i c t s the productive application of 
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other men's labour. Therefore, i n the interest of the whole aggregate of 
individuals, l i m i t a t i o n and regulation must be placed upon the appropriation, 
of natural resources. I t would thus be regarded as the duty of government 
i n the interests of the community, to place r e s t r i c t i o n s on the use of 
natural resources^such that they would not be wasted by private interest. 
Some of the examples given by Sidgwick where government interference would 
be appropriate are i n the management and control of mines and fi s h e r i e s , 
natural water courses f o r the supply of i r r i g a t i o n and power, and even, i f 
necessary, the complete a b o l i t i o n of private property i n land. The public 
i n t e r e s t also requires that monopoly resu l t i n g from a combination of 
i n d u s t r i a l or commercial concerns must be l i m i t e d , while on other occasions 
there might be a need f o r a combination of producers i n order to realize 
a certain u t i l i t y , and here, governmental action i s the most effective 
method f o r the purpose. Farther, government i s specially f a c i l i t a t e d to 
provide certain kinds of service i n a modem community. As examples of 
these, Sidgwick gives, banking and insurance f o r the poor, the responsibil-
i t i e s of paper currency f o r the community generally, and the colle c t i n g and 
c i r c u l a t i n g of s t a t i s t i c a l information. 
The forgoing are some of the examples cited by Sidgwick to reinforce 
his view that governmental interference i n the l i v e s of individuals i s 
necessary f o r the good of the community as a whole, and that the t r a d i t i o n a l 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t laissez-faire approach to the organization of , industry 
and commerce i s not the most effective and e f f i c i e n t . I t i s clear then, 
that f o r the securing of certain u t i l i t i e s f o r the community at large, 
government must undertake re s p o n s i b i l i t y instead of leaving i t to the 
private enterprise. Governmental interference of t h i s kind, Sidgwick 
refers to as " S o c i a l i s t i c " i n p r i n c i p l e , meaning the increase of the sphere 
of government, , and the narrowing of that of private property and private 
enterprise, i n the holding or regulating of resources and functions. I t 
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i s i n t h i s sense of the term 'Socialist' that Sidgwick means i t to be 
used i n opposition to ' I n d i v i d u a l i s t ' . 
Sidgwick's understanding of the term 'Socialist' i s that which 
relates to a moderate measure of governmental interference i n the l i v e s 
of individuals. The aim of such interference i s to secure benefits f o r 
the commtmity generally. I t w i l l be a necessary outcome of the aim that 
a d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth take place as a result of the type of governmental 
intervention and enterprise given i n the above examples. But Sidgwick 
stresses the-distinction between t h i s meaning of s o c i a l i s t , and that whick 
has as i t s aim the express purpose of a l t e r i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth 
by taking from the r i c h to benefit the poor. He cites education as a 
fur t h e r example where his type of s o c i a l i s t i c a c t i v i t y can be seen i n 
/ application. Public expenditure f o r instance i s used fo r promoting general 
technical or professional education. This enables the labourer, through 
greater efficiency, to earn more wages, butit.also means that employers 
and consumers vill also benefit as a consequence of t h i s greater efficiency. 
Such expenditure, because i t improves production, can be regarded as designed 
to benefit the whole community, while at the same t i m e i t w i l l have the 
furth e r a t t r i b u t e of reducing inequalities i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of v/ealth. 
Also of importance i s the fact that public expenditure on.education 
provides other benefits than i n d u s t r i a l efficiency, f o r i t can be seen not 
only as a means to elevate the poor, but to be of general benefit throughout 
society i n bringing about a moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l u p l i f t i n g through 
r e l i g i o u s , s c i e n t i f i c and l i t e r a r y education via the agencies of musemns, 
l i b r a r i e s and unive r s i t i e s f o r adults, as well as the provision of schools 
f o r the ,young. The government ought also to make funds available f o r 
research projects which might be of benefit to the community at large, but 
which.would not always be d i r e c t l y saleable f o r i n d u s t r i a l or commercial 
benefit. Expenditure i n t h i s respect might be on salaries, instruments. 
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l i b r a r i e s , laboratories, equipment and ar t g a l l e r i e s . This kind of 
project would, Sidgwick believes, make opportunities available f o r the 
s c i e n t i f i c and a r t i s t i c education of the children of poor families that 
they might realize any potential they might have. Again the general aim 
of such governmental action i n f i e l d s such as these i s f o r the benefit of 
the community as a whole. 
Sidgwick's thesis i l l u s t r a t e s i n the examples given, the need f o r 
governmental a c t i v i t y i n the interests of the community. And so, he i s 
able to j u s t i f y l e g i s l a t i v e and administrative governmental intervention 
i n the l i v e s of the people which goes beyond the more narrow " I n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
P r i n c i p l e " of protection of the individual from mischief. The concept of 
l i b e r t y which Sidgwick i s espousing, i s clearly not one of negative l i b e r t y 
alone; i t i s also the positive concept of l i b e r t y which T.H, Green stressed 
as being so fundamental to enable the great majority of the people to be 
free to enjoy the benefits of c i v i l i z a t i o n . Without raisin g the poorer 
citizen's material standard and providing him with the f a c i l i t i e s f o r 
self-improvement, negative personal l i b e r t i e s , as Green said, are meaningless. 
The measures of State intervention of the kind that Sidgwick has argued f o r , 
though s o c i a l i s t , are not contrary to individualism as he understands the 
concept, giving a man greater opportunities f o r self-help and f u l f i l m e n t , 
the benefit i s not only to himself but to the community at large. Liberty 
i s not merely negative and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , but also positive and collective, 
and i n t h i s l a t t e r sense the l i f t i n g of r e s t r i c t i o n s from the opportunities 
of the great mass of men i s a gain to the community. And i n creating 
greater opportunities f o r people by government interference i n t h e i r l i v e s , 
Sidgwick thinks that individualism, as he conceives i t , gives greater 
scope f o r human progress. 
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Chapter 10 
William, Edwaxd, Hartpole, Lecky 
The l a s t author.to be considered i n our study of 19th century 
ideas of l i b e r t y i s V/illiara, Edward, Hartpole, Lecky. I n his book, 
"Democracy and Liberty" he states his views on l i b e r t y and i t s relationship 
to government, the individual and society. 
Lecky, l i k e someoof the other v/riters v/e have studies was unable to 
to accept the popular notion that l i b e r t y was inextricably t i e d up with 
democracy. He accepted the democratic form of government as a fact of 
l i f e t o be l i v e d with f o r some time to come, but saw the fundamental task 
of p o l i t i c i a n s as that of moderating the e v i l s which he thought were 
characterisitc of democracy. I n his rebuttal of the argument that democracy 
i s conducive to l i b e r t y , he refers us to history f o r examples of democracy 
leading away from l i b e r t y . I n Ancient Rome, f o r example, the change from 
an a r i s t o c r a t i c republic to a democracy soon gave way to an imperial 
despotism. I n France, more than once, a despotism has been brought in t o 
being by a p l e b i s c i t e . And furthermore, the equality whch i s often seen 
as the complement of democracy i s the arch enemy of l i b e r t y . This i s so, 
because to make men equal would mean a: 
"constant, systematic, stringent repression of t h e i r 
natural q u a l i t i e s . " ^ 
Such r e s t r a i n t s i n the pursuit of equality hamper l i b e r t y i n terms of 
natural individual development, and here again we have the view which was 
1. W.E.H. Lecky, "Democracy and Liberty", page 256. 
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expressed "by Henry Maine, that men should be free to be unequal. Lecky 
also saw democracy adversely a f f e c t i n g that balance of opinions, interests 
and classes which i s the succour of constitutional l i b e r t y . Democracy also 
undermines the authority and efficiency of Parliaments, and by doing so 
impairs them as organs of p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y . 
Authoritarianism i n a democratic i n s t i t u t i o n i s seen i n his own day, 
says Lecky, i n the d i s c r e d i t i n g of free contract and free trade. Authorit-
ative regulation here i s evident i n the widespread protectionist policies 
adopted by most of the democratic nations yrhich r e s t r i c t and regulate, and 
i n t e r f e r e with industry i n numerous ways. Lecky points out, as did Spencer 
and others, that the groiivth of democracy .brought with i t the expansion of 
state authority and i t s functions, and that t h i s makes f o r r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
individual ..actions because of the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of state o f f i c i a l s and 
the growth of state bureaucracy. These developments and others, such as 
the progressive increase i n taxation, r e s t r i c t l i b e r t y . P a r t i c u l a r l y on 
the question of taxation, Lecky thinks, does freedom receive a set back, 
f o r he regards a man's freedom to use his property and money as a funda-
mental r i g h t , and taxation i s a f o r c i b l e l i m i t a t i o n of t h i s r i g h t . Men 
have to pay taxes f o r objectives which they do not support, and i n t h i s 
way t h e i r freedom i s circumscribed. Lecky sees democracy as having a penchant 
f o r increasing taxation, thus making i t more pernicious towards libertyo 
He believes i n the policy of no taxation without the consent of the taxed, 
an old fundamental English freedom, as being repudiated under a democracy 
i n favour of a system i n which one class i s compelled to pay the taxes 
imposed by another. I t i s Lecky's observation that more and more taxes 
are being levied f o r purposes antagonistic to the community's interests 
as a whole, and must therefore be regarded as a tendency towards confis-
cation, aimed at the destruction of the power of the wealthy classes i n 
favoiir of those classes that can be bribed by^ what Henry Maine called the 
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•wire-pullers'. 
I n his concern f o r l i b e r t y , Lecky further c r i t i c i s e s democracy 
because i t gives the ignorant class, who, he thinks, have l i t t l e respect 
f o r l i b e r t y , and who w i l l be most influenced by a persuasive leader, the 
major say i n p o l i t i c a l decisions. Lecky argues that i t has always been 
the middle axid upper classes who have shown most regard f o r l i b e r t y , and 
that the democrat's aim i s the exploitation of these classes. Democracy, 
he espostulates, has a tendency to cause these classes to turn av/ay fromi 
l i b e r t y and towards despotism. This change of heart i s a direct r e s u l t , 
we are t o l d , of the insecurity and i n s t a b i l i t y which a democratic system 
produces. He says there are i n such a system: 
"the spectacle of dishonest and predatory adventurers 
.climbing by popular suffrage i n t o positions of great 
power i n the state; the alarm which attacks on property 
seldom f a i l to produce among those who have something 
to lose, may easily scare to the side of despotsim 
large classes who, under other circumstances, would 
have been steady supporters of l i b e r t y . " ^ 
These classes w i l l see a despotism, (which leaves property, industry, 
r e l i g i o u s l i b e r t y and private l i f e unmolested, and by doing so affords 
order and security) as something to be prefeired to a democratic republic 
which denies those benefits and freedom. Lecky takes the establishment 
of the despotic French Empire of Louis Napoleon i n 1852, to have been 
p a r t l y the resul t of the threat to the ag r i c u l t u r a l and middle classes 
made by the s o c i a l i s t s i n 1848. 
Lecky, l i k e J.S. M i l l , was concerned to place safeguards against 
popular democracy i n the electoral system. He favoured proportional 
representation as did M i l l , arguing that democratic principles would be 
better served under a system i n which g-ovemment represented the whole 
of the people rather than a majority. Under the majority system large 
1. W.E.ll. Lecky, "Democracy., and Liberty", page 259« 
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numbers of electors, he says, are hot represented merely because they 
happen to be i n a minority i n t h e i r constituencies. This i s not conducive 
to l i b e r t y f o r those so placed, because, Leoky says, they are i n effect 
deprived of the franchise. The e v i l Lecky wishes to guard against i s that 
of the most numerous c l a s s , (and necessarily to him the most ignorant) 
permanently dominating a l l other classes, thus leaving the l a t t e r t o t a l l y 
without-representation. J.S. M i l l ' s fear of the majority i s c l e a r l y 
evident i n Lecky's thinking on t h i s issue, and emphasises the importaice 
he places on the representation of the views of the minorities, Lecky quotes^ 
M i l l : 
" I n a r e a l l y equal democracy every or any section would be 
represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately, 
A majority of the electors would always have a majority 
of the representatives but a minority of the electors, would 
Ijave a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they 
would be as f u l l y represented as the majority. Unless 
they are, there i s not equal govemment.but government of inequality and 
p r i v i l e g e .... contrary to the principle of democracy vhlch 
professes equality as i t s very root and foundation."-*-
Lecky contended that an e l e c t o r a l system planned i n terms of 
proportionate representation would be, though not perfect, much more 
democratic than the existing one. I t would more accurately represent 
the wishes of the electorate, avoid the great waste of votes, stimulate more 
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t among the minorities :.in constituencies, and end the 
sharp change of p o l i c y urtiich accompanies the change of p o l i t i c a l power 
through a s l i g h t s h i f t i n g of e l e c t o r a l opinion. More candidates of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
eminence would be selected by peorty loanagers because of t h e i r greater 
opportunities of success v i a t h e i r support fl*om the more enlightened voters 
from the minorities i n the electorate. This would bring about an inprovement 
i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l l e v e l of the members of the House of Commons, Countering 
the argument that t h i s would be detrimental to l o c a l representation, Lecky 
says that the strong l o c a l candidate would s t i l l most often obtain the 
1, W.E.H. Lecky, "Democracy and Liberty", page 267. 
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required number of votes, and that the transfer of votes would be done 
by the present disfranchised minority i n the constituencies. By t h i s 
system of proportunate representation then, i t i s •• urged that an important 
freedom i s restored to minorities, while at the same time, going some way 
towards the democratic principle of absolute equality, by ensuring the 
parliamentary representation of the various classes, interests and 
opinions i n t h e i r proper numerical proportiono 
A sympathetic attitude i s also shown by Lecky to Mill's e:g>edient of 
p l u r a l voting. This would give two or more votes to classes of persons, 
who had achieved certain positions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and standards of 
education. M i l l had l i s t e d such persons as employers of labour, forman, 
labourers i n the more s k i l l e d trades, bankers, merchants and manufacturers, 
for t h i s p r i v i l e g e . And greater voting power s t i l l was to be conferred 
upon members of the l i b e r a l professions, university graduates and other 
persons who had achieved higher educational status. M i l l had also been i n 
favour of the preservation and extension of the provision whereby owners; 
of property i n different constituencies were able to vote i n each one of 
them. These p o l i c i e s were advocated to circumvent the danger of clasS' 
l e g i s l a t i o n and government dependence upon a low p o l i t i c a l intelligence. 
But the predominent view i n Lecky's day was opposed, to t h i s kind of thinking, 
The watchword of English Radicalism was one man one vote, a principle which 
was progressing inexorable towards the consumate domination of property 
and l i b e r t y by the "poorest and most ignorant"."^ I n D i s r e a l i ' s f i r s t 
draft of the Reform B i l l of I867, a system of p l u r a l voting based on 
qualifications was i n fac t introduced, aimed at counterbalancing the weight 
of mere numbers of voters by increasing the influence of intelligence, 
1. W.E.H, Lecky, "Democracy and Liberty", page 275. 
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education, property and i'rugality, ' but the opposition of G-ladstone and 
h i s followers resiilted i n D i s r e a l i ' s abandonment of these measures. The 
r i d i c u l e which they received under the l a b e l of "fancy franchises" did a 
great deal, says Lecky, to s t i f l e serious and r a t i o n a l argument about t h e i r 
usefulness as safeguards against the use of p o l i t i c a l power by a majority 
to repress minorities, 
Lecliy, i n h i s discussion of the l i m i t s of governmental interference 
i n the moral l i f e of the individual further shows h i s a f f i n i t y with 
J.S. M i l l : 
" I f a man's bad acts a f f e c t himself alone, or i f they 
only affect adult men who voluntarily share i n .them, 
there i s a strong presumption that they ought not to be 
brought within the coercive province of law. They 
may be matters for argument, remonstrance, reprobation, 
but they are not subjects for l e g i s l a t i v e penalties," 
This aspect of l i b e r t y , and the several objections to i t , we have 
considered i n our study of M i l l ' s t r e a t i s e 'On Liberty'. What we discovered 
about i t was that, i n essence, and with qualification, i t stood as an 
important guiding p r i n c i p l e as part of the Victorian ideology of l i b e r t y . 
I n s pite of the many qualifications advanced by other l i b e r a l theorists 
i t i s s t i l l the same p r i n c i p l e to which Lecky subscribes. M i l l had 
argued that the law must punish only those i n j u r i e s to society which 
are c l e a r , direct, and d e f i n i t e . The depravity of a man might make him 
l e s s u s e f u l to a society by his bad example to others. There i s a l i k l i h o o d 
of h i s doing harm to society. But despite t h i s , punishment must not be 
applied unless there i s c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i a b l e damage, or r i s k of damage, 
to e i t h e r person or persons. 
Lecky i s as seriously concerned then about the r e l a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i o n 
to individual actions as was M i l l . He adumbrates some of the main reasons 
1. W.E.H. Lacky, "Democracy and Liberty", page 275. 
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f o r the preservation of individual l i b e r t y based on M i l l ' s principles. 
The community cannot claim i n f a l l i b i l i t y on moral questions. The danger 
of governmental interference i n the l i v e s of individuals often becomes 
overwhelming, enfeebling and enervating moral resistance. This destroys 
the self-reliance and spontaneity without which character degenerates. 
When excessive governmental regulation suffocates these qualities of 
character, individual moral freedom i s the casualty. Another argument 
i s that government interference often becomes self-defeating by the fact 
that the reaction to suppression results i n the vices i t i s the intention 
to stopj, becoming more aggravated. They may be prevented by law from being 
p u b l i c i l y performed, but t h e i r existence may continue secretly and be more 
harmful as a consequence. The more positive way, according to Lecky and 
M i l l , to decrease vice i n the community, i s to change the moral habits, 
tastes and interests, a process which i s not within the province of 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
I t i s largely f o r these reasons that Lecky concurs vdth J.S. M i l l 
about the coercive powers of the state being generally harmful to others. 
Exceptions to t h i s r u l e , where they arise, must have strong arguments f o r 
t h e i r acceptance. But, says , Lecky, i n the present p o l i t i c a l climate the 
the number of exceptions have increased, and these have become more 
important i n the minds of the legis l a t o r s than has the rule i t s e l f . While 
accepting that much l e g i s l a t i o n a f f e c t i n g the free actions of the individual 
i s j u s t i f i e d by appeal to exceptions, Lecky has misgivings about the growth 
of l e g i s l a t i o n i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , f o r he states that though we are f a r from 
the moral regulations obtaining i n some Catholic countries, and among the 
Puritans i n the Commonwealth, i n Scotland, and i n New England, B r i t i s h 
l e g i s l a t i o n by no means adheres to the l i m i t a t i o n s of J.S. M i l l ' s doctrine. 
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For example; 
" I t condemns prize f i g h t s , and duels, and suicide, though 
these are purely voluntary acts of aault man. I f a man, 
through some reli g i o u s scruple, suffers members of his 
family to die f o r want of medical aid, he i s punishable 
by law, though a l l parties concerned may f u l l y share i n 
the superstition. Theatrical amusements are placed under 
legal censorship; games that aire played f o r money i n 
licensed houses, and some forms of gambling i n private 
houses or i n voluntary societies, as well as i n public 
places, are criminal offences; and under the guise of 
the Licencing Acts, an increasingly severe censorship i s 
exercised on many other forms of public amusement. 
He thus condemns p a t e r n a l i s t i c l e g i s l a t i o n and i t s encroachment on 
individual l i b e r t y , saying that the way i n which the amusements of mature 
adults are regulated by English Law, would be thought to be intolerable 
and c h i l d i s h i n many continental countries. 
I n Lecky's thinking about l i b e r t y we have come back to the more 
negative and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c interpretation of the concept expressed by 
J.S. M i l l . Lecky's concern i s about the freedom of the individual, and 
-par t i c u l a r l y the cultured individual, to have a voice i n p o l i t i c s , and to 
cairy on his private l i f e as he wishes without too much interference from 
government and society. He fears the growing power of the majority to 
suppress minorities as endemic to democracy, and hostile to l i b e r t y . Lecky 
i s anxious about the increase i n l e g i s l a t i o n and state authority which has 
come about since the extension of the suffrage, but at the same time he 
accepts popular government as inevitable, believing, however, that i t s 
e v i l s can be alleviated by .constitutional safeguards. 
1. W.E.H. Lecky, "Democracy and Liberty", page 126. 
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Chapter 11 
General Appraisal of the 
authors studied 
Our study of the works selected f o r t h i s thesis has not enabled 
us to show that there existed i n Victorian England a d e f i n i t e and precise 
concept of l i b e r t y . Some of the writers saw l i b e r t y as negative and 
ind i v i d u a l , while others saw i t as positive. V/e shall discuss these 
interpretations flzr.ther, but f i r s t l e t us establish what themes the authors 
held i n common, despite t h e i r differences of opinion. 
Each one of the authors, with the exception of J.P. Stephen, were 
cautious optimists believing i n human progress, though they did not accept 
that i t would be engendered by the same means. M i l l , Bagehot, Maine and 
Lecky, believed that the l i b e r t y of the individual vrauld be the mainspring 
of progress, while Acton, Green, Montague- and Sidgwick believed that 
co l l e c t i v i s m was the way forward f o r human improvement. Stephen refused 
to see progress as something continuous; rather, he thought i t and 
regression were more l i k e l y to alternate throughout human history. He did 
however, believe that c i v i l i z a t i o n , when i t had been realized, flourished 
i n an ordered and disciplined society, so t h i s perhaps makes him something 
of a conservative l i b e r a l , who believed i n authoritarian government. 
But the claim holds f o r most l i b e r a l social theorists .of the epoch, 
that a b e l i e f i n l i b e r t y entailed a be l i e f i n human progress. Liberty 
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was nothing less than the culmination and summation of p o l i t i c a l and social 
development. Liberals entertained the expectation that p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u -
t i o n s , not only i n England but everywhere else, would be l i b e r a l i z e d by 
a process of gradual evolution. As L.T. Hobhouse puts i t : 
"Every constructive social doctrine rests on the conception 
of human progress. The heart of liberalism i s the vinder-
standing that progress i s not a matter of mechanical con-
trivance, but of the l i b e r a t i o n of l i v i n g s p i r i t u a l energy. 
Good Mechanism i s that which provides the channels wherein 
such energy can flow unimpeded, unobstructed by i t s own 
exuberance of output, v i v i f y i n g the social structure, 
expanding and enabling the l i f e of the mind."^ 
Most of the authors held misgivings about popular democracy. Bagehot 
even thought universal suffrage ought to be delayed f o r a hundred years, 
so intense was his forboding-about the uneducated masses coming to have 
too much influence over l e g i s l a t i o n . A l l of the authors, however, accepted 
democracy as inevitable, but advocated safeguards of one sort or another, 
either c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , or i n terms of other legal obligations and moral 
duties to the community or the state. The fear that the unenlightened 
majority might gain too much influence over the more cultured minority, 
and thereby replace individual d i s t i n c t i o n by d u l l mediocrity made our 
l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s , f o r the most part, sceptical of popular government, and 
i n the case of Henry Maine, exceedingly h o s t i l e . Their anxiety was also 
due to t h e i r b e l i e f that democracy entailed equality, and that the l a t t e r 
would be incompatible with l i b e r t y . I t was not then, a democratic system 
which they believed would safeguard l i b e r t y , but a parliamentary one based 
on representative government placed safely under the control of the 
c u l t i v a t e d and wise minority. 
Nor was laissez-faire a doctrine which endeared i t s e l f to our 
p o l i t i c a l thinkers. The writers who come under positive and collective 
1. L.T. Hobhouse, "Liberalism", page 13.. 
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notions of l i b e r t y such as Acton, Green, Montague and Sidgwick were 
t o t a l l y opposed to la i s s e z - f a i r e ; but i t i s also true to say that M i l l , 
Stephen, Bagehot, Maine and Lecky did not i n fact advocate the doctrine. 
Spencer, who seemed to be defending laissez-faire i n his organic evolution 
and survival of the f i t t e s t theoigLes, described i n "The Man v The State", 
i n f a c t denied that he ever professed allegiance to the doctrine. He 
claimed that his aim i n w r i t i n g "The Man v The State" was to "define the 
proper rol e of government,"''' and he v/as indignant at being labelled a 
l a i s s e z - f a i r e reactionary f o r his c r i t i c i s m of growing state interference 
in-the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l . Leaving aside the issue as to whether or 
not Spencer was an apostle of laissez-faire, a f t e r exploring the views of 
our other authors and giving examples of the kind of economic, p o l i t i c a l 
and social l e g i s l a t i o n which they favoured, and which was carried through 
Parliament by Liberal legislatures, i t cannot be f a r from the t r u t h to say 
that p r a c t i c a l l y no major l i b e r a l theorist from M i l onwards, i n the 19th 
century, stood on a platform of laissez-faire. 
I t was thet.more c o l l e c t i v i s t approach to liberalism, and i t s need to 
redefine l i b e r t y i n positive rather than negative terms which led liberalism 
f u r t h e r away from any possible association with laissez-faire. This restate-
ment of liberalism, largely i n i t i a t e d by T.H, Green, tended to blur the 
difference between liberalism and some other p o l i t i c a l theories. V/as 
there, f o r instance, actually any real difference of principle between the 
2 
c o l l e c t i v i s t l i b e r a l , and what L.T. Hobhouse called "Liberal Socialism?" 
The Fabian Society which was formed i n 1884, reflected a social philosophy 
which offered no sharp difference of principle to separate i t from Green's 
1. G. Watson, "The English Ideology", page 74. 
2. L.T. Hobhouse, "Liberalism", page 62. 
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positive interpretation of l i b e r t y . Both p o l i t i c a l stances doubted that 
private enterprise could appropriately and adequateley provide f o r human 
needs, and both offered as a solution to t h i s hiatus the l e g i s l a t i v e and 
administrative power of the state. The Socialism of the Fabians, l i k e the 
li b e r a l i s m of Green, was a doctrine of selft^realization, not of suppression. 
No doubt s o c i a l i s t policy of state intervention was to go further than that 
of Green's, but both were at one about the need to remove the i l l - a f f e c t s 
of an economy uncontrolled by government action. This was a policy giving 
them an a f f i n i t y which c l e a r l y separated them from the Marxists who based 
t h e i r p o licy on the d i a l e c t i c of history and the class struggle, leading 
to revolution and the dictatorship of the p r o l e t a r i a t e , Fabian Socialism, 
l i k e C o l l e c t i v i s t Liberalism, believed that l i b e r t y could not be achieved 
i n an environment of economic and social insecurity. Thus, such aims as 
a basic l e v e l of leisure, health, education and subsistence, below which 
no one i n the community must be allowed to f a l l , came to be seen by 
Fabians and the B r i t i s h Labour Party as an extension of l i b e r t y . 
Liberalism ceased to be an ideology exclusive to Liberals. In f a c t , 
l i b e r a l i s m , i n i t s broad sense since the 19th century might be more 
accurately i d e n t i f i e d i n large parts of the western world, where p o l i t i c a l 
and c i v i l l i b e r t y , and the maintenance of a substantial degree of social 
and economic security i s available f o r everyone. This culture favours 
neither t o t a l free enterprise i n the economic system, nor t o t a l domination 
by the state, but instead supports what iilaynard Keynes expounded as a 
mixed economy - "the marriage between liberalism and state control."^ 
1. M. Cranston "Freedom, a New Analysis", page 54-
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Chapter 12 
Some recent views on the basic ideas 
of the authors studied 
Liberty i s a complex concept, and perhaps i t would be more correct 
to "speak of l i b e r t i e s rather than l i b e r t y . Liberty stands f o r a variety 
of things i n a variety of contexts. As we have seen, i t involves notions 
of negative and positive l i b e r t y , democracy and equality, and individualism 
and collectivism. YVe know what our Victorian theorists thought about 
these concepts. Let us look at them now i n the l i g h t of some more recent 
studies. 
Much has been iv r i t t e n about the meanings of the negative and positive 
senses of l i b e r t y . Perhaps J.S. M i l l i s the greatest champion of negative 
l i b e r t y , f o r he believed that: 
"The only freedom which deserves the name i s that of 
pursuing our own good i n our own way." 
By t h i s , M i l l did not mean that compulsion was never j u s t i f i e d . Compulsion 
i s i n f a c t necessary i n order to r e s t r a i n those who would deprive other 
individuals of the minimum of freedom to which they are e n t i t l e d . Following 
from t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l i b e r t y , the law functions to maintain order 
and prevent c o n f l i c t between individuals, and the state occupies the role 
of nightwatchman or t r a f f i c policeman. We learned from our analysis of 
M i l l ' s views that he held individual l i b e r t y to be sacred because he believed 
that without i t the progress of c i v i l i z a t i o n could not continue. Only i n 
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a climate of free and varied ideas would t r u t h , spontaneity, o r i g i n a l i t y , 
genius, mental energy and moral courage t h r i v e . He feared that "collective 
mediocraty" would crush and destroy these q u a l i t i e s . Thus we have great 
emphasis l a i d upon the negative aspect of l i b e r t y and. i t s challenge to 
interference with the l i f e of the individual. The l i m i t i n g of authority 
to a minimum i s essential, runs the argument, i f human dignity i s to be 
protected - to be. a.bsolutely free i s impossible, f o r we must surrender some 
of our l i b e r t y i n order to preserve t h i s minimum, but to go beyond t h i s i s 
to go so f a r as to be self-defeating. 
Negative l i b e r t y i s l i b e r t y from interference, which i f not safeguarded, 
mocks the concept of a man as a person with a l i f e of his own: 
"This i s l i b e r t y as i t has' been conceived by l i b e r a l s 
,in the modem world from the days of More and Erasmus 
(some would say Occam) to our own. Every plea; f o r c i v i l 
l i b e r t i e s and individual r i g h t s , every protest against 
exploitation and humiliation, against the encroachment of 
public authority, or the mass hypnosis of custom or 
. organized propaganda, springs from t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , 
' and much disputed, conception of man."l 
In appraising the view,of negative l i b e r t y , Isaiah Berlin states that 
J.S. M i l l has mistakenly associated two notions which are quite d i s t i n c t . 
He declared that a l l coercion i s e v i l even though j u s t i f i e d to prevent 
greater e v i l s , and that non-interference i s a great good. As a result of 
the existence of the negative aspect of l i b e r t y . M i l l believed that certain 
commendable attri b u t e s of character-, would be nurtured, such as courage, 
o r i g i n a l i t y , imagination, independence and non-conformity. Berlin attacks 
t h i s veiw as a non-sequitur, pointing out, as did J.F. Stephen, that these 
a t t r i b u t e s of character are just as l i k e l y to be engendered i n a social and 
p o l i t i c a l atmosphere of quite r i g i d d i s c i p l i n e , as i n a l i b e r a l society. 
I f t h i s be the case, then M i l l i s i n error i n claiming that an environment 
of freedom and tolerance i s a necessary condition f o r the flowering of 
1. Sir Isaiah B e r l i n , "Two Concepts of Liberty", page 12. 
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human talent and qu a l i t i e s of character 
The positive sense of l i b e r t y stems from the desire of the i n d i v i -
dual to be his own master. I t i s a freedom to achieve some good object. 
A man wishes hi s decisions to be his ovm and not forced upon him. Isaiah 
Berli n believes t h i s individual desire derives from the rational aspect of 
a human being vathout which a man would not exist as a self-conscious, 
thinking and w i l l i n g hiunan being. This notion of positive l i b e r t y - being 
master of oneself, and the notion of negative l i b e r t y - not having other 
men prevent one from making one's ovm choice, do not seem to be d i s t i n c t l y 
disparate. But Berlin argues that these 'positive' and 'negative' notions 
of l i b e r t y have h i s t o r i c a l l y movedapart u n t i l they have become diametrically 
opposed to each other. This i s c l e a r l y sho\vn, says Berlin, i n the ways in:: 
which the idea of self-mastery i n the positive sense of l i b e i t y was used 
against the individual by countering the b e l i e f , that a posit i v e l y free 
i n d i v i d u a l i s a slave to no man, with the rejoinder that he may be a slave 
to nature or his own uncontrolled passions. Thus, we get the proposition 
that man i s a slave to his ovm base s e l f , and that there i s another higher 
s e l f , which, i f he follov/s i t s prompting, w i l l free him from the control 
of the former. V/e have then, a higher s p i r i t u a l self contrasted with an 
i r r a t i o n a l , impulsive, empirical lower se l f . This kind of thinking led 
to the idea.that the higher self was represented by the race or social 
organism which was more comprehensive than the individual. I t was then a 
short step to using such organic metaphors to j u s t i f y the coercion of some 
men by others f o r t h e i r own sake i n the name of a higher level of freedom, 
represented by the r e a l i z a t i o n of the-higher and true s e l f , as something 
which men would always choose i f they were as rat i o n a l and wise as t h e i r 
coercers: 
- 125 -
"This monstrous impersonation, which consists i n equating 
-What X would choose i f he were something he i s not, or 
at least not yet, with what x actively seeks and.chooses, 
i s at the heart of a l l p o l i t i c a l theories of s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . 
I t i s one t h i n g to say that I may be coerced f o r my own good 
which I am too b l i n d to see; t h i s may on occasion be f o r my 
benefit; indeed may enlarge the scope of my l i b e r t y ; i t i s 
another to say that i f i t i s my good, then I am not being 
coerced, f q r I have vailed i t , whether I know t h i s or not, 
and am free - or ' t r u l y ' free - even while my poor earthly 
body and f o o l i s h mind b i t t e r l y reject i t , and struggle 
against those who seek, however..benevolently to impose i t , 
w ith the greatest desperation." 
This interpi'etation of the positive notion of freedom can also be 
applied to the negative one, f o r i t can be claimed that the area of l i b e r t y 
which i s private to the individual i s i n fact not the imperical s e l f but 
some higher self with a purpose beyond anything that the emperical self 
may conceive of, and which may be i d e n t i f i e d with an organic e n t i t y such 
as a class, or a state, or a nation. Berlin, however, lays the blame at 
the door of the positive notion of l i b e r t y f o r dividing the personality . 
into two., a baser s e l f i n need of control by a higher;.self. By s t a r t i n g 
from t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of a man, the manipulator .is given licence to make i t 
mean whatever he desires. Berl i n inclines towards the negative, "the l i b e r a l 
view" of l i b e r t y , and sees i n attempts to establish a positive sense of 
l i b e r t y a contradiction i n the idea of being forced to be free, and a 
tendency f o r t h i s concept of l i b e r t y to lead too easily to a j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
of p o l i t i c a l autocracy: 
"The 'negative' l i b e r t y that they st r i v e to realize 
seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the 
goals of those who seek i n the great, disciplined 
authoritarian structure the ideal of 'positive' 
self-mastery, by classes by people or the whole of 
mankind."2 
An interesting and worthwhile c r i t i c i s m of Berlin's account of 
1. Isaiah B e r l i n , "Two Concepts of Liberty", page 18. 
2. I . B e r l i n , "Two Concepts of Liberty", page 56. 
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l i b e r t y has been made by Bernard Grick.^ Liberty, he thinks, i s some-
thing more than the mere absence of constraint. He stated that the 
l a t t e r i s more correctly described as ' i s o l a t i o n ' , 'loneliness', or 'self-
reliance'. This condition he. rejects as abstract and sociologically 
2 
impossible. Furthermore, he sees Berlin's onslaught against the 
presumptuousness of "positive l i b e r t y " as lacking, because i t f a i l s to 
recognize that-freedom involves a relationship between people, and that i t 
involves ' a c t i v i t y ' . I t i s important, says Crick, i n a study of l i b e r t y , 
to analyse the connection between p o l i t i c a l action and l i b e r t y . Particular 
objects, he thinks, are necessary as goals of freedom because negative 
l i b e r t y cannot, i n i t s e l f , stand as an 'ideal' to s t r i v e f o r . 
What i s required, according to Crick, i s a synthesis which w i l l 
avoid both the latent tyrannical aspects of 'positive l i b e r t y ' and the 
anarchical or q u i e t i s t aspects of 'negative l i b e r t y ' . This synthesis 
establishes what Crick c a l l s true freedom, which pays exclusive allegiance 
to neither the positive nor the negative concepts in Berlin's senge. 
Crick's true freedom i s : 
"A relationship and an a c t i v i t y : an individual acting 
v o l u n t a r i l y i n public or f o r a public - whether in 
a r t of p o l i t i c s . " 5 
Freedom then, i s public action and p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Seen from t h i s stand-
point, l i b e r t y becomes a broader concept than most theorists have seen i t 
to be. I t involves p o s i t i v e l y creative a c t i v i t y . But by t h i s sense of 
p o s i t i v e , Crick does not mean that l i b e r t y i s to be i d e n t i f i e d with one 
goal or good f o r everyone, a d e f i n i t i o n to which Berlin objected. Crick's 
'new' positive l i b e r t y e n t a i l s , among other things, "freedom of choice -
1. B. Crick, "Freedom as P o l i t i c s " , i n 'Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and 
Society', Third Series. 
2. B. Crick, "Freedom as P o l i t i c s " , i n 'Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and 
Society', page 198. 
5. B. Crick, "Freedom as P o l i t i c s " , i n 'Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and 
Society', page 200. 
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amid clash of alternatives.""^ 
The synthesis of negative and positive l i b e r t y shows that freedom 
rests on an int e r a c t i o n between private and public a c t i v i t i e s , says Crick, 
and privacy and freedom are most evident i n a society where government i s 
carried on p u b l i c a l l y . Thus, freedom i n t h i s sense means talcing part i n 
public l i f e as well as l i v i n g p r i v a t e l y . Crick takes A r i s t o t l e as his 
model, holding t h a t : 
"the man who seeks to dwell outside the p o l l s , or the_ 
p o l i t i c a l relationship, i s either a beast or a god." 
I t i s , therefore, the being part of public l i f e which i s important. Free 
actions by private men, actions of speaking out f r e e l y i n public a f f a i r s 
i s contrasted with the l i b e r t y v/hich rests upon an abstract concept of 
r i g h t derived from some supposed pri n c i p l e of natural law set down i n the 
work of some learned savant. For example: 
"Freedom does not consist i n being able to choose 
..between pushpin and poetry, but i n actually choosing. 
Although both choices are possible, neither i s 
necessary or"entailed."^ 
I n t h i s notion of freedom set f o r t h by Crick, the public and private 
l i f e achieve a relationship i n which one compliments the other. I t i s a 
view v/hich echoes that of Montague, ..who argued that the individual could 
not l o g i c a l l y exists apart from society and vice versa, so that the idea 
of society taking i t s o r i g i n from the individual was l o g i c a l l y untenable. 
But i n Crick's analysis of l i b e r t y the individual i s of crucial importance 
1. B. Crick, "Freedom as P o l i t i c s " , i n 'Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and 
Society', page 204. 
2. B. Crick, "Freedom as P o l i t i c s " , i n 'Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and 
Society', page 207. 
B. Crick, "Freedom as P o l i t i c s " , i n 'Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and 
Scoeity'. page 204. 5. 
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also, f o r p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y depends on the active par t i c i p a t i o n of 
. individuals i n the l i f e of a free coraraxmity. Moreover, the individual 
w i l l play his part as a member of a group; and some individuals w i l l be 
leaders of groups representing various interests i n society. These 
leaders must be free to speak f o r public interests i f there is to be the 
public debate which makes a free society. The result i s an open debate 
at several levels i n society, each of which i s necessary to representative 
government,' the essence of which i s communication, not the exercise of, 
r i g h t s , as some theorists have contended. We f i n d here i n Crick's plea 
f o r active discussion as essential to l i b e r t y , a p a r t i a l r e f l e c t i o n of 
Bagehot's advocacy of government by discussion as of fundamental importance 
to l i b e r t y . 
In. an atmosphere of communication, such as Crick favours, government 
planning i s not a power to be apprehensive about. I t i s not hostile to 
freedom, f o r the operation of planning w i l l depend upon the f u l l e s t public 
discussion, honest gathering of infoimation, and c r i t i c i s m of the plans by 
those people who v/ould have to experience the consequences of. them. 
"Negative Liberty" represented by J.S. M i l l and other in d i v i d u a l i s t s , 
and favoured by Isaiah Ber l i n as an antidote to the t o t a l i t a r i a n systems 
which 'positive l i b e r t y ' could be interpreted to j u s t i f y , i s not adequate 
as a theory of freedom, says.Crick. Freedom must involve a c t i v i t y , though 
we might seek to establish an area of personal "negative l i b e r t y " which 
our positive action might seek to avoid breaching. I n t h i s theory of 
freedom. Crick says he i s arguing f o r the e a r l i e r 17th and 18th century 
view of "freedom as citizenship,"^ a view, which was abandoned i n the mid 
19th century either by ideas of the national state of by the view of some 
l i b e r a l s that a l l power was i n s t r i n s i c a l l y e v i l . Freedom as citizenship 
1'. B. Crick, "Freedom as P o l i t i c s " , i n 'Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and 
Society':j- page 2 13i 
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means that man i s not free unless he i s an active participant i n the 
a f f a i r s of his community; so above a l l , freedom depends on individual man 
to bring i t to r e a l i z a t i o n by his own a c t i v i t y : 
"We need to recover the l o s t relationship betwean common 
..citizenship and freedom. More precisely, we need to 
extend i t to the people before other forces i n our society 
succeed i n t r e a t i n g them e n t i r e l y as masses."-^ 
We have seen that most of the 19th century p o l i t i c a l theorists we 
have studied had some misgivings that democracy might lead to a form of 
equality which would be h o s t i l e to l i b e r t y . The concepts of democracy and 
l i b e r t y f o r them actually meajit Constitutional Representative Government 
placed f i r m l y i n the hands of an educated e l i t e , a new informed class. 
These concepts did not mean government by the enfranchised working classes. 
As i t i s false to think of the Victorian l i b e r a l represented by our authors 
as committed to l a i s s e z - f a i r e , so i t i s false to think of him as absolutely 
democratic. Democracy was only acceptable under circumscribed constitutional 
conditions, a delegated parliamentary sovereignty, as we e a r l i e r explained. 
The Victorians feared that democracy might lead to mediocraty as a result 
o|- government by ordinary men; they feared a r b i t r a r y acts designed to 
confiscate wealth; they feared also that democracy might lead to tyranny 
as a r e s u l t of the electorate choosing to give i t s support to a dictator. 
But perhaps more fundamental was the issue of equality, which seemed to the 
Victorian l i b e r a l to be a corollary of democracy. His fear i n t h i s respect 
was that p o l i t i c a l equality bestowed on the masses by democracy might lead 
to the imposition of equality i n social status and v/ealth. P o l i t i c a l 
equality was therefore, only acceptable i f i t could..be achieved without 
social equality, f o r the l a t t e r was seen as a threat to l i b e r t y , and i n fact 
incompatible with l i b e r t y . To bring about equality would mean s a c r i f i c i n g 
l i b e r t y . I f l i b e r t y was one of the highest p o l i t i c a l goods, and to some, . 
1. B. Crick, "Freedom as P o l i t i c s " , i n "Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and 
Society', page 215. 
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the highest p o l i t i c a l good, then anything which was a threat to i t was 
to be feared and resisted. The kind of p o l i t i c a l democracy which sougjit 
to pursue social equality appeared to be such a threat, and was repudiated 
i n favour of a p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y v/hich protected the individuals' r i g h t 
to be unequal. 
A problem s t i l l remained f o r the Victorian l i b e r a l ; and t h i s was how 
fa r could t h e i r allegiance to l i b e r t y be reconciled with the gross social 
inequality which existed i n the 'age of l i b e r t y ' . We have already shown 
thatthe restatement of liberalism i n 'positive' terms was an attempt to 
solve t h i s problem. In a discussion of t h i s question i n his essay 
"Liberty and Equality"''' E.F. C a r r i t t . argues a contrary case to that of the 
Victorian l i b e r a l s , and claims that equality i s i n fact compatible with 
l i b e r t y . For when we t a l k of freedom as a r i g h t which men have, i t i s 
equal freedom that we mean. V/e must mean t h i s , C a r r i t t - claL-ns, unless 
we are i n favour of a system i n which each man seeks his ovm freedom at the 
expense of others. As i t would not be possible f o r a man to . have an 
absolute r i g h t to l i b e r t y , then the only r i g h t possible i s the r i g h t to 
equality i n the sense of men having equal claims. This equality of claims 
was, he says, what A r i s t o t l e meant by ju s t i c e . And justice C a r r i t t . 
takes to mean: 
"the treatment of every man as an end', 'counting every 
man f o r one,' an equality numerical t i l l reason i s shown 
to the contrary. And i f f o r the moment we neglect other 
possible c o n f l i c t i n g claims, the amount of freedom a man has 
a r i g h t t o , the amount we ought prima facie to secure him, 
i s j u s t so much as i s compatible with an equal amount f o r 
others."2 
The concern then i s with the extent to which equal l i b e r t y i s affected by 
other aspects of equality. 
1. E.F. C a r r i t t , - "Liberty and Equality", i n " P o l i t i c a l Philosophy", 
Oxford Reading i n Philosophy. 
2. E.F. C a r r i t t , ; "Liberty and Equality", i n " P o l i t i c a l Philosophy", 
page 156. 
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P o l i t i c a l equality which the Victorian Liberals viewed with 
trepidation, though not necessarily the great protector of l i b e r t y per se 
i s to be supported, says C a r r L t t a s having more to o f f e r l i b e r t y than other 
known p o l i t i c a l objectives. Also,, equality before the law makes f o r equal 
l i b e r t y by the law being i m p a r t i a l l y administered. And measures favouring 
equality which v/ould diminish the l i b e r t y o f some people i n order to 
increase the general l i b e r t y would be j u s t i f i e d . For example, i n the case 
of someone omlag a superabundance of some necessary commodity or con-
venience at the expense of the majority, he might reasonably be deprived 
of his monopoly. His being deprived i s an act favourable to the l i b e r t y 
of the majority, who would otherwise go without these necessaries. 
Further, ' C a r r i t t points out that p.'olitical equality, economic equality, 
and equality before the law are inextricably related to one another, and 
that without the maintenance of equality i n a l l these areas, equal l i b e r t y 
i s endangered. For instance, gross inequalities of wealth give power and 
influence to the r i c h , affording them advantages over the poor, which are 
irreconcilable with p o l i t i c a l equality. Such inequalities may also result 
i n 'equality before the law' being placed i n jeopardy because of the wealthy 
being able to afford l i t i g a t i o n and expensive legal experts which the 
poor can not. Furthermore, inequalities of great magnitude aggravate class 
and c u l t u r a l differences to such an extent that judges are often patently 
out of touch with many of the people w^ hom they have to judge. 
The case argued by E-F. CarrLtt.' i s that equality i s not the enemy 
of l i b e r t y , as the Victorian Liberals had argued, but on the contrary, i t 
i s essential to equal l i b e r t y , by which he means the bestowing of l i b e r t y 
on a l l the people.' 
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Much was made by the Victorian Liberals ofthe d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the concept of individualism and collectivism. Some of our authors 
tended to favour the i n d i v i d u a l i s t approach to l i b e r t y , while others 
argued the c o l l e c t i v i s t case. This i s not to say that any of them held 
an extreme indi v i d u a l i s t ' o r c o l l e c t i v i s t ethic. Liberalism remained 
d i s t i n c t from anarchism and communism throughout the nineteenth century. 
I t was argued by the c o l l e c t i v i s t s against the i n d i v i d u a l i s t s that a close 
int e r r e l a t i o n s h i p existed betvreen the individual and the state, and that 
pure individualism was unsocial and unethical. They believed that great 
objects were achieved by men working c o l l e c t i v e l y . 
I t has even been questioned whether any real antitheses existed 
between individualism and collectivism. Erned Barker^ argues that the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between a period of individualism and a period of collectivism 
i n the 19th century i s merely a r h e t o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n . He regards the 
entire 19th century as a period which saw a continuous extension of i n d i v i -
dual r i g h t s . The epoch referred to as " C o l l e c t i v i s t " was that of the 
promotion of government a c t i v i t y engaged i n to f a c i l i t a t e the actual exercise 
of individual r i g h t s . Barker c a l l s t h i s process 'Individualist' because 
i t extended personal r i g h t s : 
" I f by individualism we mean a belief i n the rights of 
individual persons, and by collectivism we mean a belief 
i n the collective service owed and rendered to such rights 
by government, we shall see no opposition, but rather a 
necessary connection."2 
Individualism, i n the sense of the state leaving the individual alone to 
conduct the whole of his l i f e as he pleases, would, says Barker, mean that 
the state was f a i l i n g i n i t s duty to give i t s citizens the opportunity to 
exercise t h e i r r i g h t s , thus making i t impossible f o r them to have any l i b e r t y 
1. E. Barker, "Principles of Social and P o l i t i c a l Theory", Oxford 
University Press I965, page 208. 
2. E. Barker, "Principles of Social and P o l i t i c a l Theory", page 208. 
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at a l l . To avoid t h i s state of a f f a i r s , the state has a fvmdamental role 
to play i n the l i b e r a t i o n of the c i t i z e n , and t h i s . Barker concludes, 
must'be recognized as part of a true account of individualism. I t i s the 
duty of the state to provide the conditions necessary fo r the development 
of the individual's capacities, f o r they would not come to f r u i t i o n other-
wise. And i t i s through collective e f f o r t i n an organized state that the 
development of each individual.can be made manifest. This interpretation 
of individualism emphasizes the essential requirement f o r individual 
developnjent of the coll e c t i v e service which each c i t i z e n i n concert with 
others helps to provide f o r a l l . 
I t may seem paradoxical, says Barker, to claim that the individual 
gains i n l i b e r t y v;hile at the same time the state increases i t s control 
over him. But t h i s i s explained i n that individual rights are not 
g r a t u i t i e s - they must be paid f o r , and the most significant price i s a 
s p i r i t u a l one. This means the balancing of the s p i r i t u a l gain received 
i n increased enjoyment of ri g h t s against the s p i r i t u a l loss entailed by 
consenting to the control which accompanies them. I t also involves 
weighing the loss of l i b e r t i e s f o r one class i n society against the gain 
of l i b e r t i e s of another. 
I n place of the idea of antithesis between idividualism and 
collectivism. Barker; postulates the idea of 'tension' between individual 
development, and the collective service and control of the state. These 
two opposites are seen as complementary to each other, but with a delicacy 
of adjustment between them. Ivian has i n his nature the tendency to privacy 
and the tendency to s o c i a b i l i t y ; he i s a unity with two diverse elements 
which create tension i n him. This i s significant f o r p o l i t i c s , because 
i t means that there are not two separate bodies of men, one called 
- 134 -
i n d i v i d u a l i s t and the other c o l l e c t i v i s t , but that the p o l a r i t y exists i n 
each person. Likewise there exists the two complementary poles, of i n d i v i -
dual development, and collective service which must be recognized and 
reconciled. No, antithesis between the individual and the state, or between 
individualism, and collectivism exists, i n Barker's view. What does exist, 
i s a tension revealing the existence of the private and the social a t t r i -
butes of man which complement each other, but which do not divide. 
We have discovered that the Victorian idea of l i b e r t y was not cast 
i n a precrustean bed of ideological dogma. The 19th century p o l i t i c a l 
ideologisfe-ve's^ have studied did not pay allegiance to a fixed set of basic 
pri n c i p l e s about l i b e r t y . As oux study has shown, t h e i r views as to the 
properties of the concept of l i b e r t y were not the same. Even during the 
f o u r t h quarter of the 19th century, when, as some commentators have argued, 
the emphasis was placed on the positive and collective senses of l i b e r t y , 
and l i b e r a l i s m was said to, have been revised or more correctly, restated, 
some theor i s t s s t i l l stressed the importance of the negative and i n d i v i d -
u a l i s t senses of l i b e r t y as being authentic liberalism. Furtheimore, we 
have seen that these same contrasting interpretations'of l i b e r t y are s t i l l 
being made by some p o l i t i c a l theorists today. V/hile at the same time, 
others are disputing the existence of an opposition between the negative 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t , and the positive c o l l e c t i v i s t senses of l i b e r t y . I t i s i n 
fact d i f f i c u l t to confine the label 'positive' to the collective notion of 
l i b e r t y , and the label 'negative' to the individual notion of l i b e r t y . 
Today i t can ju s t as well be argued that to be an individual, one needs 
positive freedom as i t can that negative freedom i s the condition of 
individualism. Obviously, some cf our freedoms such as freedom from the 
tyranny of government or from the pressure of the majority, also involve 
freedom to take part i n shaping a society's future, including the freedom 
- 135 -
to reorganize some of i t s most fundamental relationships through education 
and l e g i s l a t i o n . Both kinds of l i b e r t y are desirable and necessary and 
cannot exist i n i s o l a t i o n from each other. 
We have said that the l i b e r a l idea of l i b e r t y , i s not a s t a t i c 
ideology. I t i s a changing, ongoing and developing application of the 
concept. I t s meaning, or meanings, can only be f u l l y understood i n the 
context of the time and conditions of an era, and as these are always in 
f l u x , so i n the idea of l i b e r t y . Therefore to understand the l i b e r a l 
concept of the l i b e r t y , we must, with John Stuart M i l l , be prepared to be 
l i f e long learners. And perhaps t h i s absence of r i g i d i t y is the very 
strength of the ideology of l i b e r t y , enabling i t to be-an effective 
antidote to those dogmatic ideologies which are sustained by the heady 
wine of metaphysical absolutism. 
- 136 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
M i l l , J. S. "On Liberty" Oxford University Press 1924 
"Representative Government" O.U.P. 1924 
"The Subjection of Women" O.U.P. 1924 
Stephen, J. P. "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" Cambridge 
University Press 1967 
Bagehot, Vf. "Physics and P o l i t i c s " Henry S. King & Co. 1872 
"The English Constitution" The Fontana Library 
1966 
.Acton, Lord J. "Essays i n the Liberal Interpretation of History" 
University of Chicago Press 1967 
Pasnacht, C. E. "Acton's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy" Hollis & Carter 1952 
Green, T. H. " P o l i t i c a l Obligation" Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd. 
1937 
Spencer, H. "The Man v The State" Pelican Classics 1969 
Montague, F. C, "^ The Limits of Individual Liberty" Rivingtons 1885 
Maine, H. "Popular Government" London, John Murray 1886 
Sidgwick, H. "The Elements of P o l i t i c s " MacMillan 1919 
- 137 -
Lecky, ¥. E. H. "Democracy and Liberty" Longmans, Green & Co. 1899 
Rostow, W. If. " B r i t i s h Economy of the 19th Century" 
Dicey, A. ¥. "Law and Public Opinion i n England" MacMillan 1914 
Watson, G. "The English Ideology" Allan Lane 1975 
Hobhouse, L. T. "Liberalism" Oxford University Press 1964 
Sabine, G. H. "A History of P o l i t i c a l Thought" Harrap 1959 
B e r l i n , I . "Two Concepts of Liberty" An Inaugral Lecture 
delivered before the University of Ozfoi'd 
1958. Oxford University Press 1958 
Laslett, P. & 
Runciman, ¥. G. 
"Philosophy, P o l i t i c s and Society" Basil 
Blackwell 1969 
Quinton, A. (ed.) " P o l i t i c a l Philosophy" Oxford Readings i n 
Philosophy, Oxford University Press 1973 
Barker, E. "Principles of Social and P o l i t i c a l Philosophy" 
Oxford Paperbacks, Oxford University Press 
1965 
Cranston, E. "Freedom, A New Analysis" Longmans, Green & Co. 
Ltd. 1967 
